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Abstract 
 
This thesis challenges common political science assumptions about regions, 
nations, and societies in contexts of state weakness, with a special focus on de facto, 
rather than de jure, statehood in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that theories of 
statehood must reach deeper into the empirical workings of state-society relations. 
Instead of positing abstract models or normative ideal types of modern states, I 
conceive of statehood as a set of daily practices that govern, regulate and generate 
effects on those experiencing and “performing the state”. I look at public good 
provision and consumption as a way to study these practices of statehood.  
 
The arguments advanced in this thesis are based on interpretive and relational 
methods. Interpretivism focuses on meanings and beliefs, as opposed to strict laws 
and statistical correlations. Relational methods demonstrate how interactions 
between consumers and providers of public goods evolve and condition de facto 
statehood. Qualitative data, which includes semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, and participant observations, are drawn from firsthand encounters with 
service providers and citizens in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Empirical observation and analysis shed light on 
governance patterns, citizen-subject relations, and provide a heuristic approach to 
statehood dimensions. Approaching the concept of statehood through dimensions 
is useful in light of the multiple meanings that it holds.  
 
Statehood, I argue, is never fixed and does not reach a teleological end point, but 
rather, embodies different dimensions that can be analyzed through patterns of 
public goods provision.  I argue that the state, often imagined as a coherent entity, 
is comprised of different practices found in a variety of spaces and social relations. 
This approach to statehood decreases discrepancies between the literature and 
empirical realties and engages with “real” experiences of statehood in non-Western 
spaces.  
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Figure 1 Contemporary, political map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Illustrates the position of Bukavu with red circle and the capital of the DRC, Kinshasa, in blue circle. 
Reserved Rights of Nations Online Project.  
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Figure 2 Colonial map of Belgian Congo 
Illustrates Belgian Congo (1908-1960) where regions were divided up and named after the main urban 
administration polities (chief-lieu de province), such as Costermansville, today Bukavu and provincial capital, 
and Leopoldville, today Kinshasa and capital.   
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Figure 3 Bukavu general map 
 
 
Illustrates Bukavu’s three urban territories (communes): Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira.  
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Figure 4 Bukavu detailed map  
 
 
Additional details of Bukavu, as referred to in the case studies.  
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Figure 5 Historical map of Bushi kingdoms in Bukavu and surroundings 
 
Illustrates Bukavu and surrounding province (South Kivu) based on chiefdom systems. Kabare chiefdom 
is the closest to Bukavu and is ruled by a local king (mwami) of the Shi population in Kabare. Both 
Ngweshe and Kabare are two kingdoms organized within Bushi – the country of the Shi.  Reserved 
Rights of “Colle, P. (1937). “Essai de monographie des Bashi.” Bukavu, Zaïre: Centre d'Etude de 
Langues Africaines” 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
“States, one discovers, are not so easy to destroy. Fragments of their institutional organs may persist 
even when the central nervous system is no longer fully operative. (…) Imprinted on societal memory 
is a set of recollections of a “normal state”: security it is expected to provide, services it is assumed to 
assure, rituals of statehood it is expected to perform. These expectations serve as a legitimating reservoir 
for renewed assertions of state authority.” 
 
(Crawford Young, 2002, p. 445) 
 
There is an abundance of political science literature which characterizes, and pathologizes, 
specificities about the “African state” and African politics, adding to an already pervasively 
negative description of these states. The African state has been termed : “Weak” (Rothschild, 
1987), “quasi” (Jackson, 1993), “failed” (Rotberg, 2003) (or a “failure” (Bates, 2008)), 
“fictitious” (Sandbrook & Barker, 1985), “lame”, “leviathan” (Callaghy, 1987) and even 
“vampire” (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991) and, more recently, in a “hybrid political order” (Boege et 
al., 2008). However, despite this categorization, there are many examples of “strong” states 
that do not demonstrate critical weaknesses in the areas of state engagement in service 
provision or monopoly on violence, such as contemporary Rwanda, Ethiopia and Ghana. 
Nevertheless, certain states in the sub-Saharan African region are often perceived as weak, 
demonstrating what many observers would term high political disorder, little or limited 
legitimacy from its citizens and/or autocratic rule. This has typically included the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and more recently 
South-Sudan (Krasner & Risse, 2014, pp. 549-550).  
 
There are indeed states that have depleted their national economic assets, and thus have limited 
ability to conduct larger scale projects or even most civil services. Yet, these particular African 
states have, despite receiving criticism (see e.g., Zartman, 1995), shown resilience to total 
collapse or breakdown. For instance, Somalia is framed as the example of a “failed” or 
“collapsed” state. However the country has, since the 1990s, demonstrated empirical versions 
of statehood, state-building and other political processes that have largely been ignored by 
many Western scholars (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009, p. 52). In the DRC, “the complexities of 
statehood (…) are legendary [and] the state remains omnipresent on the social, economic and 
political landscape,” as Trefon (2004, p. 3) argues.  
 
Instead of recognizing these different forms of statehood, Western political science has often 
assumed weakness in such states because it does not engage with empirical or alternative forces 
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of state-society relations. A common feature of such political science literature is the focus on 
what the African state is not, rather than what it is. Often, Western political experiences and 
ideal notions of legal-rational states are compared to African states.  For instance, Krasner 
(2004) argues that state failure is defined by the absence of one or more of the principles of 
legal, non-intervention and domestic sovereignties. Jackson and Rosberg (1982a) argue that 
many African states lack positive sovereignty, i.e., they do not control their territory. Or, as 
Zartman (1995) argues, a state has collapsed when it no longer provides basic services to its 
population. However, as Eriksen (2011, pp. 233-234) has pointed out, all of these perspectives 
are defined by deviations or deficiencies from a given norm of statehood.  
 
Further, interpreting African states as “weak”, “quasi” or “failed” often stems from an image 
of the Western state. The tendency to think of the non-West as an extension of Europe has 
already been recognized. In particular, Escobar (2011) on development and modernity, Said 
(2001) on Western notions of orientalism, Mbembé (2001) on postcolony thinking, Spivak 
(1988) on silencing the subaltern, and Chakrabarty (2000) on provincializing Europe all make 
thought-provoking contributions to this broader criticism. As Mbembé (2001, p. 2) writes: 
 
 “(…) Africa still constitutes one of the metaphors through which the West represents the origin of its 
own norms, develops a self-image, and integrates this image into the set of signifiers asserting what it 
supposes to be its identity. Africa, because it was and remains that fissure between what the West is, 
what it thinks it represents, and what it thinks it signifies, is not simply part of its imaginary 
significations, it is one of those significations.”   
 
The narrow interpretation of the African state as something not Western (or not yet Western), 
or as a black hole of nothingness as Mbembé (2001, p. 3) remarks, is a disservice to political 
science literature. It can almost appear as if the “African state” whether weak, failed, strong or 
authoritarian does not consist of any civil servants or citizens relying on these relations.  
 
Recognizing both the academic work on African statehood and criticisms of Western 
situatedness, my contribution is to examine how statehood is perceived and practiced daily in 
Africa, as a counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of the “state”. In this respect, 
I propose an inductive way of seeing the state as practices that are created, sustained and 
challenged, through the people living and performing the experience of statehood. I propose 
the following research question:  
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 How is statehood perceived and practiced by those experiencing the state and how can 
these perspectives and practices inform scholarly understanding of statehood?  
 
My approach contributes to a shift from static perceptions of states and statehood norms, to 
investigate how statehood is practiced and shaped within state-society interrelations.  To 
investigate this, I have taken an inductive approach based on previous field experiences to 
study certain daily goods that matter profoundly to people who live in nations often considered 
“weak”, “failed”, or lacking de facto (but not de jure) statehood, using the DRC for my 
observations. Rather than making claims of what statehood should be, field experiences in the 
DRC generally and in the provincial capital of Bukavu specifically have led me to the topics 
of waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads. These topics are studied 
as different case studies of public goods within the same geographical space (Bukavu) under 
the concept of statehood. I term these goods “public” as they are basic, daily goods that the 
majority of citizens in Bukavu will to some degree consume, enjoy or would like to enjoy. 
Water and sanitation (waste management) are basic to existence, while roads represent a good 
that citizens need for communication and livelihood. These are also public goods because they 
rely on certain collective efforts in order to work in a densely populated urban space.  
 
However, as Blundo and le Meur (2009, p. 14) argue; “public is not synonymous to state” and 
there can be many different providers of these services. Thus, the concept of statehood is useful 
as it avoids ontologically prejudging the location of these services as being in a given space, 
such as the “state” (Brenner, 2004, p. 4). Inductively, statehood is explored as something that 
is exercised in relations to others and to certain (material) goods and that forms patterns of 
practices. Specifically, the relations explored are found within two main categories of people, 
namely people as “providers” and as “consumers” related to specific goods. I use the terms 
“provider” and “consumer” to distinguish two basic positions in relation to public goods. I 
derive these terms from various and different sources in the sociological and anthropological 
literature (Bourdieu 1984, Dahl G. 1999, Miller 1995) and have found they help with my 
interpretation of what I observe in relation to public goods. They are not terms used by my 
informants but analytical distinctions I find useful.  
 
However, these categories, i.e., consumers and providers, are not mutually excluding, but rather 
relational and dynamic. By analyzing how social actors, interpreted as service providers and 
consumers, are accessing, enjoying, and interpreting the meaning of public goods in the city of 
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Bukavu in eastern DRC, I demonstrate how they call the state into being. In doing so, I also 
establish how the city becomes a central locus for interpreting statehood in contexts in which 
a “formal” state interpretation as conceived in the West would be problematic. 
 
Based on these case studies and understanding different perceptions and practices, I propose 
an alternative analytical approach to statehood, namely seeing statehood through different 
dimensions.  These dimensions are based on empirical observations and deployed at different 
levels of abstractions. They are inductively produced but also linked to the work of other 
scholars (e.g. Bissell 2011, Ekeh 1975, Hagmann & Peclard 2011, Hansen & Stepputat 2001, 
Mitchell 1999) to demonstrate the transferability of these ideas beyond the study site. 
Specifically, the conceptual tools of dimensions are inspired by Hagmann and Péclard’s (2011) 
“negotiating statehood” as well as languages of stateness, i.e., (re)production of hierarchies, 
institutions and forms of identities and languages (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 6). The 
purpose of focusing on dimensions is to suggest a heuristic approach to study abstract ideas of 
statehood. By heuristic approach, I mean “a set of conceptual tools, which, rather than telling 
us anything substantive about the social world, suggests ways of approaching it” (Lund, 2014, 
p. 229). In other words, I do not attempt to explain why the state is weak, for instance, but 
rather propose ways of approaching the dynamics of statehood.  
 
The empirical observations here are thus connected to a broader academic debate on (African) 
statehood (Clapham, 1998; Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a, 1982b), public goods 
provision, contested states (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; 
Trefon, 2010) and state-society relations (Migdal, 2001). By contested, I follow what Hagmann 
and Péclard (2010, p. 545) argue, namely that recognizing: “the profoundly contested nature of 
the state and the host of conflictive interactions inherent in defining statehood.” Thus, I propose 
an approach that brings to the fore the conflictive interactions of what statehood means, seen 
through the eyes of those living and performing “the state” on a daily basis.  
 
 
1.1 Aim and purpose  
 
The aim of this thesis is two-fold: First, the thesis stems from an interest in challenging some 
common assumptions about “regions”, “nations” and “societies” associated with state 
weakness and de jure, but not de facto, statehood in sub-Saharan Africa.  State weakness is an 
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assumption derived from the absence of governance: such a claim assumes as a starting point 
Weberian ideal forms of legal-rational states, i.e., it assumes that a failed state is one that hardly 
performs its basic tasks of welfare distribution, taxation for the public interest or the provision 
of internal and external security. Understanding the distinction between de jure, the legal status, 
and de facto, the domestic statehood, as famously proposed by Jackson and Rosberg (1982a, 
p. 3), explains how the “empirical properties [of African states] have been highly variable, 
while the juridical components have been constant.” Following this, Englebert (2009, p. 7) 
applies a causal link between international legal sovereignty and domestic authority, arguing 
that the essence of this power is legal (juridical) and that “it is the last remnant of public order 
in weak and failed states – sovereignty – that Africans instrumentalize.”  
 
However, many would agree that sovereignty is also something that is challenged at various 
levels from external and internal sources, and it is not necessarily the most interesting angle to 
analyze in order to understand “the state”. In addition, examination of the political map of 
Africa reveals a continent that has hardly changed on the surface, despite being considerably 
dynamic at the level of empirical or de facto statehood. I argue that one should examine more 
closely the empirical workings of crucial state-society relations, such as public goods 
provision, to understand the survival and persistence of the state and state-like presence in 
states that are often considered weak or failed. I propose that scholars need to take de facto 
forms of statehood seriously in order to understand states in non-Western spaces.  
 
Second, and following the lines of closer engagement with de facto forms of statehood, this 
thesis offers a micro-analysis of the practice of public good provision and consumption in 
Bukavu, a provincial capital in the DRC. The aim is to better understand what the “state” 
means, through state-society interactions of de facto statehood, in what observers may claim to 
be a weak state. This research angle aligns with the “politique par le bas” approach, i.e., low 
rather than high politics (Bayart, Mbembe, & Toulabor, 1992). I argue that it is important to 
scrutinize basic services for citizens in order to understand statehood, instead of focusing solely 
on elite actors and national levels to understand states and state-society relations. Along those 
lines, I subscribe to what Lund (2006a, p. 674) proposes, namely that:  
 
“instead of looking at the state as an entity ‘from above’, we attempt to approach public authority ‘from 
below’, from the variety of concrete encounters between forms of public authority and the more or less 
mundane practices of ordinary people.”  
 
                   20 of 250 
Thus, instead of reflecting from an “armchair”, as Olivier de Sardan (2009, p. 39) terms it, this 
thesis is based on first-hand encounters with public servants, various citizens of Bukavu and a 
range of actors involved in controlling and negotiating public goods. The services, i.e., waste 
management, piped water (and electricity) and roads are, to various degrees, often controlled, 
monitored or sub-constructed through or by the state, and form a central part of the daily life 
of citizens and their daily interaction with the “state”.    
 
The purpose of this thesis is to combine two different scholarly fields in order to shed light on 
the process of statehood and the contested nature of the state. First, I question assumptions 
about “the state” based on the literature on deviant states in Africa. This leads my research into 
a field of a more philosophical body of literature, in particular into that which emphasizes social 
theories of practices. Here, Bourdieu’s ([1990] 1997) “categories of practices” and “categories 
of analysis” are useful tools for approaching abstract notions, such as “the state”. On one hand, 
states in the daily lives of people may be interpreted in a variety of context-dependent ways. 
However, “a state” may often be considered an “it”, even though the “it” could relate to a 
number of different practices and topics that can broadly be positioned as categories of 
practices. On the other hand, scholars, when analyzing topics such as the state, may also assume 
the state to be an entity containing a set number of attributes (e.g., monopoly of legitimate use 
of violence, territorial sovereignty, basic health and education services). However, such 
approaches, as categories of analysis, may be little more than a scholar’s subjective reflection 
of what a state should look like. Instead, I interpret something that is not real per se, i.e., a state 
as an entity, as still having “effects on reality” (Foucault, 1994, p. 23). Drawing from empirical 
observations, I see the state as practices coming alive through performance and effect (inspired 
by Bourdieu, 1999; Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010; Foucault, 1994; Mitchell, 1999). The purpose of 
this approach is not only to avoid the pervasively negative description of the “African state”, 
but also to approach the social world inductively through categories of practices. Here, the state 
is seen as a set of practices in daily life; governing, regulating and/or have effects on the 
provision and consumption of public goods.   
 
Secondly, in using empirical observation, my purpose is to contribute to a small but emerging 
scholarly field that can be positioned in political anthropology or interpretive sociology to the 
study of African statehood, broadly, and public goods debates, specifically. Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan (2014), Blundo and Le Meur (2009), Hagmann and Péclard (2010), and Lund 
(2006b) all provide a much needed counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of 
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statehood. I consider these scholars’ work within a heuristic approach to statehood by providing 
researchers with conceptual tools for approaching these topics (Lund, 2014, p. 229). 
Empirically, this is a move towards seeing state-society relations from the perspectives of state 
agents, state-like actors and citizens. Thus, this thesis responds to the lack of narratives from 
below and the need to challenge sweeping characterizations regarding the African state. This 
type of research is known variously, in the Global North, as studies on citizenship in urban 
centers, European state formation and the study of bureaucrats and institutions (Bierschenk & 
Olivier de Sardan 2014, p. 39). These areas of investigation are equally necessary for African 
countries for a deeper insight into statehood.  
 
1.2 Locating the site and universe of cases 
 
The DRC is facing difficulties in establishing (or running) what can be considered “effective 
state institutions”: two such difficulties are an inability to control its own forces (raising 
concerns regarding the legitimate use of violence) and systemic corruption in the state 
apparatus. However, and largely neglected in contemporary writing on the DRC, important 
state-building efforts were made during the first period of president Mobutu Sese Seko’s  rule 
between 1965-1974 (Putzel, Lindemann, & Schouten, 2008, p. v; Young & Turner, 1985). The 
strong sense of nation and citizenship that the Mobutu regime (1965-1997) fostered, though 
certainly with its considerable challenges, is still overtly present even in the eastern provinces. 
However, the ebbs and flows of the thirty years of Mobutu’s state-formation and state-decline, 
resulted in highly complex power networks fulfilling, or substituting, de facto statehood.  
 
The provincial capital Bukavu in South Kivu province is situated in the far east of the country, 
close to the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. This is, arguably, the most governed area of 
the province with provincial ministry representatives, municipal governance and the presence 
of UN forces. The further away from the capital one travels, the less visible the formal state or 
state-like presence (e.g., the UN) are. It is important to emphasize that outside the city forms 
of governance vary from territorial administration, chiefdoms or armed groups to religious 
authorities, that is different from the city. In Bukavu, there exist considerable “stateness” or 
“state-like” systems of formal government that offer interesting spaces to study local 
government in interaction with citizens. Thus, this study is limited to a space where there is a 
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considerable presence of local government, a situation that sets the urban setting apart from its 
surroundings and offers an intriguing space for studying civil servants and urban consumers.   
 
Moreover, the urban center of Bukavu is not a random choice for case constructions, in line 
with what Bates et al. (1998, p. 13) argue: “[O]ur cases selected us rather than the other way 
around.” The starting point for this research process came during fieldwork, two years prior to 
the PhD in, amongst other places Bukavu. From this fieldwork, I was puzzled by the density 
of public authorities, or those claiming to have legitimate positions. This was a place far from 
the textbook description of African states, where the state is considered weak, failed or 
collapsed. Instead, there appeared to be a plurality of competing, as well as complementing, 
networks and agents of those offering forms of state-like roles, such as education, security, or 
health. There was, in a sense, no escaping the state in Bukavu.  
 
What particularly stood out in contrast was a visit to a Congolese bureaucrat who was writing 
his report on a piece of paper. His office was in a cupboard with only the sun as a source of 
light. Immediately after this visit, I went to the office of an international NGO located in a 
colonial house by the lakeside, with infrastructure the Congolese administration could only 
dream of acquiring. The reality I witnessed, left me wondering who actually governs this space 
(Dahl, 1963). Another contrasting experience was in the central military camp in Bukavu where 
the families of the soldiers were also living. I witnessed how the children did not even have 
clothes to cover their bodies. The starvation and impoverishment in this camp left me 
questioning the assumption of territorial control and means of violence in Weberian 
interpretations of statehood. In the DRC, the soldiers were not protected by the state while they 
were charged with protecting the people. 
 
Yet, and despite these difficult circumstances, there is clearly a heavy state presence in Bukavu, 
where one might not assume to find it, due to a perception of severe state weakness. The case 
logic, thus, represents a study of an area, considered in mainstream literature on African 
statehood to be severely weak both in terms of public service provision and control over 
territory (monopoly on violence). On the contrary, in practice, when it comes to forms of 
governance in this city, an authoritarian regime was demonstrated: there was a density of 
formal and competing arrangements of public goods provision and contested citizenship, where 
the so-called “weak state” could use considerable political and violent oppression to strike 
down its citizens. I argue that the state is not an “empty shell” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 14) 
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but establishes frames of political order that allow citizens, to a lesser or greater degree, to 
acquire rights and navigate access to the public goods.  
 
On the universe of cases, the research questions posed above are broad enough to be asked 
wherever there is a form of governance structure and citizen-like perceptions and practices. 
The studies of particular public goods (waste management, water including electricity, and 
public roads) here are seen as cases whose observation may enable an understanding of 
dimensions of statehood. That is, they are not seen as statehood per se but as cases to address 
perceptions and practices of the “state”. In other contexts, such goods may be taken for granted 
and thus not as negotiated, which may lead to other case studies, such as perceptions, practices 
and expectations of provision and consumption of social benefits and the welfare state. In this 
thesis, it is precisely from areas of deep contestation and daily negotiations between authorities, 
service providers and citizens that offers clues to understand how statehood emerge.  
1.3 Thesis summary and structure 
 
This thesis engages with a discussion on de facto statehood through empirical practices of 
public good provision and consumption. Chapter 2 positions the study in a broader scholarly 
debate on African statehood to develop a theoretical framework of these case studies. The 
classic scholarly debates in political science on statehood are often discussed in neo-
patrimonial, clientelistic and deviance forms in relation to the Weberian ideal type of legal-
rational state practices. Instead, my framework contributes to understandings of African 
statehood by linking together various discussions on the state that are not sufficiently 
interpreted in the mainstream literature on “African states”, namely discussions on modes of 
governance, citizen-subjects relations and dimensions of statehood seen through the city. 
Inspired by Olivier de Sardan (2014) a “mode of governance” is any organized form of public 
good delivery, de facto or official, i.e., de jure, form of service delivery involving specific 
authorities. 
 
In the dimensions of statehood, I interpret how the state is performed and enacted: not as a 
singular entity but rather as a series of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and 
citizenship coming alive through the city. My approach aligns with Hagmann and Péclard 
(2011, p. 19) and the idea that statehood processes are dynamic and partly undetermined and 
that empirical statehood should be  the starting point of any analysis. What can be termed 
“languages of stateness” (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001) or “discourses of stateness” (Dunn, 2010) 
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are ways of understanding what I call the “dimensions of statehood.” These dimensions are 
formed mainly through an inductive approach based on case studies with an emphasis on 
interpretive and relational aspects.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological aspects of the thesis, namely the interpretative and 
relational approaches, the case studies, reflexivity and limitations. The interpretive approach 
emphasizes “meanings, beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations 
between social categories, or deductive models” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, p. 70). 
Interpretations of what statehood is, what the state should provide, relations between service 
providers and consumers are multiple, intersubjective understandings. These interpretations 
can be considered categories of practices and are seen as informants’ perspectives and are 
central to understanding perceptions and practices of “living” and “performing” the state in 
these case studies.   
 
Furthermore, the conceptual approach in this thesis focuses on the relations between 
‘consumers’ and ‘providers’ of public goods to eventually demonstrate how dimensions of 
statehood are interrelated. Thus, no one or nothing, in this analytical approach, is considered 
in isolation. Rather, consumers and providers derive their whole being from relations within a 
group, a community, a city and/or a state. Further, statehood is not one, unified concept, but 
rather consists of different dimensions, which, I argue, give statehood its “reality”. A dimension 
is considered here as an aspect of statehood, which is, to varying degrees, related to other 
dimensions and thus follows the logic of a relational approach.  
 
Chapter 4 offers some general and specific selections of history relating to the creation, effect, 
practices and performance of state and statehood relations in the DRC and Bukavu. I argue that 
it is necessary to use history as a means to problematize the present. A contextual understanding 
is necessary to understand contemporary languages of statehood, public services and 
ownership, and ideas about who is entitled to citizenship. The chapter examines “pre-colonial”1 
forms of governance, the Belgian Congo (1908-1960), the Zaire period (1971-1997), the 
transition from Zaire to the DRC and fieldwork interviews from Bukavu and its surroundings. 
This chapter is aimed at situating the empirical chapters in a historical context and, in particular, 
                                               
1 In quotation marks as these pre-colonial structures were interpreted, reinforced and suppressed during and after 
colonialism.   
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situating the colonial construction of Bukavu as an administrative city space. The chapter 
allows for references, images and expectations that are produced discursively in contemporary 
Bukavu.  
 
In Chapter 5, 6 and 7, I present the case studies of public goods in Bukavu. These chapters are 
structured to allow providers to speak first and then subsequently for us to hear consumers’ 
perspectives. This structure follows the direction of supply as I examine those with a good to 
offer (providers) and then subsequently those who consume the goods (consumers). These 
chapters expose the differences between the goods, actors involved in provision and 
consumption, and how actors interpret these relations. Service providers are, to varying 
degrees, found within the municipal apparatus (waste management), the national and parastatal 
agencies (e.g., road construction, electricity, and water), commercial companies (e.g., waste 
management, water) but also in other forms of networks and associations. The latter shows 
how being a consumer does not exclude one from being a provider or vice versa. These are 
relational roles that are dynamic and changing rather than a priori conceived. Locally, such 
roles can be performed by those working in neighborhood networks (sharing water) or local 
NGOs (clearing household waste), or by street children (waste management), vendors (selling 
access to generated electricity) or criminal groups2 (controlling water pumps).  
 
Consumers are located in two main geographical areas, namely the urban territories of Kadutu 
and Ibanda. These sites (Kadutu and Ibanda) are historically divided areas, the former being 
the African cité and the latter a European center. Citizens in these areas have different and 
similar experiences and perceptions of services. There are also specific categories of 
consumers, namely taxi drivers, enjoying public roads and a pharmaceutical company that 
enjoys regular access to water.  
 
I find that there is an important state engagement in managing the infrastructural construction 
and control (policing) over the roads in urban settings, though this in not necessarily the case 
in rural areas. At the other end of the scale is neglect and loss of control when it comes to 
sanitation and waste management, both of which are formally placed under the responsibility 
of the municipality. Water (and the sub-category hydroelectricity) aligns more closely with an 
                                               
2 This criminal activity is more accurately governing access to public services, rather than service provision per 
se. 
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idea of state unity and is both perceived as and controlled by the “state” in a form of state 
monopoly. However, there are institutional changes taking place in attempting to privatize 
water, which have further implications for statehood. Moreover, consumers’ perceptions of 
these goods and their expectations towards those in control of these goods vary. There are also 
clear distinctions between those who have access to these goods from “official” connections 
and those who have to seek alternatives to enjoy some level of access.   
 
I argue that all of these practices and perceptions of public goods play a role in statehood 
dimensions. There is also a level of state persistence that is integrated in service providers’ and 
citizens’ daily lives, and, in turn, enforces de facto statehood. This micro-study of these 
interactions shows not only how these public service providers cope (or the provider-consumer 
relationship), but also demonstrates the multiple ways of speaking of the state, the variety of 
practices, expectations and performance. Even for the most neglected public good, namely 
waste management, there are a number of providers that act to redress certain deficiencies in 
overall management by the municipality. For the public roads, there are multiple institutions in 
place, with varying degree of access to international networks and of domestic cooperation 
with each other. These different practices, expectations and performance develop into 
dimensions of statehood.  
 
Chapter 8, the analysis, offers a theoretical discussion for analyzing my observations through 
modes of governance, citizens-subjects and dimensions of statehood. I categorize the three 
public goods into the following modes: Waste management as “non-governed”, public roads 
as “plural governance” and, finally, water and hydroelectricity as “state monopoly”. Further, I 
make distinctions between citizens based on their enjoyment of public services, that is to say, 
I differentiate between those connected to official service provision regulations and those 
disconnected from the same services. In other words, a distinction is made between the “haves” 
and “have-nots” or citizens and subjects. The contribution of modes of governance and 
citizens-subjects is to provide analytical clarity to the complex and lived experience of state 
practices and performances.  
 
Further, and in order to develop a more dynamic approach, I develop “dimensions of statehood” 
as a heuristic approach to public good relations between consumers and providers. There is no 
conclusive list of dimensions of statehood, and so, in agreement with  Hagmann and Péclard 
(2011, p. 16), that is why I see these as a heuristic rather than explanatory approach (Lund, 
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2014, p. 229). I propose three dimensions based on empirical observations from Bukavu. These 
are  1) dimensions of disctinctions, 2) spatial dimensions and 3) ideology  dimensions. These 
three dimensions are stemming from the empirical data in Bukavu and linked to broader 
discourses connected to theoretical contributions. I argue that understanding the different 
encounters and practices is key to understanding “the state”, which creates structural effects on 
those “living” and “performing” the state and is engrained in daily life.  
  
Chapter 9, the conclusion, offers summary remarks on the theoretical, empirical and 
methodological contributions of my thesis. My theoretical contribution is to nuance and 
complicate state practices when it comes to the daily governance of public goods, moving away 
from limited understandings of de facto statehood in Africa. Rather than defining public goods 
as ‘non-excludable’ or ‘non-rivalrous’, I argue that a broader understanding is needed to 
capture the realities and practices in their daily forms. These goods are rather seen as something 
that all citizens would like to enjoy and/or enjoy, and they are hence of a public interest that 
somehow falls under the state’s responsibility, may that be through the regulating of private 
services or a state monopoly on public services (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 400). My empirical 
observations contribute to area studies of the DRC, and, more broadly, hold comparative and 
general value. I argue that even though Bukavu and all the specific set of events studied may 
be particular to the area, it is still possible to use similar approaches to other concrete (urban) 
places. Methodologically, by taking a relational approach, consumer-provider practices and 
ideas demonstrate different modes of governance structures and (dis)connections to services of 
interest. Finally, I argue that categories of analysis based on empirically observed categories 
of practices are valuable to comparative analysis and broader theory-building.  
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2.0 Literature review and theoretical framework  
 
This chapter will position this thesis in a broader theoretical field, namely the so-called sub-
Saharan “African state” and statehood literature linked to urban public goods provision. Rather 
than using the terminology of “state” or “authorities”, I use the concept of statehood, as the 
former two phrases hold limitations when confronted with the empirical material I have 
gathered. As Brenner (2004, p. 4) argues (emphasis in original): 
 
 “The generic concept of the state has become increasingly problematic. The notion of statehood seems 
to me a more precise basis for describing modern political institutions, because it does not ontologically 
prejudge the configuration of state scalar organization, the level of state centralization, or the degree of 
institutional isomorphism among state agencies.”  
 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a discussion of mainstream (political science) literature in 
order to situate my theoretical framework. The framework contributes to linking together 
discussions on the state that are not sufficiently interpreted in the mainstream literature on 
“African states”, namely the dimensions of statehood seen through the languages of stateness 
in the city space. Rather than studying the state per se, the approach of dimensions of statehood 
takes into account ongoing political and economic challenges that affect state practices. By 
studying statehood, I interpret the multiple sources of representing the state through various 
practices and performance from the viewpoint of those living and performing “the state”.  
 
Rather than taking normative or pre-formed claims about the state, the starting point of this 
approach consider negotiations over public goods seen from the perspectives of those living 
and performing the state, what I term consumers and providers. The focus on those attempting 
to access (consumers) and those who deliver and/or control (providers), leads to an 
understanding of the everyday needs of citizens and functions of service delivery. In turn, this 
speaks to aspects of statehood challenges, prospects and negotiations in dynamic rather than 
static forms. I argue that it is possible to have and experience statehood in the absence of actual 
state practices in public goods provision. For instance, people can have a strong opinion and 
sense of national belonging even though central governance structures might appear 
dysfunctional. Further, those controlling and/or providing public goods are forms of authority 
figures, but these individuals do not necessarily need to be employed by, for instance, central 
government.  
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The city space provides an added analytical perspective from which to understand intensified 
negotiations over public goods. It is a space where the state can be more visually and physically 
present and where a higher concentration of people requires collective efforts for public good 
provision. Though the study of cities is far from new in social sciences, it is strikingly absent 
in much of the mainstream political science literature on neo-patrimonial rule, ‘weak states’ 
and de jure, but not de facto, statehood. This is surprising considering how cities can be viewed 
as “the cradle of citizenship” marked by the etymological relation between “cities” and 
“citizenship” (Earle, 2011, p. 2). I argue that it is through the creation and continuation of cities 
that colonial masters conquered and ruled their colonies in Africa, an organization based on 
the European experience of nations-states. As Isin notes (2007, p. 221), the state can be seen 
as emanating from, organized through and assembled by the city space. It is a space where a 
dominant group or groups have consolidated themselves, whether as colonial masters or 
citizens; these groups then create forms of modern rule and authorities under what later may 
be termed “states.” The city space is thus the production of state representation and effect.  
Here, I see the state as practices, not an entity or a group of actors that come as given, but rather 
an entity that becomes “real” through performance (see also Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010).   
 
This chapter is structured as follows: First, I will discuss the central conceptual terms in this 
thesis, including “the state”, “statehood” and “public goods”. This debate lays the conceptual 
foundation for the thesis. Namely, understanding the state as processual in nature, i.e., a series 
of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship in the city space. Further, 
statehood is seen as living and performing the state, something that is exercised in relations to 
others and to certain (material) goods that forms patterns of practices. Finally, public goods are 
seen as necessary material goods, though with symbolic value attributed to statehood and which 
may, indirectly or directly, be assumed to fall under the duties of the state.  Second, I will 
present some of the mainstream theoretical contribution to this field. The debates on neo-
patrimonial rule, clientilism, strongmen and weak states are highly influential and largely based 
on interpretation of Max Weber’s work on traditional and modern forms of domination. 
Although this literature has academic value, the ontological basis is affected by a certain 
situatedness of Western forms of statehood interpretations. The literature, generally speaking, 
takes de facto statehood as absent or limited. Thus, and finally, I offer a discussion to speak 
back to this literature by taking de facto statehood seriously through those living and 
performing the state. The final section engages with a more recent contribution, namely 
                   30 of 250 
interpretive forms of statehood based on extensive, qualitative research that lays the foundation 
for my theoretical approach to the subsequent empirical study.   
 
2.1 Conceptual approaches: The problem of the state in African studies   
 
The sub-Saharan “African state” (henceforth Africa) is put in brackets, as many critics would 
rightfully say that there is no form of unitary African. Empirically speaking, the historical, 
cultural, socio-economic and geographical diversity of these forty-seven sovereign states is an 
obvious reason. In that sense, scholars may find it more useful to, for instance, discuss 
“European” states rather than “African” states, as European countries have a certain path 
dependency reflected in state formation literature, such as Tilly (1992) has pointed out. 
Certainly, European states are different but have at the same time undergone and are 
undergoing processes of integration. Also, fortunes and misfortunes in states’ development are 
also a result of several internal and external factors and it would be overly simplistic to claim 
the African state as, e.g., “failed”.  What is certain, however, is that “the Western imagination 
of the state, however traversed by myths and historical fiction, remains the globally most 
powerful idea of political order in the twentieth century, institutionalized in the international 
state system after 1945” (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 10).  
 
Thus, I will not attempt to theorize what a state is per se but rather how a state is performed 
and enacted; not as a singular entity but rather as a series of experiences, practical dimensions 
of statehood and citizenship coming alive through the city.  According to this line of thinking, 
the state is interpreted in a processual understanding, not as a pre-given entity, but rather 
subjects in process (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 20). As Weber (1998, p. 78) writes, “all 
subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices 
which are performatively enacted.” A more applicable definition for this thesis regarding the 
state can be found in Lund’s (2006a, p. 676) important contribution to the debate on African 
states and state formations where he argues the following:   
 
“The ‘state’ is (…) the quality of an institution being able to define and enforce collectively 
binding decisions on members of society. We tend to reserve state qualities for government 
institutions, but this is more a reflection of our idea of an end result than of the messy process 
of state formation itself.”  
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In many ways, I subscribe to the idea that the concept and discourses of the state are “a 
‘mythical abstraction’ which has assumed a particular place within the field of government” 
(Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). This is not the same as saying that the state is a myth, or a 
product of the human imagination. Rather, it subscribes to what Foucault (1994, p. 23) terms 
“effects of reality” (effets de réalité)  to describe that a discourse, which does not exist per se, 
still has effects on reality.3 This is what I call the state effect (Bourdieu, 1999; Foucault, 1994; 
Mitchell, 1999). Methodologically, this thesis is not based on a discourse analysis of the state 
but is rather inspired by the way of seeing the state as practices through an interpretive research 
design (see Chapter 3). As Eriksen (2011, p. 247) argues, the idea of state can be seen as a 
category of practice rather than as a category of analysis. Both domestic and external actors 
reinforce or undermine the state idea (whatever it may be) through their practices.    
 
Based on this processual understanding of the state, statehood is understood as “performing” 
and “living” the state (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, pp. 14-15). By applying “performing” and 
“living”, statehood becomes more “real” it is exercised in relations to others and to certain 
(material) goods that forms patterns of practices. These practices are conducted by “the diverse, 
multiple actions of state actors as well as the myriad responses and interactions between state 
officials and non-state actors” (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 15). I reject a normative concept 
of statehood that evaluates the amount of service provision and/or territorial control, as most 
states would not fit such definitions of statehood (see also Eriksen, 2011, p. 234). Such 
normative concepts are static; what a state is, or rather should be, rather than how it is done. 
Moreover, various dimensions of statehood in this thesis do not automatically fit concepts of 
formal state structures but rather show the assemblage of social relations, practices and political 
processes involved in public good provision and consumption. As Lund (2006b, p. 686) argues, 
“(…) public authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of 
local institutions and the imposition of external institutions, conjugated with the image of a 
state. Hence the practice of governance varies from place to place, and even from field to field.” 
In sum, I argue that statehood is not limited to the nation-state and that my approach is based 
on the claim that the “state” is practices that can be observed at different levels. As an entry 
point, I see practices of negotiating (access, control and delivery) of public goods as a clue to 
understanding dimensions of statehood.   
                                               
3 Quotation from the original text: “(…) c’est la formation corrélative de domaines, d’objets, et de discours 
vérifiable et falsifiables qui leurs sont afférents; et ce n’est pas simplement cette formation qui m’intéresse, mais 
les effets de réalité qui leur sont liées.” 
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By public goods, I mean goods that are perceived by most citizens and authorities as necessary 
and practiced in different forms in the performance of statehood. As discussed above, I do not 
make assumptions as to where such services might be located or as to who should perform 
them (i.e., I avoid normative and static readings of the state). Rather, I take a more pragmatic 
view as to how statehood is performed by tracing who and how public goods are controlled by 
different actors.  This thesis examines the public goods of water, electricity, public roads and 
waste management. Two of these goods, namely water and waste management are vital for the 
maintenance of basic public health. Public roads and the sub-category of electricity are not 
equally vital for life, but they are necessary for most livelihoods and generally in great demand. 
These goods can be associated with the state. For instance, and even under neo-liberal 
governance, the state will often at the very least hold a role as a regulator of different services, 
and in close-to ‘pure’ state-controlled countries there will be alternative, sometimes clandestine 
operators delivering these goods. There are, however, many other practices that perform 
delivery of these services, such as commercial companies, NGOs or neighborhood networks.  
 
 Views as to what public goods are and who should provide them are rooted in historical, 
normative and contextual notions. As shown in Chapter 7 on water and energy, for instance, I 
evidence how there is a shifting debate, and therefore tension, over the perception of water as 
a “social good” (bien social), a “public good” (bien public) or as a matter for commercial 
ownership (société commerciale) for paying clients. In other words, these goods cannot simply 
be defined by their function (non-excludable, non-rivalrous) when using interpretive and 
relational approaches (Chapter 3) to the dimensions of statehood. By unpacking what is 
understood by “public goods” and moving beyond static views, I am opening up an avenue for 
a dynamic and multilayered understanding of practices related to statehood. This stands in 
contrast to the representation of classic, mainstream political science literature on the African 
state.  
 
 
My decision to avoid a priori categories in defining consumers, providers or public goods stems 
from my interpretation of empirical rich research, in which I saw no clear dichotomy between 
“state” and “society”. As Mitchell (1991, p. 78) suggested, to begin “with the assumption that 
the elusiveness of the state-society boundary needs to be taken seriously, not as a problem of 
conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon. Rather than searching for 
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a definition that will fix the boundary, we need to examine the detailed political processes 
through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced.” 
Political processes and negotiations over public goods occur continually and result in a 
dynamic de facto statehood that is never frozen in time but rather performed, created, 
transformed and reinvented.  
 
Now that I have established the central parameters in my approach to the analysis of statehood 
and public goods, it is necessary to situate their relevance in how mainstream African politics 
literature has been discussed and critiqued.4 This includes how concepts of neopatrimonialism, 
clientelism, state weakness, statehood and public goods have been studied either separately or 
from a normative perspective. This is done in order to establish my heuristic approach to 
statehood, an approach which seeks to address current discrepancies between the literature and 
empirical realties. Moreover, the different goods, perspectives of consumers and providers are 
found in the scope of a city (Bukavu). The city is seen as a proxy for a state in terms of the 
public delivery agencies located in Bukavu, as different from the surroundings in the province. 
By proxy, I do not claim that the city replaces the state. Rather, I see the city as an observable 
terrain where statehood is a more pressing topic. In this terrain, there is a specter of the state in 
the public’s expectations and then in how the state is performed; these form a reality that is 
often overlooked by current literature.  
 
The research question in this thesis is a way to zoom in on statehood practices from below. 
That is, away from a macro perspective of the state, as seen from above, to the day-to-day 
realities of civil servants, alternative providers and citizens, as viewed from below. In other 
words, politique par le bas as Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabor (2008) have termed it. Thus, the 
theoretical framework for this study will in particular examine the more interpretive and 
relational approaches, as discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter (3), to understand 
how public good providers and consumers are creating and challenging certain dimensions of 
statehood through their relations and subjective perspectives.  
 
                                               
4 Inevitably, several elements of the wide-ranging literature have been omitted in order to offer only a selection 
of the theoretical and conceptual approaches central to this thesis, before moving on to the more specific 
theoretical framework of the empirical and analytical research. 
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2.2. The African state, statehood and public goods: Mainstream 
literature in review 
 
Much political science literature on African states and politics has emphasized characteristics, 
such as the neopatrimonial (e.g. Médard, 1982), the clientelistic (e.g. Lemarchand, 1972) 
and/or informal (e.g. Bayart, 1993; Chabal & Daloz, 1999) forms of state and authority. There 
is also a substantial literature on “local strongmen” or chiefs (e.g. Berman, 1998; Herbst, 2000; 
Sandbrook, 1985). These terms make up some of the fundamentals of African statehood 
literature. I will primarily focus on neoptatrimonialism and clientelism, both of which, in many 
ways, form the basis of broader theoretical discussions informed by interpretations of Max 
Weber’s (1978) writings on traditional and modern forms of domination. These theoretical 
debates are important and influential in the study of African statehood and authorities:  because 
they form essentially the analytical basis of Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982a) de facto and de jure 
conceptualization of African statehood. The neo-patrimonial and clientelistic debates connect 
observed data (e.g., observations on relations of reciprocity between patrons and clients) with 
the broader theoretical literature. They nevertheless remain somewhat more abstract, taking a 
top-down (domination), long term view that is difficult to entangle compared to the more recent 
contributions from what can be termed interpretive approaches (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 
2010) from below. What becomes rapidly apparent from reviewing this literature, whether top-
down or bottom-up, is the predominance of early European state formation as a blueprint with 
which to analyze African contexts. This means that the scholarly literature is somewhat limited 
in thinking of the rest as an extension of Europe of what state means and how they are formed 
(see also Chakrabarty, 2000). Where this literature ends, so to speak, my analytical contribution 
begins by developing how processes of statehood are taking place with or without a state 
performance that calls the state into being.  
 
 The concept of neopatrimonialism, introduced by Eisenstadt (1973), derives from the 
governance system, named patrimonialism, which Weber (1978) viewed as a traditional form 
of domination. Patrimonialism derives from the masculine, father figure type rule of patriarchy. 
It is important to distinguish between what Weber explains as primary patriarchalism, 
indicating a structural relationship at a household level, and patrimonialism as a form of 
political rule (Bruhns, 2012, p. 14). The patrimonial state as Weber (1978, p. 1013) argued is 
“when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political 
subjects – which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion – just like the 
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exercise of his patriarchal power.” By introducing “neo” into patrimonialism, one moves from 
this traditional form of rule to a rule where one formally distinguishes between public and 
private but whereas these differences are not practiced. Médard (1979) is largely credited for 
applying the term “neopatrimonialism” to the sub-Saharan African context, with the case of 
Cameroon. His work (see also 1982) drew heavily on political clientelism literature.  
 
Clientelism has a less clear origin than neopatrimonialism and its use varies widely. The term 
was used widely in 1960s literature on local politics.5 An often cited definition is by Scott 
(1972, p. 92), who sees clientelism as a “special case of dyadic (two persons) ties involving a 
largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) 
uses his own person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.” Moreover “[clientelism] is 
predicated on a situation where there is already a difference between ownership of resources 
and control of their use in broader settings and on a certain segregation between the resources 
exchanged in generalized and in specific exchange”, according to Eisenstadt and Roniger 
(1980, p. 60). In a setting of material deprivation and social destitution and with an absence of 
social provision by the state or lack of law enforcement, people may seek clientelistic forms of 
linkages for their subsistence survival. Such relationships can and do expand from only two 
people, and in the African statehood literature, political clientelism can be understood as “a 
more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of 
actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties and 
involving mutually beneficial transactions” (Lemarchand, 1972, p. 69). 
 
The modern use of neopatrimonialism, as distinct from Weber’s (1978) ideal type application 
of the term to describe traditional domination in contrast to legal-rational bureaucracy under 
modern rule, has been conceptually stretched to encompass a number of political experiences 
in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and Asia.  But as Erdmann and Engel (2007, 
p. 96) write “[n]eopatrimonialism is indeed a universal concept, although one that has received 
little critical analysis, notably of its appropriateness for understanding African politics.” There 
are of course noteworthy exceptions to this claim, especially Bach and Gazibo (2012), but I 
                                               
5 John Sidel, lecture in “Local Power in an Era of Globalization, Democratization, and Decentralization”, 17 
January 2012.  
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argue that the analytical utility of the concept characterized by (though not reduced to) 
clientilism, personal and informal rule is limited. 
 
The analytical challenge that comes with a catch-all concept is to disentangle what processes 
are at work. From a political scientists’ angle, one can question whether agents are performing 
according to a structuring principle of neopatrimonial rule or if they are performing according 
to an agent-to-agent form of rule in the absence of any structure. However, this dichotomous 
view of agents versus structure is limited. As Elias (2001, p. 19) suggested, we can imagine 
society as 
 
 “a group of dancers performing court dances. The steps and bows, gestures and movements made by 
the individual dancers are all entirely meshed and synchronized with those of other dancers. If any of 
the dancing individuals were contemplated in isolation, the functions of his or her movements could not 
be understood. The way the individual behaves in this situation is determined by the relations of the 
dancers to each other.” 
 
Hence, I argue that it is useful to distinguish between normative perspectives from the Western 
experience and how the state is practically performed from the African experience. In this 
thesis, I focus on the latter, namely practices according to African experiences.   
 
An emphasis on neopatrimonialism hinders potentially stimulating avenues of research if 
scholars can already detangle the malaise of a political system, a regime or a political economy. 
In other words, in whose image are scholars constructing authorities and states? That is, are 
scholars interested in developing models of state performance through Weberian ideal types or 
are they engaging with discourses through the lived experience of citizens or state agents on 
their own terms? I argue that the mainstream literature on neopatrimonialism engages with the 
former. This is problematic, as Western experiences are used as the main historical source to 
explain current state practices in African contexts. Although there is no escaping and no need 
to avoid the discourses of statehood and state as interpreted in Western literature, my 
contribution is to develop an analysis through some of the lived experiences of people to speak 
back to this literature.  
               
Moving further from these debates on neopatrimonialism and clientelism, there is a significant 
debate on whether to describe certain African states as weak (Englebert, 2009; Jackson & 
Rosberg, 1982), quasi (Jackson, 1993) or collapsed (Zartman, 1995). For instance, from 
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Zartman’s (1995, p. 4) standpoint, the state is seen as a service provider and is collapsed “when 
the basic functions of the state are no longer performed.” Jackson and Rosberg (1982) and more 
recently Englebert (2009) subscribe to a specific type of state performance, namely a monopoly 
on violence and ability to control  sovereign territory. In these debates, I argue that the state is 
seen as a “preformed” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 282) entity that must deliver on the terms of its 
preformation in order to be real. This particular state performance is not necessarily seen 
through the eyes of the citizen but rather through problems of civil wars, armed groups and 
loose boundaries emerging from underlying political and socio-economic problems. As an 
alternative analytical avenue, statehood offers a way of examining the performance of specific 
functions of public good delivery and expectations. 
 
In terms of statehood and inspired by Max Weber, the work of Jackson and Rosberg (1982a; 
1982b), focuses on statehood both in terms of the de jure, the juridical, and the de facto 
attributes of the state. As they (1982b, p. 3) argue, the “empirical properties [of African state] 
have been highly variable, while the juridical components have been constant.” On the one 
hand, the principle of sovereign states (de jure) remains, while on the other, many states have 
not been able to control their territory (de facto). Following the work of Jackson and Rosberg, 
Englebert (2009) establishes a causal link between international legal sovereignty and domestic 
authority. He (pp. 62-63) argues that international recognition endows African state actors with 
a domestic power of command. The essence of this power is legal (juridical). He (p. 7) argues 
that “it is the last remnant of public order in weak and failed states – sovereignty – that Africans 
instrumentalize”. I argue that seeing “international recognition” as the independent variable to 
explain domination is a reductionist approach that overlooks the “politique par le bas”. Such 
an approach overlooks the agency of Africans, whether as citizens or public authorities, and 
assumes that states would evaporate without international recognition. Somaliland serves as a 
counter-example. In addition, the focus on de jure can even be seen as a myth (Adalbert 
Hampel, 2015, p. 5)  when we consider the critical literature on the Westphalian narrative (see 
e.g. De Carvalho, Leira, & Hobson, 2011; Schmidt, 2011). I argue that it is necessary to take 
de facto aspects seriously because African states are not simply upheld by principles of 
international sovereignty. By taking de facto into consideration, an analytical avenue opens up 
that demonstrates different forms of domination, various state practices, perceptions and 
ordinary people’s understandings of the “state”, and a number of statehood dimensions.  
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Further, the underlying feature of contrasting or comparing African states with an interpretation 
of Western liberal norms and/or Weberian rational-legal authority as an ideal type under 
modern rule is problematic. Weber (1991, p. 78) famously argued that “a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (emphasis in original). Force in itself does not make a state, as Weber 
explained, but it is a mean specific to the state. In addition, territorial delineation is also a key 
attribute of the state. The point to be made about territory and the monopoly of violence is that 
states can be defined by how they work, not what ends they seek. In fact, Weber’s writing sees 
states’ characteristics and capabilities limited, ultimately, only by the human imagination. One 
such imagining is what Weber (1978, p. 905) called the ideal type modern state with the 
following basic functions: “The enactment of law (legislative function); the protection of 
personal safety and public order (police); the protection of vested rights (administration of 
justice); the cultivation of hygienic, educational, social-welfare, and other cultural interests (the 
various branches of administration); and last, but not least, the organized armed protection 
against outside attack (military administration).” The Weberian rational-legal authority as an 
ideal type in a modern rule is far removed from the real practice of states in many countries, 
not only on the African continent. As Scott (1998, p. 82) reminds us: “The utopian, immanent, 
and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, 
constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling the 
administrative grid of its observations.” My work is in line with a functional approach to state 
performance and practices, namely the provision of public goods, but I detach this provision 
from any particular institutional form, such as an ideal type modern state. This is done in order 
to avoid normative assumptions of what the state should or should not do and rather to take a 
more inductive approach to where and how these goods are de facto delivered.  
 
The literature on persistent “state weakness” and the blurring of formal and informal 
boundaries in many African states is seen in relation to the aforementioned Weberian ideal type 
of modern states. Hardly any other mainstream literature makes this more explicit than Chabal 
and Daloz (1999, p. 7) when they argue that “the logic of state service [in Africa] is resolutely 
particularistic and personalized – far  removed from the bureaucratic norms as they operate 
willy-nilly in most Western societies” and thus “public employment is exploited as a private 
resource.” And as they (ibid, p. 14) provocatively argue further, the African state is “an empty 
shell” that “failed to acquire either the legitimacy or the professional competence which are the 
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hallmarks of the modern state”. Thus, a common feature of this literature is the focus on what 
the African state is not rather than what it is, seen from a modern ideal type state perspective.   
 
However, as Sartori (1970, p. 1034) noted, the terminology in political science is largely bound 
to political experience from the Western hemisphere, and this still remains relevant today. 
Chakrabarty (2000, p. 27) argues that “[t]here is a peculiar way in which all these other histories 
[e.g. being “Indian” or “Kenyan”] tend to become variations on a master narrative that could 
be called “the history of Europe”.” In other words, we can only think of the rest as an extension 
of Europe both conceptually and in the rest’s experience of what is the life of “nations” and 
“states”. The history of the “others” is thus interpreted through the history of the European. 
Paradoxically, an outsider perspective is thus privileged over an insider perspective when 
considering the “other”, whether it is citizens, states or nations.  There is thus a need for 
scientific knowledge that can connect different practices and meanings, not do deny the 
existence of certain practices and meanings, but rather to build knowledge through these 
different interpretations (Haraway, 1988, p. 580). Only through recognizing the situatedeness 
of social researchers and the researched, it is possible to move forward in conceptually and 
theoretically stimulating fields.   
 
In order to do so, Hagmann and Péclard (2010, p. 541) have suggested that “[t]he heuristic 
limitations of mainstream Western political science have encouraged researchers to resort to 
either more empirically grounded or more conceptually innovative approaches to public and 
state authority in Africa.” A common feature for these approaches relies on dynamic 
interpretations of state-society relations in Africa (e.g. Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014b; 
Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Lund, 2006a; Titeca & de Herdt, 2011). They are dynamic in the 
sense that they consider a range of actors providing public goods and services as well as 
variations across time and space where they engage more deeply with empirical realities on, 
for example, bureaucracy and corruption on a daily basis. They also analytically employ 
concepts interpreted from the empirical research, such as “twilight institutions” (Lund, 2006a). 
These interpretive approaches are of inspiration to my thesis and will be further developed in 
the theoretical framework below.    
 
Though the mainstream African state literature is extensive, in particular regarding states’ 
weakness, what is often overlooked is precisely the interpretive and dynamic forms of de facto 
statehood. Statehood, I argue, is never fixed or reaches an end point, but rather allows 
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researchers to study different dimensions, through particular relations, issues and spaces. The 
relations, issues and spaces in this thesis relate to so-called public goods in an urban setting. 
Rather than taking the state as a given entity, the study of public goods, both in meaning and 
practices, through consumer-provider relations enables a space for expressing statehood. The 
term public goods, however, is often associated with economic theory. A classic definition in 
this field is Samuelson’s (1954, p. 387) model where he argues that “collective consumption 
goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a 
good leads to no subtraction of that good (...).” In this field, public goods, or collective 
consumption goods, are as an ideal, seen as non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning that no 
citizen should be excluded from using them regardless of payment and that their use will not 
reduce availability for others (Samuelson 1954, see also Pickhardt, 2006, p. 446). The term 
public in the economic literature is not reduced to an understanding of the public sector 
(government). Rather, it means that allowing goods, such as roads, defense, water or schools 
solely in the hands of the private would, using economic terms, lead to substantial market 
failure where some citizens would benefit more at the cost of others.  
 
There are many challenges in applying an orthodox economic definition to public goods, as 
many of the goods discussed in this paper do not fall under Samuelson’s strict definition. For 
instance, the development of roads would not be a public good as increased use of the same 
roads decreases the availability for others. Moreover, it was for long assumed in political and 
economic sciences that self-interested individuals cannot act collectively without outside 
coercion, inspired by the publications of Hardin’s (1968) The Tragedy of the Common and 
Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action  (see also Bardhan & Ray, 2008a, p. 4). 
However, subsequent studies have shown how various communities do indeed cooperate 
without outside coercion but instead through a sense of, for instance, common norms and 
collectivity (see for instance Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). The exogenous perspective in classic 
political and economic sciences leaves out crucial perspectives about how people actually (de 
facto) produce, manage and consume public goods. Also, I argue that a deeper immersion into 
perceptions of public goods by people themselves is important to avoid a priori assumptions 
about these goods and how they are accessed and delivered.  
 
At the other end of the social science scale, regarding epistemology, many anthropologists have 
taken a different view of public goods or what can be termed common resources. Resources 
such as water or land may be interpreted “as cultural systems with material as well as symbolic 
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value” (Bardhan & Ray, 2008b, p. 8). Closely connected to the debate on public goods is the 
term consumer, as the anthropologist Miller (2003, p. 1) has described in the following way:  
 
“While in economics to be a consumer is to have choice, my emphasis is on quite another aspect. I use 
the term consumer in opposition to the aesthetic ideal of a creative producer. (…) [T]o be a consumer 
is to possess consciousness that one is living through objects and images not of one’s own creation. It 
is this which makes the term symptomatic of what some at least have seen as the core meaning of the 
term modernity.” 
 
In this study, and inspiried by anthropology and sociology, I use the terms “consumers” and 
“providers” as forms of relations over material goods that also take symbolic meaning in 
expressing statehood. Section 2.3.2 and the methodology chapter (3.1) will include further 
discussion on the conceptual choice of “consumer/provider” categories.. Consumer/provider 
categories in this thesis are “observer expressions” (categories of analysis) that “belong to an 
observer’s vocabulary rather than to that of the actors” (Dahl G., 1999, p. 15). This is due to 
the rather normative nature of the terms, which, if used actively in fieldwork, might cause 
excessive confusion or debate.  
 
I have taken an approach of seeing individuals as part of their surroundings and assumed that 
there are specific, though not necessarily unique, relations of reciprocity, mistrust and/or 
resistance when it comes to interpretations and practices of public goods. I find it useful to 
understand public goods in terms of certain economic and material conditions but at the same 
time I seek to understand more precisely the meaning and the role of different goods in 
expressing statehood. I argue that their limited availability and the way in which they are 
subject to negotiation within urban territorial organization provide an interesting entry point 
for further investigation into what we mean by public goods and interpretations of de facto 
statehood. The focus on the urban space – the city – will be further developed in the next 
section.  
 
2.3 Theoretical and conceptual approaches to statehood: Modes of 
governance, citizens –subjects and dimensions of statehood   
 
Instead of assuming the African state as dysfunctional according to a parochial understanding 
of what the state should be, I rather see the state as practices coming alive through performance 
and effect (inspired by Bourdieu, 1999; Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010; Foucault, 1994; Mitchell, 
1999). The modern state’s distinctiveness, Mitchell (p. 89) argues, is that it appears as an 
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apparatus separate from the social world that creates the state effect. Mitchell (1999, p. 89) 
argues “[w]e must analyze the state as (…) a structural effect. That is to say, we should examine 
it not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices 
that make such structures appear to exist.” Furthermore, he (1999, p. 84) states that this 
distinctiveness “means that we should not be misled into taking for granted the idea of the state 
as a coherent object clearly separated from “society” – any more than we should be misled by 
the vagueness and complexity of these phenomena into rejecting the concept of the state 
altogether.” In this thesis, public goods seen from consumer perspectives demonstrate how “the 
state” is considered often as an entity, but also that the different practices that informants 
discuss can relate to anything from the central regime, the water agency, municipal authorities 
to traffic police. In other words, consumers and providers make what the state is rather than 
delimiting how they should think about the state. Simultaneously, those who consider the 
“state” to be largely found within public good provision (though with exceptions), are making 
claims about citizens and subjects within this coherent idea of modern statehood. The state 
effect means the construction of a binary separation of state from society, as well as considering 
claims about accessing and enjoying what is considered public goods as clues to interpret 
statehood. The state effect forms a basic assumption of this thesis and can be viewed as an 
explanatory framework: a substantive statement about “the state” to challenge dominant 
frameworks of failure and weakness (Lund, 2014, p. 229).  
 
In order to take into account how people themselves speak of what I interpret as statehood, this 
thesis takes an inductive approach to study public good provision and consumption in Bukavu. 
Thus, the empirical chapters (5-7) will let the informants speak rather than taking prescribed 
measures to evaluate state functions from a distance. In the final analysis chapter (8), I will use 
what Oliver de Sardan (2009, 2014) calls “modes of governance” to categorize forms of 
governance when it comes to public good provision. Olivier de Sardan together with other 
scholars, especially Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014), Blundo and Le Meur (2009), 
Hagmann and Péclard (2010) and  Lund (2006b), provides a much needed counterpoint to 
abstract and decontextualized models of statehood. I consider these scholars’ work within a 
heuristic approach to statehood. That is, they provide conceptual tools that enable researchers 
ways of approaching social science topics, rather than making claims of how the social world 
is (Lund, 2014, p. 229). Though theories of neo-patrimonial rule or clientelism are providing 
some useful ideas for theorizing governance practices, they do not, in light of the evidence 
gathered in this thesis, contribute to a fuller picture of interpreting or approaching daily 
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governance in regions seen as different from the West, such as certain African states. In other 
words, when the image of an ideal-type of modern “Western states” does not fit other states, 
scholars need to go further to investigate how assemblages of state practices actually work in 
different contexts. Instead of “state failure”, I argue, there are conceptual failures in mainstream 
political science literature as it appears unable to grasp state-society relations in a meaningful 
way.  
 
At the same time, I do not claim that there are certain essentialist characteristics of the state in 
Africa, i.e., certain normative features of the state as different from the normative features of 
the Western state. As Hansen and Stepputat (2001, p. 10) argue, there is a need to abandon the 
idea of “African” or “Western” conceptions of statehood and rather trace the “various 
languages of stateness (…) [to understand how they] have been spread, combined, and 
vernacularized in various parts of the world.” Or, to go back to Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982a, 
1982b) de jure and de facto statehood, there is a need to distinguish between discursive 
productions of the state, namely “discourses about the state’s identity vis-à-vis other states and 
‘international’ society (discourses of sovereignty) and discourses about the state vis-à-vis a 
bounded ‘domestic’ society (discourses of stateness)”, as Dunn (2010, p. 82) argues. My 
approach aligns with Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 19) and the idea that statehood processes 
are dynamic and partly undetermined and that empirical statehood should be the starting point 
of the analysis. What can be termed “languages of stateness” or “discourses of stateness” are 
ways of understanding what I call the “dimensions of statehood”. I will discuss these aspects 
further in this section, as well as in Chapter 3 (Methodology).    
 
These inspiring theoretical contributions in what can be termed interpretive, political 
anthropology or sociological readings of daily governance, however, are partly lacking an 
equal engagement with what can be considered the other side of the binary, namely “the 
society” made up of citizens and subjects and their encounters with the “the state” (i.e., the 
state effect). This is not to say that these authors do not engage with “citizens” or “ society”. 
On the contrary, it is precisely the engagement with lower level bureaucrats and citizens that 
has inspired innovative perspectives on governance such as Lund’s (2006b) “Twilight 
Institutions.” Rather, my ambition here is to contribute to this literature by providing a 
relational approach to study ‘consumers’ and ‘providers’ of public goods as dimensions of de 
facto statehood.    
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Moreover, as stated, examining the city space can provide an added analytical perspective to 
understand intensified negotiations over public goods. The design of Bukavu is a shadow of 
what it used to be under colonial rule; it is now re-negotiated and challenged in its 
contemporary forms. It is a space of state presence, of both imaginative and physical forms, 
and where an increasing population requires and demands public good provision. This enables 
a space for thinking about citizenship: the responsibility of the “state” and of “citizens”. Due 
to the broad scholarly field of “citizenship” studies in social sciences, I engage with mainly 
three scholars that contribute to a relational understanding of state-citizens perspectives. Two 
of the authors, Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975), can be positioned within the colonial/post-
colonial discussions of categorizing belonging. Though they use different terminology, I 
considered such discussions as one field of emphasizing colonial experiences as a source of 
“Africa’s impasse” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 3) between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ governance 
structures. The third author, Isin (2008, p. 16), captures a broader critical field of relational 
citizenship, namely  “as practices of becoming claim-making subjects in and through various 
sites and scales” (my emphasis). The important contribution of these authors sheds light on 
understanding public good provision and consumption, interpreted in a colonially designed city 
and the differences between those inhabiting the same urban space. Thus, rather than making 
distinctions between rural-urban divides (cf. Ekeh 1975), I see the intensity of governing and 
accessing public goods in the city as a clue to understanding citizen- and subject-making as 
part of the state effect.   
 
Finally, the interpretation of modes of governance (cf. Olivier de Sardan, 2014) and citizen-
subjects (cf. Mamdani 1996) in relation to public goods develops into what I call the 
dimensions of statehood, inspired in particular by the aforementioned scholars Hagmann and 
Péclard (2010, 2011). Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 5) contribute to an analysis of statehood 
in Africa based on perspectives from different actors (local, national, and international) 
engaged in forging and remaking the state through negotiations and contestations. However, 
rather than applying their heuristic framework (see section 2.3.3), I develop my heuristic 
approach through dimensions of statehood based on a combination of my empirical fieldwork 
from Bukavu and these heuristic approaches.  
 
Interpretive and relational approaches to statehood, seen both from the perspectives of citizens 
(consumers) and those controlling and delivering public goods (providers), are different from 
the mainstream political science literature that considers state performance as a monopoly on 
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violence and the control of borders (e.g. Englebert, 2009;  Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a) or as the 
performance of  service delivery based on norms of Western statehood models (e.g. Zartman, 
1995). The approaches also differ from taking the Western historical trajectory of state 
formation as the starting point for debating the “African state” (e.g. Chabal & Daloz, 1999). 
Instead, these approaches allow those living and performing the state to attribute meaning to 
topics considered essential to everyday life, as I find in my case studies from Bukavu. I will in 
the remaining sections discuss these theoretical approaches.  
 
2.3.1 Modes of governance  
 
In order to develop a systematic categorization of governing public goods based on the case 
studies from Bukavu, I use what Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 420) terms “modes of governance”  
in the analytical contribution (Chapter 8). A mode of governance is a way of interpreting 
governance practices when it comes to delivery (provision) of public goods. In other words, I 
avoid using established normative thinking as discussed above about where the state ought to 
work and what it ought to be, and rather take an inductive approach to interpreting actual 
practices of governance when it comes to public provision in order to understand aspects of 
statehood. “Governance”, then, as a term is “stripped of both the ideological visions peculiar 
to some development organizations and the oversimplified, reductive critiques typical of 
certain academic deconstructions”, as Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 420) argues. Instead, an 
empirical approach to the concept of ‘governance’ can be defined as “any organized method of 
delivering public or collective services and goods according to specific norms (official and 
practical), and to specific forms of authority” (Olivier de Sardan, 2009, p. 4). Hence, any 
organized delivery of public goods, involving “agents of the state” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71), 
other actors or networks and forms of practices and rules can be considered modes of 
governance and thus indicators of statehood. “Agents of the state” refers to actors that produce 
“the performative discourse on the state which, under the guise of saying what the state is, 
cause (…) the state to come into being by stating what it should be (…)” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 
71). These agents of the state exist at lower and higher levels of the administrative apparatus, 
as the empirics demonstrate, and shows how the state is enacted and performed.  
 
Governance of public goods relates to “collective action, authority or regulation, which for a 
long time was associated with the State, and which today can be implemented by other types 
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of institutions and players” (Olivier de Sardan, 2009, p. 4). Here, I find the term particularly 
useful as it avoids traditional dichotomies of state/non-state or formal/in-formal and rather 
emphasizes comparative and dynamic perspectives on statehood through the practices and 
performance of service delivery. As the empirical chapters will demonstrate, there are multiple 
actors and institutions providing, governing (e.g., exercising regulatory power), and controlling 
public goods. In my analysis, I develop three types of governance modes in relation to the 
public goods studied in Bukavu, namely:   
 
 
1. Non-governed: Waste management (Chapter 5)  
2. Plural governance: Control and usage (enjoyment) of roads and road construction 
(Chapter 6) 
3. State monopoly: Water and energy (electricity) (Chapter 7) 
 
Each category should be seen as ideal type based on an interpretive approach (see Chapter 3) 
to the empirical observations. Thus, these categories are not finite and there will always be 
exceptions to the modes. The aim of this categorization is to clarify some of the broader patterns 
of governance regarding these goods. This includes both formal and informal rules and 
practices. Olivier de Sardan’s (e.g. 2009) work is based on West Africa, broadly, and Niger, 
specifically. By studying a different context (the Great Lakes region and the DRC broadly, and 
Bukavu, specifically), my observations are different from the modes found in Olivier de 
Sardan’s work. They align, again, with the principle of taking de facto (empirical) observations 
of statehood as the point of departure for analysis (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011, p. 19). Modes 
of governance, however, are only one side of the binary effect of the state. In order to study 
these modes of governance we have to turn to citizenship because governance depends on 
relational perspectives on who and what is governed, how those attempting to access public 
goods view governance and how they interpret their claims and rights as citizens.  
 
2.3.2 Claim-making citizens and subject  
 
The term “consumers” in this thesis is not used in the strict economic meaning but is inspired 
by anthropological and sociological work on the topic. Miller (1995, p. 142) argues that modern 
anthropological work prior to 1970, was often drawn “to societies defined by the absence of 
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(…) goods.” The idea of consumerism of modern societies was the antithesis of what students 
of anthropology were supposed to study. By the 1970s, Miller argues (p. 142), Douglas and 
Isherwood with their work “The World of Goods. Towards an Anthropology of Consumption” 
and Bourdieu’s “Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste” broke the silence in 
anthropology on the subject of consumption.  
 
The idea of “consumers” in this thesis is specifically related to the creation of distinction, such 
as the “haves” and the “have nots” of citizens and subjects in Bukavu. Bourdieu (1984, p. 483) 
captures this idea, one of the dimensions of statehood in this thesis, when he argues the 
following: 
  
“One only has to bear in mind that goods are converted into distinctive signs, which may be signs of 
distinction but also of vulgarity, as soon as they are perceived relationally, to see that the representation 
which individuals and groups inevitably project through practices and properties is an integral part of 
social reality. A class is defined as much by its being-perceived as by its being, by its consumption – 
which need not be conspicuous in order to be symbolic – as much by its position in the relations of 
production.” 
 
Consumers, in this thesis, are thus defined by their relation to others, such as providers, as well 
as by other consumers. To be clear, consumers are for example, not defined by their quantity 
of domestic tap water consumption but rather by how they perceive their access in relation to 
these “others” (consumers and providers) and how these perspectives affect ideas of citizenship 
and state-society relations. These ideas, in turn, create tensions and fields of struggle that 
challenge and affect dimensions of statehood.  
 
This relational study undertaken calls for a dynamic and practice oriented understanding of 
citizenship, othering and subject-making under the state effect. Rather than considering the 
legal or constitutive acts of citizenship or dichotomous categories, I subscribe to Isin’s (2008, 
p. 16) definition of citizenship “as practices of becoming claim-making subjects in and through 
various sites and scales” (my emphasis). These practices can, for instance, be consumer-
provider relations and expectations and duties and rights from the viewpoint of those 
attempting to access and those who control the access to public goods.  Critical studies of 
citizenship are thus focused “on how status becomes contested by investigating practices 
through which claims are articulated and subjectivities are formed” (my emphasis) (Isin 2008, 
p. 17).  The focus on practices is important in this study as I focus on the daily consumption 
and provision of public goods from citizens’ own perspectives on norms, expectations, rituals 
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and rules. In other words, I look at citizenship as practice in order to understand politique par 
le bas and acts of citizenship to enable an understanding of how claims are articulated as part 
of a sense of belonging to a political community (e.g., a state). These articulations are situated 
in the everyday realities of citizens. The city and territorial state have in common that they are 
sites where statehood happens, in the context of the DRC and many other African states and 
elsewhere. De facto statehood, at the municipal or provincial government levels, happens at 
the city level.  
 
Part of the broader picture of understanding citizenship in Bukavu is to consider the relation 
with and belonging to the city. As Isin (2002, pp. 1-2) argues, the city can be seen as a 
difference machine, where social struggles take place, which can determine the content and 
extent of citizenship. In colonial terms, the rights and duties (content) and criteria for inclusion 
(extent) could be determined for instance by observable physical attributes, e.g., white or black 
skin, based on racial discrimination. In post-colonial terms, the content and extent of 
citizenship was generally granted on paper to most inhabitants (though with exceptions) but 
the practice of citizenship could be limited to certain urban inhabitants connected to the modern 
state while excluding, for instance, rural and uneducated inhabitants. In the city of Bukavu, 
people considered ‘properly’ urban, e.g., the educated French-speaking citizens, are 
increasingly confronted with a growing population escaping the countryside and this forms the 
basis of contested and evolving statehood. This is also why I consider Ekeh (1975) and 
Mamdani’s (1996) work of interest because of their engagement with colonial and post-
colonial effects on citizenship. In many ways, the city encapsulates much of the dynamics 
involved in producing and performing the state.  
 
In brief, the actors and groups studied in this thesis are positioned in an urban space where 
there is a high density of formal “stateness”, marked by a central administration and 
representation of all provincial offices. The state’s formal territorial organization beyond this 
space (outside of the city), however, is more limited and in many places completely absent. 
Statehood can thus be studied in a highly concentrated space of territorial organization to 
emphasize the intensity of the state effect. My case studies from Bukavu observe ongoing 
struggles for citizenship, feelings of alienation and claims of rights to public goods in the city. 
I argue that nowhere is the state closer, physically and virtually, than in the city.  
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This section will first start with Isin’s (2002, 2007) contribution to the debate, which  is a 
relational approach to citizenship. Like the idea of “state effect”, as discussed by Mitchell 
(1999), Isin provides a framework for interpreting some of the basic relational aspects of 
citizenship. This includes interpreting relations of inclusion and exclusion and how subjects 
derive their identity from these transactions (see also Chapter 3 on the relational approach). As 
the empirical observations will demonstrate, there are citizens connected to public good 
provision and there are others that are disconnected from the same services, who find 
alternatives sources. After this introduction, I will discuss the basic arguments of Mamdani 
(1996) and Ekeh (1975) that contribute to the theoretical debate on colonial and post-colonial 
effects in these debates.   
 
In this study, subjects at the margins of inclusion and exclusion are of interest because they 
confront, destabilize and contest citizenship. In this way, they contribute to an evolving 
interpretation of statehood through their claims and interests in public good provision. Isin 
(2002, p. 3) writes that investigating citizenship requires, at the very least, “constraining the 
claims of citizens against the claims of the others.” If there are victorious citizens, then there 
ought to be those who are not victories in their claims. This does not mean that citizenship 
comes naturally and those excluded are irreconcilable with the included. Rather, the otherness 
is, according to Isin (2002, pp. 3-4), seen as a condition of citizenship and that preciously the 
alterity always emerges  both from  dialog and from constituting each other.  Isin (2007, p. 222) 
proposes that  
 
“through orientations, strategies and technologies as forms of being political, beings develop 
solidaritistic6, agonistic7 and alienating8 relationships. (…) [T]hese forms and modes constitute 
ontological ways of being political in the sense that being thrown into them is not a matter of conscious 
choice or contract (…). It is through these forms and modes that beings articulate themselves as citizens, 
strangers, outsiders and aliens as possible ways of being as identities and differences.”  
 
 
For instance, in colonial Bukavu, citizens were seen as a minority group of white settlers, while 
certain groups of Congolese, referred to as évolués, were entitled to partial citizenship rights, 
including rights to services, such as piped water or education. These two groups were largely 
seen in contrast to a third group, namely the tribal or indigenous groups considered unruly and 
                                               
6 For instance generous, beneficent, accommodating and understanding (Isin, 2008, p. 19) 
7 For instance competitive, resistant, combative and adverse (Isin, 2008, p. 19) 
8 For instance vengeful, malevolent, revengeful, hateful and hostile (Isin, 2008, p. 19) 
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attached to traditional customs (see Chapter 4). In contemporary Bukavu, certain citizens 
formally connected to public services and service providers refer to inhabitants who live in 
squatter settlements and who refuse to comply with various taxes and payments as “anarchic” 
citizens (see especially Chapter 8).   
 
It is, in Isin’s (2007, p. 222) view, impossible to study citizenship without consolidating the 
othering processes that lead to the terms of “strangers”, “outsiders” or “aliens”; and moreover, 
one must also consolidate the spaces that are created through these orientations, strategies and 
technologies available for producing these relations. These processes articulate themselves and 
crystalize in the space called the city. Here, the actual practices of public good provision may 
be highly excluding processes, where only a few may be formally connected to services. In 
studying public goods provision and consumption in Bukavu, processes of alienation and 
belonging are being articulated (see Chapters 5-7) and ultimately demonstrate the complexity 
and dynamics of statehood (see Chapter 8). As Simone (2004, p. 2) argues, “African cities can 
be seen as a frontier for a wide range of diffuse experimentation with the reconfiguration of 
bodies, territories, and social arrangements necessary to recalibrate technologies of control.”   
 
More broadly, colonial African cities created the feeling and presence of the superior colonial 
state (see e.g. Ferguson, 1999).  As Fetter (1976, p. xi) argued, “[m]odern imperialists, like the 
ancient Romans, were among the world’s foremost city builders.” However, the design of these 
European planned cities to create a “‘rational’ and ‘orderly’ urban milieu” (Bissel, 2011, p. 2) 
in the name of modernity may to varying degrees have been unsuccessful in controlling the 
urban spaces, according to those master plans. Master planning, of course, is not the same as 
implementation, which can be inconsistent, underfunded and incomplete. Nevertheless, as 
Bissel (p. 23) argues, creating wide and straight streets, clearing “huts” and placing natives 
where “they ought to be” was a key aspect of colonial urban design that transformed drastically 
both the imaginative (virtual) and physical (actual) spaces. The resulting colonial urban design 
can be as much used and interpreted by the liberated elite in former colonial city spaces. 
 
In the study of Bukavu as a city, there are signs of both physical and interpreted colonial 
inheritance that cannot be overlooked. As a physical example, the city’s administrative 
buildings and central residential areas are in art deco architecture that is a European imported 
construction. The more interpretive aspects concern political identities and perceived civic 
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relations in access and enjoyment of public goods. Thus, some practices when it comes to 
consumption and provision of public goods is analyzed in colonial design of the divided city. 
 
Moreover, citizenship and belonging in Bukavu is differentiated between those living in the 
urban center and those considered rural but inhabiting the urban space. These differences have 
historical trajectories and have also been affected heavily by the wars and conflicts in the 
region. The mass import of Belgian and European versions of administration, e.g., reports and 
organizational charts, was mixed with a particular view of tribal/indigenous groups, who were 
deprived of basic rights and the évolués, who had access to certain goods.  In many ways, the 
city can be seen as a difference machine in the way that it “assembles, generates, distributes 
and differentiates these differences, incorporates them within strategies and technologies, and 
elicits, interpellates, adjures and incites them” (Isin 2007, p. 223). The city is thus a 
battleground for groups to define themselves, make claims and demand rights. The city of 
Bukavu is an historical and contemporary site for these processes. Historically, Congolese 
living in the African city (contemporary Kadutu) were not randomly picked out as évolués – a 
claim to semi-citizenship – but had acquired certain bonds with the colonizers through the 
latter’s orientations, strategies and technologies. Évolués’ positions created ways of being 
political that were different from the ways experienced in the pastoral life of the village. But 
instead of accepting a subordinate position to the white settlers, the battleground for the city 
and thus the state began. Since independence, various forms of expressing and making claims 
of public goods have taken place and these claims provide an insight into dimensions of 
statehood.    
 
Since the historical trajectory of Bukavu is affected by a particular colonial urban design, the 
work of Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975) contributes to the discussions above in illuminating 
particular aspects regarding differentiating citizens, connections of public goods and belonging 
in the modern state system.9  Mamdani’s (1996, p. 4) influential work on citizen and subject 
focuses on the colonial legacy of institutions and institutional segregation that in his view 
remains to different degrees intact in Africa. The minority rule by Europeans in the colonies 
                                               
9 Noting, however, that I do not think colonialism is the only perspective for understanding contemporary 
politics on the African continent. In addition, the variety of colonial experience when it comes to colonial rulers 
(British, French, German, Portuguese, Belgian), varieties within colonies across time and space as well as 
varying impacts on the colonized do not allow for a unitary ‘model’ of colonial legacy overall. Nevertheless, 
this case study represents a particular vision of a colonial urban space that persists in form in present-day 
Bukavu.    
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offered citizenship only to the civilized, leaving the ‘uncivilized’ “subject to an all round 
tutelage” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 17). This meant political rights for only a few, civilized men, as 
made up, broadly speaking, the historical European political experience of the time, but with a 
racial logic for the African continent. Mamdani (pp.17-18) differentiates between two forms of 
controlling natives in the colonial era; indirect and direct rule. Direct rule meant urban civil 
power and exclusion of natives from civil freedoms, while indirect signified tribal authority, as 
Mamdani (p. 18) explains. The latter was a state-enforced way of dealing with the “native 
question” – how a foreign minority could rule over an indigenous majority (p. 16). The author 
sees indirect and direct rule as two forms of despotism, the former decentralized and the latter 
centralized. Mamdani (p. 18) argues that “[u]rban power spoke the language of civil society 
and civil rights, rural power of community and culture.” Urban power spoke of civil rights 
(citizens) and customary power emphasized tradition (subjects) where all power was in the 
hands of chiefs. Though the author’s theoretical and empirical discussion goes into greater 
depth, the value of this argument relates specifically to urban citizenship – rights and duties 
under a formal state – and the contrast with rural subjects excluded from formal rights. This 
insight is particularly important to understand differentiation as part of the dynamic forms of 
statehood, such as disputes, (re-)negotiations and interpretations.  
 
Ekeh (1975, p. 106), much inspired by de Tocqueville and others, wrote that the European 
conception of citizenship entails that “[t]he individual as a member of a political community 
has certain rights and privileges which he may claim from it. Similarly, he has certain duties 
and obligations which he has to perform in the interest of the political community.” He (ibid, 
p. 106) argues that the African experience of citizenship is different and depends on whether 
the person is taking part in the “primordial” or the “civic” public. The primordial public is seen 
by Ekeh as a moral obligation to sustain and benefit from the person’s community, often seen 
as an ethnic community, which surpasses economic or material goods. The civic public, on the 
other hand, is according to Ekeh (p. 107) an amoral community with a considerable emphasis 
on the economic community. While people from both publics may seek to acquire rights from 
the civic, there is no obligation to “give back” (duties) in return for the benefits in the civic 
public. Ekeh’s (p. 108) explanation for these two publics is the colonial experience that 
established a myth of a civic public that could never be impoverished and a primordial one that 
needs care in terms of reciprocity; a perception emphasized by the creation of the civic public, 
according to the author. In short, as Ekeh (p. 108, emphasis in original) rephrases, “[a] good 
citizen of the primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return; a lucky citizen of the 
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civic public gains from the civic public but enjoys escaping giving anything in return whenever 
he can.”  
 
Ekeh’s argument is theoretical and there are many authors who disagree with the emphasis on 
colonial structures or the existence of a primordial public. There are certainly also many 
examples of Africans paying a number of taxes or performing duties that cannot simply be 
interpreted as extraction.10 Finally, Ekeh’s deterministic view can assume a ‘return to the tribal’ 
when all economic means from the civic public are exhausted, which is not necessarily the case 
forty years after the article was first published. Though keeping in mind this criticism, there is 
value to this theoretical claim, which takes the form of distinguishing between expectations 
(rights) and responsibilities (duties) in the ‘civic public’ in Africa. In these case studies, what 
is considered a “modern” form of statehood stands often in contrast to the way in which certain 
public good providers and citizens describe certain others to be “anarchic” subjects that belong 
to “traditional” cultures. In turn, there are excluded sections of the population that make claims 
to the same goods that challenge statehood dimensions. In this thesis, these views are expressed 
by several participants of the study in Bukavu and will be further discussed in the empirical 
and analytical sections (Chapters 5-8).  
 
In sum, modes of governance provide understanding of governing public goods from the 
provider side, while citizens-subjects aspects articulate differentiation between inhabitants and 
how they make claims in accessing public goods. The city offers a space to study more intense 
negotiations over the same goods, state presence as de facto statehood forms and efforts of and 
challenges to collective efforts. These theoretical approaches are important in interpreting 
statehood as something that is exercised, forming patterns of practice, in relations to others and 
to certain (material) goods.  I will in the next section incorporate these aspects into what I call 
dimensions of statehood.  
   
2.3.3 Dimensions of statehood  
 
Based on the interpretations of modes of governance, on one hand, and citizen-subject aspects, 
on the other, I develop a more dynamic interpretation of statehood through what I call 
                                               
10 See for instance a more nuanced approach to corruption in Olivier de Sardan (1999) “A moral economy of 
corruption in Africa?” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37(01): 25-52. 
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“dimensions of statehood”. I see statehood as a concept that it is composed of dimensions 
which give it its “reality” (what it is). A dimension, as defined by Babbie (2015, p. 129), is “a 
specifiable aspect of a concept”. The focus on dimensions in this thesis is to underscore that a 
dimension is only one way to interpret a situation (statehood) and that there can be multiple 
dimensions to explain the same topic. The empirical chapters provide indicators of these 
dimensions to show statehood in concrete existence, matriculation and enactment. The focus 
on dimensions of statehood through consumer and provider perspectives on public goods 
diverges from the traditional preoccupation with authorities, legitimacy and evaluating 
performance from a Western legal-rational ideal type. The scholarly inspiration for this 
thinking is derived from the aforementioned scholars (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014b; 
Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; Lund, 2006b) and in particular Hagmann and Péclard’s (2010, 2011) 
work on “negotiating statehood”. I will in this section discuss the heuristic framework of 
“negotiating statehood” and some limitations, in order to contribute to this literature through 
“dimensions of statehood”.  On “negotiating statehood”, Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 19) 
argue that  
 
“processes of state (de-)construction are dynamic and partly undetermined, (…) [and hence] the analysis 
of state institutions must be embedded in a broader understanding of state-society relations, (…) [as] 
state building and formation is inherently conflictive and contested and that empirical rather than 
judicial statehood constitutes the analytical point of departure.” 
 
 This thesis draws inspiration from this approach by taking de facto (empirical) statehood as a 
starting point. More specifically, Hagmann and Péclard (2010, p. 544) suggest looking beyond 
the position of actors and into the resources and repertoires that these actors employ, where 
negotiations take place (negotiation arenas) and what the main outcomes and issues at stake 
(objects of negotiations) are. The term “resources” in this framework relates to the material 
basis for collective action, both tangible and intangible, which includes, for instance, access to 
state resources through national monopolies on piped water, bureaucratic skills and 
international donor networks (Hagmann and Péclard, p. 547). The repertoires are the symbolic 
basis that legitimizes the actors’ existence, which can include shared but also contested and 
transforming ideas of public service provision and duties and rights as citizens (ibid, p. 547). 
These transforming ideas could be, for instance, changes in the policy of water provision from 
a social good to a good for paying clients (see Chapter 7).   
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Most state-society relations are arguably dependent on both the material and the symbolic basis 
for the construction, destruction and reinvention of shared communities, be they in the form of 
a village, a city or a nation-state. These case studies show how statehood in the DRC is dynamic 
and symbolism is drawn from a repertoire of colonial, post-colonial, international and local 
imaging. It also shows the resources available in public institutions, such as technicians, and 
international donor networks unfold a story of decay and a reassertion of the state. By 
introducing the idea of “negotiating” statehood, scholars can move beyond a discussion on 
“failed” or “weak” states and static or immovable political systems in Africa (Doornbos, 2011, 
p. 219). This avoids attempts that start with a list of criteria for state functions and rather 
engages with a more grounded approach to statehood derived from empirical observations 
(Hagmann & Péclard, 2011, p. 7).   
 
However, and precisely because Hagmann and Péclard’s approach supports empirically 
grounded studies, I do not attempt to copy their framework. Instead, my approach is based on 
patterns of experience from both “providers” and “consumers” views on public goods in 
Bukavu. Though “negotiations” is an interesting term to approach the dynamics of statehood, 
there is not always room for negotiations due to highly unequal power relations, donor 
conditions and authoritarian forms of governance. For instance, the World Bank negotiates 
with the central regime in Kinshasa on restructuring roads, in which both local representatives 
of the road agency and private consumers in Bukavu hold little power in negotiating the terms. 
Those living in Bukavu, however, share practices and hold perceptions regarding public good 
deliverables. This is why dimensions in this study, I argue, hold a better approach to 
understanding statehood. In brief, dimensions of statehood mean to address the relations 
between those “performing” and those “living” the state in how they attribute meanings to de 
facto statehood through public goods (also inspired by Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 14). These 
statehood dimensions are developed inductively in the analytical contribution (Chapter 8) 
through relational networks of public good provision and consumption/enjoyment. They are 
also coupled with a broader scholarly contribution to show the transferability beyond the study 
area.  
 
Through the empirical contribution, I show that the challenge to and potential of state practices 
and performance is not limited to the models of neopatrimonialism or clientelistic rule but is 
instead constituted by negotiations, interpretations and practices over public goods, all of which 
I consider to be dimensions of statehood. In turn, this affects what it means to be a citizen and 
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a service provider and is linked to acts of citizenship, practical ways of claiming a right or to 
have rights, all of which are in turn linked to an “implementation” of statehood. The different 
forms of being political (Isin 2002) are used as clues to interpret the relationships that develop 
in the urban space to understand, for instance, identities of alienation, claim of rights as citizens 
and seeing citizens as clients under the neo-liberal agenda. Ferguson (1999, p. 83) points out 
that some urban inhabitants may feel more “properly” urbanized in contrast to either newer 
villagers or less educated urban dwellers. During fieldwork in Bukavu, this was a repeated 
narrative among inhabitants, who often looked down on the uneducated, poorer citizens, often 
framing them as villagers. These differences could manifest in choice of clothing or number of 
children in a family. Though there can be many explanations for these popular narratives, the 
peculiarities of colonial history when it comes to bureaucratic and administrative practices are 
important for a fuller picture of many contemporary African cities. Long after the departure of 
the colonial presence, there is a certain sentiment of once having been connected to a “modern 
world” and a feeling of being disconnected in the contemporary world among those viewing 
themselves as “properly” urbanized and to some extent also among those on the margins 
(Ferguson, 1999, p. 238). Many of the older urban population were once privileged with an 
access to public services, although certainly with a racial discrimination that is now gone. For 
instance, once there was a modern post-office in Bukavu, now citizens have to cross over the 
border to Rwanda to receive mail.  What this contemporary disconnection results in is a high 
degree of expectations towards the “state” of what should be state deliverables (norms). 
However, a high degree of expectations does not solely come from an older generation but is 
also shown in the debates of youth, which will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters. The 
popular image of the neighboring town Cyangugu in Rwanda demonstrates that there are 
alternative forms of statehood and state practices and performance that shape perceptions and 
claims of what it means to be a citizen.   
 
Although there are high expectations in the urban space, there are also considerable forms of 
resistance and contestation when it comes to public goods provision. As Low (1999, p. 10) 
argues, the city is a “site of ongoing urban conflicts about the provision of the material basis 
for social reproduction” such as control over housing and access to land. In the city, resistance 
against the state does not always have to be in the form of active contestation, it can be as much 
about silencing, as Low (p. 10) argues. The answer to who should provide and deliver 
electricity, piped water and public transport depends on ideological, commercial and need-
based viewpoints. As these case studies will show, resistance can take the form of stealing 
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electricity or refusal to comply with official bureaucracy. All of these aspects of perceptions, 
images of statehood relations and constraining relations develop into dimensions of statehood.      
2.4 Conclusion  
 
 
This theoretical discussion has reviewed some of the mainstream approaches to what can 
broadly be termed “African politics”. The concepts of neopatrimonialism, clientelism, the 
blurring of informal/formal rule and assumptions of state weakness were some of the important 
debates in this review. However, as I have argued, there is an underlying tendency to compare 
ideal types, based on Max Weber’s work, and to apply them, wittingly or unwittingly to the 
African context. Although less spoken of, the deeper interpretation of this literature is a reading 
of the master narrative of European state formation privileged and applied to a number of 
nations and states around the world. Though European state formation is of crucial importance 
to the history of modern state organizations, I argue that there is a need to construct scientific 
knowledge that can connect different state practices and meanings to build knowledge from a 
variety of experiences. Where the literature stops, i.e., that the de facto does not exist in a form 
known to Western scholars, my research begins. I take the de facto seriously, based on the 
claim that the state is not an entity that comes preformed but rather it comes into effect and is 
realized through practices and performance.      
 
In order to do so, I place an emphasis on the state effect, i.e., the forms of modern statehood 
that create a distinctiveness of the state separated from society. I use the literature inspired by 
the more interpretive, political anthropology and sociological readings of statehood to 
understand modes of governance, citizen-subjects and dimensions of statehood. However, I 
develop a basis for this understanding through a more inductive approach, engaging with 
empirical observations of statehood seen through the eyes of citizens in Bukavu, who are in the 
position of service providers (providers) or who are citizens in search of access to goods 
(consumers). There are never any clear lines of who is a consumer and who is a provider as 
real practices are not found in a priori categories. I apply a relational, interpretive approach 
that allows people to express views of how they deal with these issues on a daily basis, what 
they expect of the state and vice versa and how privileges and disadvantages to access of goods 
work in the city. I argue that public goods are highly contested in the city and are a political 
question at the core of understanding de facto statehood, i.e., performing and living the state in 
the daily lives of citizens. These statehood dimensions make up what I call the state effect: A 
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view that the state comes into being through the performance and practice of different groups 
in relations to each other.   
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3.0 Methodology   
 
“For, when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough. (…)  [T]o have any chance of 
thinking a state that still thinks itself through those who attempt to think it (…), one must strive 
to question all the presuppositions and preconstructions inscribed in the reality under analysis 
as well as in the thoughts of the analyst.” 
 Pierre Bourdieu (1999, p. 54) 
 
This thesis draws inspiration from those social scientists who argue for the inclusion of the 
qualitative field research that is more often used in anthropological work into broader political 
science research areas, such as governance, public order or the state (e.g. Blundo & Le Meur, 
2009; Olivier de Sardan, 2008; Schatz, 2009). Certainly, I do not attempt to make claims of 
crude divisions between anthropological methods and political science topics. Rather, the 
interest of this thesis is inspired by social scientists, irrespective of their discipline, whose 
research relies on extensive empiricism for developing theories and conceptual framings from 
‘real’ practices (interactions between the researcher and the researched).  
 
The rationale, both ontologically and epistemologically, in this thesis is based on interpretive 
approaches to science both in the “reality” of the topic being studied and its “know-ability” 
(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, pp. 3-4) In fact, interpretivism recognizes the validity and 
positioning of these experiences that shape the researcher’s understanding of the social world. 
Further, I do not believe that there is a clear dividing line between inductive and deductive 
research in practice, as scholars predominantly construct a case or a concept based on academic 
training and social experiences (see Lund, 2014). Thus, extensive empirical research to inform 
theory, i.e., so-called inductive research, will to some degree involve the use of existing 
theoretical approaches and ideas regarding the topic under investigation. This thesis leans 
mostly on inductive research, but also draws inspiration and approaches from different studies 
on statehood and public services. Specifically, I conduct a micro-scale analysis of certain public 
goods in Bukavu to inform the debate on abstract notions of de facto statehood, the populace 
and the state.  
 
Bevir and Rhodes (2006, p. 70) argue “[a]ll political scientists offer us interpretations. 
Interpretive approaches differ in offering interpretations of interpretations. They concentrate 
on meanings, beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social 
categories, or deductive models.” The topics covered in this thesis can be seen from multiple, 
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intersubjective realities. It is of interest in this study to find interpretative meanings of de facto 
statehood, both from the perspective of those being researched and my own analytical 
interpretation of these issues (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 41). For instance, I asked the 
participants to explain what they considered public, and to explain what their expectations are 
and how they deal with daily, basic goods. As the interview questions demonstrate (see 
empirical chapters), I search for knowledge that is based on (subjective) views, diverse voices 
and interpretations from empiricism (categories of practices) and from the literature on 
statehood, public goods and the state (categories of analysis). These categories are discussed 
in Section 3.1 below.  I also search for meanings and beliefs that people hold to explain their 
practices as I see these as inseparable and constitutive of each other (Bevir & Rhodes, p. 70). 
In interpretive research, this means that what, in the first encounters, may seem as a range of 
conflicting, counterintuitive (e.g. expectations of the state when state services have ceased) and 
varying perspectives from participants, gradually falls into recognizable patterns as the 
researcher immerses herself in the data and literature. This is not an isolated process of the 
researcher making sense of individual participant’s “rationality” but rather a careful mapping 
process of what increasingly emerges, in the forms of recognizable meanings, beliefs or 
practices in the case study, connected to a wider literature discourse and historical trajectories.         
 
Methodologically speaking, these approaches are often flexible and open-ended, but at the 
same time systematic in the process of empirical research, which in more positivist approaches 
would be termed “rigorous”. By positivist approaches I mean “forms of research that rest on 
realist ontological and objectivist epistemological presuppositions” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 
2012, p. 6). Flexibility and open-endedness of the interpretive approach have taken place at all 
the different stages of my research process, from initial design, fieldwork, systematizing data 
and textual representation. For example, the concepts of public goods or statehood are never 
firmly fixed by a set of assumptions or claims in this thesis. Instead, their meanings have 
developed through engaging with the research participants and in further work outside the field 
study. This is a systematic process in the way that, for example, similar types of questions are 
asked to different participants while allowing them space to elaborate on meanings and views 
on topics that arise, which, in turn, are subjected to further interpretations. This is not a linear 
process, however, but rather a reflexive one by moving back and forth between fieldwork, 
deskwork and analysis.  In the following section, I will explain the relational approach and the 
categories of practices and categories of analysis that fall under the interpretive ontological and 
epistemological rationale.   
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3.1 Concepts and categories    
 
My conceptual approach focuses on the relations between ‘consumers’ and ‘providers’ of 
public goods as dimensions of de facto statehood. The problem with statistical “variables” 
analysis, rational actor and norm-based models, as Emirbayer (1997, p. 281) argues, is that 
these approaches hold the idea that entities come first and relations between these entities 
happens subsequently.11 Instead, relational approaches reverse these assumptions and enable 
an understanding of the social reality “in dynamic, continuous and processual terms” 
(Emirbayer, p. 281). Relational approaches, as Emirbayer (p. 287) explains, consider how 
“units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the 
(changing) functional roles they play within that transaction. The latter, seen as a dynamic, 
unfolding process, becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent element 
themselves.” For instance, as Lund (2006, p. 675) eloquently puts it, “the state did not rise like 
the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making.” Thus, no one, or nothing, in 
this analytical approach is considered independent from each other or in isolation. Rather, 
consumers and providers derive their whole being from relations in a group, a community, a 
city and/or a state. Also, being a consumer does not exclude one from being a provider or vice 
versa: these are relational roles which are dynamic rather than being categorically stable.  
 
The empirical chapters demonstrate the different viewpoints of consumers and providers and 
the back and forth between these groups that produce and unfold the dimensions of statehood 
processes. Moreover, public goods are relational entities specific to different and dynamic 
situations and interpretations. For instance, the case studies show how the perception of water 
as a public good is contested by neoliberal donor agendas. Also, and crucially, the very notion 
of “public goods” is equally contested and disputed in these relations. The relational 
perspectives in this thesis, investigated through the empirical data and the face-to-face 
encounters in the field study, lead to a reconceptualization of the terms, such as “citizens” and 
“subjects” and form the essential contribution of the thesis (see also Emirbayer, 1997, p. 295). 
The recurrence of terms such as “anarchic” to describe subjects or my participants’ repeated 
protestations that “public goods”  should be “free, available to all” or claims by other groups 
                                               
11 In the article, Emirbayer (1997, p. 282-283) develops a thorough critique of what he calls the substantialist 
thinking, namely that there are units of analysis (things, beings, essences) that are “self-subsistent entities, which 
come ‘preformed.”’  
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that such goods should be “only for paying clients”, all demonstrate the unfolding processes 
and negotiations between groups within a relation (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).         
 
One challenge with the relational approach is the problem of boundary specification 
(Emirbayer, 1997, p. 303). In my study, the issue of drawing lines when it comes to the units 
of study is the most pressing. Since there are no finite categories or natural borders, i.e., 
essentialist categories that are mutually excluding, the field of “units”, such as groups or goods, 
could be endless. The dimensions of statehood, and state practices and performance, are also 
multiple sites of study. Fieldwork restrictions, such as time and attaining qualitative data, are 
fairly obvious. Analytically, I restricted the boundaries of my research to three cases of public 
goods – waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads – within two 
significantly different urban territories in Bukavu, namely Kadutu and Ibanda. These goods 
were studied through the service providers, for instance through the national agencies or local 
practices of provision. I also limited myself to consumers of these goods in these two territories. 
But more than the practical and analytical boundaries that I have drawn, there are ontological 
questions that need to be answered, as Emirbayer (1997, p. 304) points out. Once the 
boundaries are drawn encompassing who and what constitutes these relations, there is the 
challenge of interpreting what is obtained from inside those boundaries (ibid, p. 304). In other 
words, in forming my interpretation of statehood dimensions, the perspectives and narratives 
conveyed by the actors I engage with are coupled, systematically, with certain aspects of state 
performance, and the loss or access to everyday goods. The relational approach thus follows 
the interpretive approach as discussed above.               
 
Conceptually, I argue that statehood is composed of dimensions that give it its “reality”. A 
dimension, as defined by Babbie (2015, p. 129), is “a specifiable aspect of a concept” and is 
useful in approaching a concept that holds multiple meanings. Thus, dimensions are essentially 
aspects of statehood in this thesis and these aspects are relational, i.e., one dimension may 
depend on or be in conflict with another dimension. Moreover, the dimensions identified in my 
analysis (Chapter 8) are based on the patterns discovered in public good provision and 
consumption in Bukavu. Thus, the focus on dimensions is not an attempt to build a complete 
“model” of what encompasses statehood, as both the topic and the site (Bukavu) are limited in 
scope and generalizability. Rather, the focus on dimensions is a way of highlighting some of 
the central relations identified as a move towards revealing dynamic and negotiable forms of 
statehood. The dimensions are inductively approached but they also are discussed through other 
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theoretical interpretations of statehood (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Hansen & Stepputat, 
2001; Mamdani, 1996), which is important for their comparability and transferability. Table 1 
summarizes the dimensions discussed in this thesis.  
 
Table 1 Dimensions of statehood based on empirical evidence 
Dimensions Specific topics Discussion points 
Spatial International borders 
Urban Design 
 Relations with Rwanda 
 Segregation of population and 
urban demography 
Distinctions Hierarchies 
Citizen-subject 
 State domination and 
discrimination 
 Belonging and Othering; 
anarchic subjects, tensions, 
practices of state resistance 
Ideology  Languages of stateness 
Statehood Ideals 
 Language as performative 
through presence and 
representation of state without 
corresponding practices 
 Assumptions of unity and 
disunity 
 
 
These dimensions operate at different levels of abstraction. The spatial dimension is derived 
from the particular geographical location of Bukavu and implications for perceptions. This 
especially concerns border relations with Rwanda and colonial and contemporary urban design. 
The dimension of distinction concerns issues such as being citizens, what are acceptable 
consumer-provider relations and tensions related to hierarchies and discrimination. Finally, the 
dimension of ideology is concerned with discourses of stateness and unity/disunity of statehood 
ideals. These discourses are found in Bukavu, but also beyond, and I use Hansen and 
Stepputat’s (2001) and Hagmann and Peclard’s (2011) work in particular to show how these 
aspects are produced and (re)negotiated in ways that ultimately underscore the dynamics of 
statehood.   
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Further, the public goods represented in this thesis – waste management, water and 
hydroelectricity and roads – are widely different in terms of both their materiality and location 
of responsibility. For instance, managing waste is often the responsibility of municipal 
arrangements and/or private companies. Constructing national roads or hydroelectric dams are 
encompassing investments, and often a national priority; hence, they are more closely governed 
by central state ministries and agencies. Moreover, Rao and Appadurai (2008, p. 163) ask a 
pertinent question about public goods, calling them common goods: “How do we decide 
epistemologically what constitutes the Commons. In other words, what is common about the 
commons from a methodological perspective?” Broadly speaking, “the commons”, or what I 
term public goods, relate to certain physical goods in this thesis. However, these goods also 
hold symbolic value, such as that relating to shared meanings and interests, collective actions 
or an individual’s position in a community. What makes these goods public, I argue, is the 
common need, desire and enjoyment of them in the city and, in turn, the control, management 
and delivery by service providers. Thus, rather than assuming these goods are located within 
public institutions or in the “state”, public means a shared value in one or more communities, 
requiring certain collective actions (service provision). Urban centers are geopolitical sites of 
contested access to and control of public goods and form a space of intensified negotiations of 
statehood.  
 
It is useful for analytical purposes to distinguish between categories of practice and categories 
of analysis, as inspired by Bourdieu ([1990] 1997, pp. 80-97). Categories of practice denote 
the more popular, everyday terms used to describe social life. These are necessary forms of 
categorizing and organizing the world around us and enable researchers to connect with their 
population of interest. Here, the idea of the “state effect”, i.e., that modern statehood appears 
as an apparatus separate from the social world (Mitchell, 1999, p. 89), becomes highly relevant 
for the researcher. Categories of analysis are what the researcher uses to describe the object of 
scientific inquiry. I do not think a sharp distinction between categories of analysis (scientific 
inquiry) and practices (everyday descriptions of the social world) is useful in this research. As 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 5) argue; a sharp distinction between these categories would 
mean that social scientists would have a much poorer, artificial language to describe the social 
world. This does not mean that these authors, or I, uncritically accept the way those being 
researched portray their world or frame them as categories of analysis. Instead, as Brubaker 
and Cooper (2000, p. 5) argue, categories of practices, such as public goods or state, can be 
(and here will be) used as categories of analysis, but social scientists have to exercise caution 
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in how they use these categories. Mitchell (1999, p. 76) makes this distinction clear when he 
argues the following:  
 
“The network of institutional arrangement and political practice that forms the material substance of the 
state is diffuse and ambiguously defined at its edges, whereas the public imagery of the state as an 
ideological construct is more coherent. The scholarly analysis of the state is liable to reproduce in its 
own analytical tidiness this imaginary coherence and misrepresent the incoherence of state practice.”  
 
Concepts such as the state, statehood or public goods are, and will remain, ambiguous, fluid 
and fragmented, depending on their theoretical foundation and social practice. Thus, a first step 
in this process has been to avoid a usage of these concepts that connotes a given, essentialist 
categorization. For the categories of practices, this means that I have let my informants explain 
what they perceive or understand as public goods, what they expect from the state, what is 
expected of being a citizen and their everyday access to and control over the goods studied 
here. This has meant, however, that informants may speak of the state as an entity, even though 
they may refer to multiple actors and different institutions from the local municipality level to 
the head of government. These categories of practices from informants’ perspectives are 
important ways of understanding perceptions and practices of “living” and “performing” the 
state in the case studies. However, these categories of practices, such as what people describe 
as the “state”, are different from the categories of analysis in the thesis. As a category of 
analysis, I see the state as the effect of practices and that it takes multiple forms and that it “is 
called into being by stating what [the state] should be” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71). Thus, the 
analytical process of this thesis has involved making certain conceptual separations between 
empirical (categories of practices) and theoretical (categories of analysis) contributions.  
 
In the categories of analysis, I have identified citizens of the two urban territories Kadutu and 
Ibanda as consumers because they represent groups of private households trying to access, 
enjoy, navigate and manage their ways in the field of what is categorized as “public goods” in 
the analysis. In a sub-category of consumers, I identify taxi drivers as consumers because they 
represent a group of actors who enjoy access to public goods provided by, for instance, the 
urban road agency. These taxi drivers are also service providers in offering transport that 
private citizens enjoy and rely on daily. Nevertheless, they are seen as consumers in the 
category of public roads because of their frequent usage and confrontation with the state and 
state-like actors. Providers, as another category of analysis, represent groups of actors involved 
in the provision of and control over the same public goods. None of these individual actors 
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refer to themselves or are called consumers or providers in practice. This is, rather, a category 
of analysis to organize the inquiry. However, these categories of analysis are blurry as 
(networks of) citizens may be providers of public goods when they assist in or constraining 
public good provision that benefit the community, such as collective waste management, 
controlling water posts or restricting access to roads. From those charging small client fees to 
larger criminal networks, citizens outside the formal state agencies, private companies or 
municipal apparatus are engaged in public goods provision. This represents the relational 
approach in the thesis.  
 
The categories of consumer and provider are also conceptually useful in analyzing distinction, 
i.e. what you have (or do not have) and who you are (or are not), both in relation to others 
(consumers and providers) and to understand how citizen-subject divisions are created, upheld 
and negotiated. As demonstrated empirically, distinctions are made on the basis of economic 
and social capital that differentiates consumers in two main social groups (citizen and subjects 
or the haves and have-nots) and their relations with providers. Moreover, there is evidence that 
the providers, those in charge of control and provision of common goods, are also sometimes 
seen as particularly privileged consumers. This shows how these categories of consumer and 
provider are not one-dimensional but rather conflictual, interpretive and dynamic in form.   
 
The social actors categorized as consumers or providers are, in turn, engaged in identifying, 
explaining and making claims on the dimensions of statehood and the state practices and 
performance. In the analysis (Chapter 8), I also make categorical distinctions of “modes of 
governance” in controlling public goods and citizen-subjects distinctions as categories of 
analysis. Again, these forms of categorizations are not used in practice by informants but 
analyzed through the way in which social actors self-identify, and identify what they expect 
and how they enjoy, control and manage public goods. Categories of practices in these 
situations are for instance dahoulage (stealing electricity), perceptions of what “public” means, 
service provision by the state, perceptions of what is expected of “citizens” and acts of 
“anarchic” settlers. Categories of practices also involve references to time and space through 
historical and comparative claims of how the ‘state’ used to work and how provision of public 
goods works in neighboring Rwanda (Cyangugu town). These categories of practices 
comprise, I argue, de facto statehood, i.e., the different dimensions of performing and living 
the state.   
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Table 2 shows an example of these categories. However, it should be noted that these categories 
come from a rich qualitative data collection where, as the empirical chapters will detail, there 
are fluctuations in the usage of these terms and in what context they are used and by whom. 
Thus, the Table 2 is simply for illustrative purposes.  
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Table 2 Exemplifying the differences and connections between categories of practices 
and analysis.  
Category of practices Interlinkage based on 
observation 
Category of analysis 
Dahoulage – “stealing a little 
[electricity]”  
Citizens who are unwilling to 
pay and lack trust in the 
monopolized state service of 
electricity.   
State resistance  
Anarchic  An expression used by public 
service providers referring to 
inhabitants unable, unwilling 
or resisting the duties of 
urban space and common 
goods.      
Subjects 
Real clients  Perceptions by public service 
providers of proper citizens 
able to pay, comply with the 
rules and duties of the state 
apparatus.  
Citizens 
Public  Considered free to all, 
regardless of status, 
enjoyment on equal basis, 
liberty, as considered by 
private citizens (consumers) 
in Kadutu, Bukavu.     
Public  
 
3.2 Case studies and Methods 
 
Before elaborating on my case study design and field research, I will position the case studies 
in relation to broader literature. Lund (2014, p. 224) argues that 
 
 “[a] case is an edited chunk of empirical reality where certain features are marked out, emphasized, 
and privileged while others recede into the background. As such, a case is not “natural,” but a mental, 
or analytical, construct aimed at organizing knowledge about reality in a manageable way.”  
                   69 of 250 
 
By applying concepts, such as public goods and statehood to an empirical reality, I have made 
theoretical choices that enable me to speak to a broader audience and make connections that 
reach beyond this particular site of field research. However, the concepts used have also 
directed me, as a researcher, to orient my inquiry about the world (the cases) I have studied. 
This is not a selection bias but rather a conscious choice of how to study and frame reality. 
Other researchers might have emphasized structural models of domination or focus on the 
individual rational actor with a set of fixed preferences. Case studies, however, are a more 
dynamic exercise where there are no static variables and action is not frozen in time (Migdal 
& Schlichte, 2005, p. 20). Based on the broad research question I have posed, I do not believe 
these complex processes can be narrowed down to a single explanatory variable. Instead, this 
thesis captures a range of views, context and interpretations of the state of affairs, which can 
be positioned in what George and Bennett (2005, p. 76) refer to as ‘building blocks’ studies. 
These are “particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon [to] identify common patterns or serve 
a particular kind of heuristic purpose” (George & Bennett, p. 76). The phenomenon I study is 
de facto statehood through public good relations (types). I consider the study of public goods 
as consisting of different case studies of the same phenomenon, namely statehood. In my 
analysis, I seek to both identify certain patterns through “modes of governance” and “citizen-
subject” relations. However, in order to contribute more broadly to de facto statehood analysis, 
I use these patterns to develop a heuristic approach to statehood dimensions. I do, however, 
place much value on individual perspectives in themselves, and I have chosen an empirical 
representation of participants’ own voices in Chapters 5-7.          
 
The case studies here are positioned in an interpretive, relational research design that 
investigates how social actors in Bukavu discuss, negotiate, control and enjoy public goods. 
This allows for problematizing normative and/or preformed claims about the state based on 
European state formation and, instead, provides an entry point for analyzing statehood coming 
alive through citizens’ relations in urban space. As Danermark et al. (2002 in Lund, 2014, p. 
227) argue:  
 
“Social scientists do not discover new events that nobody knew about before. What is discovered is 
connections and relations, not directly observable, by which we can understand and explain already 
known occurrences in a novel way.”  
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These case studies are positioned within typical political science concepts, such as states, 
statehood, public goods and citizens, but are based on rich qualitative data to interpret everyday 
perspectives on statehood by analyzing the social actors whose voices are often silenced in 
Western dominated literature.   
 
Choosing a single-site for the case studies, meaning geographically narrow in this study, is a 
highly context-dependent exercise. Instead of using loaded terms, such as generalizability, case 
studies that are rich in descriptive data can make use of patterns (general) and abstractions 
(concepts and theories) to interpret the social world (Lund, 2014, p. 225). By using these terms, 
it is possible to address the relationship between the context-dependent, i.e., case studies based 
on Bukavu citizens, and the broader implications of the research in the literature and vice versa. 
In other words, by applying categories of analysis, I use the case studies to develop conceptual 
and theoretical contributions that are relevant outside the patterns observed.  
 
The selection of participants (informants) follows what Yin (in Small, 2009, pp. 25-26) terms 
“the case study logic”, rather than sampling logic. As Small (p. 19) argues “[s]ampling logic is 
superior when asking descriptive questions about a population; case study logic is probably 
more effective when asking how or why questions about processes unknown before the start 
of the study.”   The relatively limited number of informants, namely 40 interviews and 7 main 
focus groups (further discussed below), is specific to the case study logic of saturation rather 
than “representative” sampling logic. Interview subjects were carefully selected on the basis of 
their role in service provision, such as specific agencies, while focus group members were 
selected based on representing different socio-economic groups and sex/age differences. The 
number of participants was unknown until completion, where each participant had a different 
“selection probability” and was asked semi-structured questions that allowed for further 
follow-up questions. Questions were also adapted to specific agencies (e.g., the road agency or 
the water company) but also between different categories of consumers, such as women living 
in Kadutu with no “formal” connections to public good provision or men in Ibanda with these 
formal connections (see further discussion below for more on this topic). This was a sequential 
process where each participant’s contribution led to a refinement and re-evaluation of my 
understanding of the topics. Towards the end of my research, I found that new interviewees or 
focus group settings did not reveal new ideas on the study topic, but rather reaffirmed the 
patterns I had identified from previous encounters. In addition, the main service providers of 
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the goods studied in this thesis were covered through the interviews and additional interviews 
with them would be repetitive. This was the level of saturation for my empirical inquiry.  
  
 
Table 3 shows the main categories of providers and consumers, type of goods and forms of 
access and delivery. Again, these categories are not fixed and consumers might be providers in 
some instances or vice versa.     
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Table 3 Table summarizing the case studies 
Based on type of goods, informants, access and delivery studied and identified in Bukavu 
 Providers:  
Public institutions 
Providers: 
Commercial 
Companies, 
international 
donors 
Consumers/ 
Providers: 
Local/Civil 
society 
associations 
Consumers: 
Private citizens 
from Ibanda & 
Kadutu 
Waste 
manage-
ment 
Single: Formally 
placed at the 
municipal level  
Poubel Net  Youth groups, 
market waste 
collectors 
Recycling, use 
of public space 
including 
rivers, lake. 
Roads and 
traffic 
Multiple:  
 Office de Route  
 Office des Voiries 
et Drainage  
 Fonds National 
D’Entretien  
 Les Policiers de 
Circulation 
Routière  
 Société Nationale 
d'Assurances 
 
Bilateral and 
international 
agreements 
though 
World Bank, 
European 
Union, 
China.12 
 Association 
Congolese 
de 
Conduire 
 Forces-
Vives 
Special focus 
on taxi drivers.   
Water & 
hydro-
electricity  
Monopoly:  
 Régie de 
Distribution d’Eau  
 Société National 
d’Électricité  
World Bank 
 
  “Salongo” 
(voluntary 
work)  
 “Fin 
d’heure” 
(extortion 
gangs) 
 Neighbor-
hood 
networks 
 
 Formal 
connections 
 Use of 
rivers, rain 
and lake,  
 Funu and 
Kaduru, 
water 
stations 
 Dahoulage  
(stealing 
electricity) 
 
 
More specifically, the case studies conducted in Bukavu involved participants representing 
different perspectives from the consumer and provider dimensions of public goods. I conducted 
these studies by combining semi-structured interviews (mainly service providers), focus groups 
with a topic guide (consumers), and participant observation (understanding social context). I 
                                               
12 I was not able to gain access to these bilateral and multilateral agencies, but informants discuss them and I use 
secondary literature, such as reports, available on the topic of restructuring the governance of water, as well as 
participant observation on road reconstruction by Chinese companies.  
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will discuss these approaches individually below, but first I will discuss the rationale behind 
different methods applied to different informants.  
 
The “providers” were interviewed on an individual basis, whereas the “consumers” where 
interviewed in a focus group setting. The reasons for this are the following. First, the providers 
were specific individuals in charge of or controlling key goods addressed in the case studies. 
As I needed specific, in-depth knowledge on the individual cases (water, electricity, waste 
management, roads), a focus group setting where these different providers were grouped 
together would have been time-consuming and not have allowed for deeper engagement with 
the individual cases. Second, I argue that these individual authorities often held different levels 
of power, influence and legitimacy and an interview setting allowed them to speak more freely 
than they might have done when confronted with powerful authorities (e.g. their superior) in 
the same room. Individually, they dared to question their roles and responsibilities as service 
providers in a broader (political) system. By having these service providers in an interview 
setting, I could also more easily follow-up on specific topics related to day-to-day management 
of these public goods while keeping the interest and attention of the interview subject. In 
addition, and practically speaking, as an individual (female) doctoral student with little political 
or economic influence in Bukavu, getting these authorities together in a room would have been 
very difficult, indeed probably impossible. It might have required unethical tools (e.g. bribes) 
or a profound confidence building with individual authorities, in addition to difficulties with 
the dispersed geographical locations of the various offices.   
 
Second, regarding the approaches to setting up the focus groups, “consumers” were grouped 
into three main categories in two different geographical territories (Kadutu and Ibanda) in 
addition to a special group of consumers related to roads (male taxi drivers). This was done 
primarily as I wanted to nuance views on specific topics and engage more deeply with meaning 
and reasoning behind different perceptions of access to services from different layers of 
society. Focus groups provided a social context in which such issues as being a citizen and the 
contested context of public goods access could be considered, rather than from the isolated, 
individual perspective of interviews. The meanings, perceptions and interpretations of topics 
related to de facto statehood are in many ways collective (however contested) and could more 
effectively be debated through discussions and interactions with a group. As will be shown in 
the empirical chapters, certain personal views were highly contested by members of the same 
focus group while other views were agreed upon, while discussions added more substance to 
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these views. As an “outsider” or “experience-distant” researcher (see section 3.3), the focus 
groups allowed me to gain further insight into these social processes and the topics debated 
revealed issues that I might not have encountered in an individual interview setting.    
 
Specifically, I interviewed 40 participants, of whom two were interviewed twice. The formal 
interviewees were mainly participants representing a service provision (state-owned, 
commercial or other types) and/or the formal administration of Bukavu. However, amongst the 
interviewees, I also conducted (six) interviews with intellectuals, who provided me with an 
insights historical, political and economic context of Bukavu, all of which were relevant for 
deeper interpretation of state-society relations. I do not claim that these intellectuals were able 
to describe the ‘objective reality’ of these relations, but it was possible to explore ideas and 
perspectives with them, based on my research, which stimulated further analysis.    
 
During the fieldwork, I made a list of core questions to ask during the interviews with the 
service providers. These questions began with some background queries about the institution 
or organization that provided the public good. Such questions could, for instance, ask if the 
agency was state-owned, how it was funded, or questions could cover any history of 
institutional changes, such as past moves from parastatal to semi-private status. I also asked 
questions regarding cooperation or connections with other institutions, such as whether the 
water agency cooperated with the municipal waste management services or vice versa. These 
questions, however, often took interesting turns on relevant topics that emerged. By using semi-
structured techniques, I managed to gain information about service provision practices and 
performances that were unknown to me prior to entering the field. This was useful as I was 
conducting an empirical study without knowing any answers before encountering the 
participants. The information that I wanted to access during these interviews was mainly oral; 
I could later follow up on interviews by searching for written documentation on the same topics 
(i.e., triangulation). One such example includes references to World Bank initiatives that were 
affecting the institutional arrangements, e.g., neo-liberal agendas, and relations between 
providers and consumers.  
 
Further, in order to gather perspectives from consumers, i.e., private citizens of Bukavu, I chose 
to conduct six focus groups; three in the poorer neighborhoods of Kadutu and three in the city 
center and more privileged area of Ibanda. Focus groups averaged from three to eight 
participants in three different group compositions:  
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1) Youth, a mixed group of girls and boys: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu 
2) Women: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu 
3) Men: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu  
 
In these focus group settings, I followed the same principle of semi-structured interviews. 
Participants were asked questions regarding basic background information, such as age, 
occupation and where they lived in Bukavu. In addition, I had a set of core questions regarding 
what they considered “public goods” and “public services” to mean, whether or not they had 
piped water, electricity and regular waste services.  Moreover, I asked them about taxation 
practices when using public roads. I would then follow up on more qualitative questions 
depending on their responses to actual practices and expectations. For instance, an emerging 
topic across these focus groups discussions was the idea of “public”, such as public space, as a 
category of practice. This was an analytical insight into the contested nature of “public” in 
Bukavu and different responses were received from private citizens in focus groups, interviews 
with intellectuals and service providers.  
 
In addition, I conducted one focus group discussion with taxi drivers in Bukavu that represents 
a particular group of consumers for one of the public goods, namely roads, in the case study. 
Obviously, these taxi drivers also need, for instance, water in their daily lives, but as Lund’s 
definition of a case study cited above highlights, I have chosen particular empirical realities 
that I privilege, the enjoyment of public roads in this particular context. These participants were 
also asked basic background information, but the prepared questions related to accessing public 
roads daily. I also followed up with questions regarding the drivers’ union (ACCO), which I 
was not sufficiently familiar to prior to the meeting, and practices and expectations when it 
came to taxation and traffic police.  
 
Prior to these focus groups, I also conducted pilot focus groups with youth, students, men and 
women, from both Ibanda and Kadutu during the first two fieldwork visits as a way of 
immersing myself in their realities and perspectives. These discussions were of an explorative 
character; I asked broad questions about life and expectations in Bukavu and sentiments about 
the Congolese government, locally and centrally. Participants were free to discuss what came 
to mind and conversations revealed topics in Bukavu that allowed me to re-consider, follow-
up and refine questions. They were also a lesson in group composition:  I learned to avoid 
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silencing certain participants in a group, and to prepare and plan for final focus groups.  
However, the main findings in the empirical chapters are primarily based on the final six focus 
groups and the focus group with taxi drivers. In total, I conducted 14 focus groups (personally) 
while the research assistant conducted one focus group.13 
 
In terms of the composition of the six main focus groups, it was useful to divide the adult 
population into separate groups of men and women, as there is a tendency in Bukavu for men 
to take charge in a group, potentially silencing women. There are also differences between 
being a university student and being an adult woman in Bukavu, where the former may have 
more room to speak up. I also adopted this approach because there were different gender roles 
concerning daily tasks and the household roles of men and women. Though the youth groups 
could also be divided into girls and boys, my previous experience with both dividing and 
combining girls and boys revealed that talking to the younger population together stirred more 
debate on the given topics. Dividing the population into age groups – young people who still 
lived with their families and adults having their own families – it was possible to gain a sense 
of expectations from people who had only lived briefly during the late Zaire and the DRC 
period (1990s and onwards) and those who had experienced the decades of the 1970s and 80s.14    
 
Finally, participant observation was an important way of understanding, for instance, ‘public’ 
transport, commercial waste services, public water sources and a range of other issues. Lessons 
from these observations were pursued further in different interview and focus group settings. 
These observations were made, for instance, when using taxis, visiting municipal offices, or 
generally engaging with people accessing different public goods. In addition, participant 
observation allowed me to ask informal questions in any particular context. For instance, when 
traffic police stopped my driver, I would ask questions about the event immediately after it 
occurred. These answers are not used as quotations in the thesis, but rather enriched my 
understanding of the social context.15 Such events also informed me about my influence in this 
social context. Using the same example, the police officer sought to negotiate a handsome bribe 
                                               
13 During the fieldwork in September-October 2014, I was unable to conduct a focus group with women in Ibanda. 
The research assistant, Jonathan Magoma, had actively participated in all the focus group meetings in the role as 
translator, moderator and also note taker to ensure we had compatible understanding and was fully competent to 
conduct a focus group on his own. I sent him the topic guide with questions, allowing for participants and 
interviewer to further discuss issues that were raised, and he conducted and transcribed the focus group interview.    
14 See background Chapter 4 for more details on the contextual situation of Congolese statehood aspects.   
15 Section 3.3 will further elaborate on reflexivity and positionality. 
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with my driver based on my presence, as a potential source of extra cash, while at the same 
time using excessively polite French when engaging with me.   
 
All interviews and focus groups were transcribed; some were recorded, when agreed upon, and 
were transcribed.  Transcription was necessary after focus groups where participants’ 
contributions had been fragmented or when participants had spoken over each other. The 
majority of interviews and focus groups, however, were recorded by my taking hand-written 
notes: this was more comfortable for the participants and more convenient for me. Once 
returning to my lodgings in the afternoon or evening, I immediately transcribed the notes using 
my laptop and made separate notes on participant observations. Quotations in this thesis are 
taken directly from these transcriptions.   
 
Language is another important issue in my methodological approach, as there are a variety of 
languages and dialects spoken in Bukavu, including, but not limited to, French in 
administrative and education settings, varieties of Swahili, Mashi (Shi language), and Lingala 
among soldiers. In this section, I will only focus on the immediate practicalities, while returning 
to more profound issues in Section 3.4. During the fieldwork, I worked with two translators. 
Ali, whom I met first, was able to assist me during the pilot fieldwork. Due to other 
commitments on his side, Jonathan would eventually also assist me in arranging focus group 
meetings. The type of participants was structured (age group, neighborhood and sex) and 
Jonathan would find participants in places where they could typically be found, such as local 
in churches, certain schools or cafés. The participants were also informed about my intentions 
prior to meetings.  
 
Working with translators was enriching because we could discuss and explore themes before 
and after the focus groups and interview settings. Jonathan, who I worked most with during the 
fieldwork visits, also reminded me of relevant questions that I could ask in interviews and focus 
groups based on previous encounters and experiences. This enriched the data with questions 
that I might have otherwise overlooked. Also, both Ali’s and Jonathan’s cultural sensitivity to 
customs on how to approach people in the particular settings smoothed entry to these settings 
and improved the way I formulated language. At a personal level, working together with them 
gave me confidence as a researcher to knock on any door because I knew that language skills 
were not a concern. I was less vulnerable to potential personal attacks or harassment as I was 
never alone. Moreover, there were conversations that I was not supposed to hear (spoken in 
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Swahili or Mashi) that my translators were able to pick up on and inform me about. One 
example of this is discussed in the chapter on roads (Chapter 6), where I was able to observe 
corruption taking place in the traffic police office.            
 
3.3 Reflexivity and Positionality  
 
In order to address validity in qualitative research, I will discuss the reflexive character of this 
thesis, i.e., that “social researchers are part of the social world they study” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007, p. 15). This is important to consider, in order to limit my effects on the data 
while, simultaneously, acknowledging my position in the study. In other words, the main 
concern here was to ask questions that were open-ended and not based on potentially biased 
personal perceptions, while being aware of how my presence might have shaped the 
participants’ answers. As such, I will use the term “participants” in this discussion as they were 
actively taking part in my research through sharing personal reflections, perceptions and ideas.  
 
However, when participants were active in the study they may have been describing a version 
of their access to public goods provision or their consumption from, to some extent, ulterior 
motives. For instance, it was usual that poorer citizens in Kadutu would claim that there were 
no existing services for them and then, in the next sentence, ask for help. Poorer citizens’ 
encounters with Westerners are usually of a donor-recipient nature and their perception of me, 
despite my presentation as a student, was often framed as a potential source of funding. 
Respecting that these citizens find themselves in difficult situations, it was important to ask 
different follow-up questions so that we could work around the subject of public goods to gain 
a fuller picture. That said, it is precisely in the subjective meanings and perspectives of 
participants that I was interested. Nevertheless, it remained an important issue throughout the 
fieldwork visits to be aware of informants’ intentions and their representations, and to 
triangulate data by combining views from different participants, with participant observation 
and with what was available from written sources to gain a more accurate picture.   
 
Moreover, becoming an “insider” in Congo was almost impossible for me. There are some 
obvious and subtler reasons, as well as advantages and disadvantages, related to this outsider 
position. Being an insider has both advantages and disadvantages and needs to be scrutinized 
thoroughly to be taken seriously (see e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1989). In short, I neither fitted in as a 
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white woman, nor was I part of the expatriate community working in Bukavu. For example, 
expatriates are generally not allowed to take local taxis due to insurance and safety issues. By 
contrast, being a student without development aid funding and taking a local taxi leveled my 
position, to some extent, with the participants. However, my European “ethnicity” inevitably 
affected Congolese perceptions about me, as they tend to view Western Europe as a rich and 
well-functioning continent. In many ways, I remained privileged with a return ticket that cost 
the equivalent of several years of an average Congolese salary, and a Norwegian passport. At 
night, I could return to a safe house with guards, food, beer and friends, where the only thing I 
lacked was well-functioning access to the Internet.  My understanding of people’s suffering 
due to poverty would be a subjective interpretation of what I saw and what people would tell 
me, not felt in the same way as the participants of this research.  
 
Furthermore, the outsider position is important to consider when it comes to knowledge and 
the types of questions asked. As an outsider, I could ask questions that a participant might not 
have thought about or reflected much upon, or I could ask questions that might compel the 
participant to explain what could be obvious for insiders. Geertz (1973 in Schatz 2009, p. 6-7) 
has termed this the “experience-distant” approach, contrasted by degree with “experience-
near.” By being experience-distant to meanings, relations and identities in public good 
provision in Bukavu, I investigated “taken-for-granted” knowledge by participants. Thus, the 
key was to be alert and always ask questions about phrases, names and expressions that seemed 
obvious to the insiders (experience-near). As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, p. 29) argue, 
“[b]eing a stranger to one’s physical setting (…)  - and trying to hold on to that quality for as 
long as one can – is desirable in order to see as explicitly as possible what for situated knowers 
is taken-for-granted, common sense, and tacitly known.” Simultaneously, doctoral research is 
an insider exercise of writing my interpretations of the empirical observations and theoretical 
field. Contrary to many participants in this study, I am “experience-near” to social science 
languages that have shaped and constructed my analytical interpretations. Thus, there are 
different degrees of experience-distant and experience-near depending on the social and 
academic context in this PhD process.     
 
Furthermore, gaining access to data and the issues of language and gatekeepers can be  pressing 
concerns for outsiders or experience-distant researchers (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 
40). Gatekeepers can potentially select access to documents and participants based on their 
personal loyalties, and so it is important to consider these limitations. Here, negotiating, and 
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re-negotiating, access in a respectful manner was important and was always a combined effort 
by the translators and me. In many respects, research assistants are also gatekeepers as they 
influence who I might end up interviewing. For instance, the research assistant usually set up 
the focus groups; I could have spoken to different people if I had done this myself. However, 
based on my experience, the best way to set up focus groups was through my research assistant 
because, had I done this, I would have, firstly, attracted unnecessary attention as a white woman 
and, secondly, been unable to find “representative” participants of each group given my lack 
of knowledge regarding local contexts. Here, it was important to develop a framework 
identifying the characteristics of the population that I wanted to meet with and to ensure that 
participants were briefed by both my research assistant and me before conducting a focus 
group.  
 
During the fieldwork visits, some doors remained closed.  I was unable to interview the traffic 
police at street level, international donors or the elite consumer Bralima, the local brewery. At 
the same time, being a white foreigner opened up more doors than perhaps would have been 
available to a Congolese student.  As my research assistant Jonathan highlighted often, and 
which I also noticed in different encounters, the Congolese administration would normally 
demand an official purpose for a local meeting, often preferring questionnaires to be filled out 
to allowing face-to-face semi-structured interviews. By contrast, there was generally an open-
door policy for white foreigners. Reasons include, from my understanding, an interest in 
potential funding or a curiosity about the researcher. The administrative and public authorities 
also seemed to be interested portraying Congo in a favorable way and thus interested in talking 
to an international researcher. As a contrast, I would not expect similar open access to 
provincial or municipal authorities in my own country of origin (Norway) and, hence, the 
outsider position came with its advantages and privileges. By being an outsider, I could also 
ask less informed questions about issues that I might, otherwise, have felt uncomfortable asking 
about.  
3.4 Methodological challenges and ethical considerations 
 
This section will elaborate on some of the ethical and methodological challenges. First and 
foremost, there are some potential biases in a micro-study design that should be addressed, 
related also to the issue of scale. Just as macro-studies can ignore details, an overemphasis on 
micro-dynamics can cause researchers to lose the larger picture.  Researchers may also run the 
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risk of ignoring macro-activities originating from political authorities, e.g., from the central 
government or development agencies, when focusing on a relatively few number of people. In 
addition, it was important always to be aware of the different realities existing outside the urban 
center of Bukavu.  
 
Thus, to avoid a purely micro-study bias, I have, as far as possible, studied contemporary and 
historical state structures, including a brief archival study of Bukavu’s colonial design as the 
administrative headquarter of the eastern Congo, to enrich my understanding of the context in 
which I conduct my analysis. Moreover, I had an important meeting with the local king of 
Kabare (the Mwami of Kabare, the Shi kingdom), the Shi having ruled the study area for 
centuries before the colonial occupation (see Chapter 4). This enabled a contextual 
understanding of rulers and legitimacy, as well as contested land issues, all of which are 
underlying problems for public goods provision.  
 
As mentioned, I worked with two research assistants to assist with translation and arranging 
focus group meetings. The issues of language and interpreters would have been even more 
pressing, had I conducted an ethnographic study; however, it is still useful to discuss some of 
these challenges in a micro-study approach. In terms of the limitations of my language abilities, 
the French I learned at school and in Paris was different from the varieties spoken in Bukavu. 
An advantage, however, was that French was used mainly as an administrative and formal 
language, which meant that I would not have to deal with slang or idiomatic expression. Yet, 
there is no escaping the fact that, due to the historical-colonial origins of the French language, 
by using French, it was difficult to gain a more personal or deeper understanding of 
participants’ inner thoughts about the public goods I was studying.  
 
Hence, a distance was created by my speaking French and not having mastered Swahili or 
Mashi (i.e., I was a linguistic outsider). Working with translators, however, allowed me to gain 
an insight into the expressions and thoughts of non-Francophone participants of a lower 
socioeconomic status. However, different translators or interpreters will emphasize and 
translate in their own ways, which might affect participants’ or my understanding. Translation 
is not simply a mechanical effort that can be controlled in the field but a highly subjective, 
cognitively demanding and time-consuming exercise (Borchgrevink, 2003, p. 106). This means 
that it is important for the translator and the researcher to work closely together to avoid, as far 
as possible, misunderstanding.  
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An example during the early stages of my second fieldwork revealed a problematic translation 
of the concept “public goods”. As the translator and I spoke English to each other, I did not 
consider using the French expression bien public to ensure that he understood what I meant. 
Instead, and during the first interview, the concept was translated to bonne gouvernance (good 
governance), which made me realize that we needed to discuss further the purpose of the 
research. However, it also revealed how categories of analysis may be interpreted in a 
dramatically different manner from categories of practices. Interpreting public goods as “bonne 
gouvernance” is an example of how Western donor agendas affect vocabulary in this area. 
Frequently, I would discover the contested nature of what public means which, in turn, 
informed my analyses regarding the contested nature of the “state”. Moreover, effective 
communication relies on more than language and I consider myself incredibly lucky to have 
worked with people that were polite, respectful and intelligent. This is important as the 
fieldwork was highly dependent on communication and could have yielded far less fruitful 
results if I had been ill at ease with the translator. Luckily, it was possible during the fieldwork 
visits to collaborate closely and, as a result, to develop more informed questions at each stage 
of the data collection.  
 
Furthermore, interview and focus groups are, generally speaking, unnatural settings and 
discussions will rarely flow naturally from the onset. Some encounters were more successful 
than others, for a variety of reasons. The most challenging aspect was that I did not necessarily 
have sufficient time to gain near-insider trust from the participants. In order to compensate for 
this limitation, it was necessary to read my participants, in terms of their social interaction, 
always to be polite and respectful and to work my way through an introduction that clarified 
my purpose. Also, as they increasingly understood my study, it was possible to ask very 
specific questions, compared to my first stumbling attempts, that allowed the participants to 
share more in-depth knowledge. This was particularly useful when conducting follow-up 
interviews with the same participants or in later-stage encounters. Moreover, it was important 
to choose environments in which participants felt secure, especially in focus group meetings; 
this was also an ethical concern. The interviews were mainly conducted in offices or similar 
such places, while the focus groups were conducted in private locations, for example, in one 
of the homes of the participants or in a shielded local pub where the participants were not 
disturbed by others.  
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Though the topic of the thesis may be seen as less volatile compared to topics analyzing 
conflicts in the region, the issues I studied were highly politicized and many were fearful of 
expressing political viewpoints that could put them in danger. By ensuring a secure 
environment, as far as possible, the conversations flowed into fuller discussions. The 
participants of the focus groups remain anonymous to protect them: in the worst case, 
individual citizens’ expressions of their viewpoints may lead to harm to themselves or their 
family.   
 
As written sources are limited concerning the topic I researched in Bukavu, the majority of the 
empirical work is based on information learnt orally. This is a subjective exercise and 
participants will intentionally and unintentionally distort information, for example, by 
manipulating their views, sharing some views and not others, or having ‘extreme’ viewpoints 
that diverge from the majority of the population. Thus, it was particularly useful to cross-check 
and triangulate data by speaking to different participants, as well as using written sources, when 
available, to gain more diverse perspectives. This does not mean that my study is “fact-based”, 
in line with more positivist approaches, but rather I wanted to verify if the perceptions presented 
by participants were one-off opinions or whether these were views to which other participants 
could also relate. 
 
Finally, a few more ethical considerations should be mentioned. As much as possible, I 
attempted to have a well-developed research design and a clear idea of what I was studying, 
before entering the field, in order to avoid taking unnecessary time from, and lose the interest 
of, participants. Though the study was constantly evolving on the ground, I was purposeful 
with the people I wanted to meet and the type of information I was seeking. It was also 
important to gain consent from and respect the confidentially of the participants. All 
participants were informed about my purpose and were asked if they would allow their name 
in my thesis, both before and after the interview/focus group. All interviews and discussions 
were conducted on a voluntary basis. Finally, I did not pay for any information but would 
sometimes offer soda or beer in appropriate settings, such as in pubs, as well as covering for 
taxi/transport for focus groups participants who had to travel in order to meet me. It would, in 
my view, be unethical if participants incurred costs related to my studies. I also provided a 
salary for research assistant work. 
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3.5 Summary remarks  
 
This chapter has demonstrated my intentions to move beyond what I consider to be the 
limitations of the methodology used in mainstream political science, namely the realist 
ontological and objectivist epistemological presuppositions (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). 
I argued that it is problematic to approach the social world only through pre-formed concepts 
and assume that entities come first and relations between these entities happen subsequently. 
Thus, I have combined what are termed interpretive and relational approaches to this study. By 
interpretive approaches, I mean a focus on subjective meanings, beliefs, and discourses, rather 
than correlations between entities. I further offer “interpretations of interpretations” to inform 
an inductive understanding of de facto statehood. By relational approach, I mean that I consider 
the transaction or relations between informants and the public goods as central to these 
meanings, beliefs and discourses. The interpretive, relational design enables me not only to 
problematize normative and/or preformed claims about how a state should appear or what it is 
not, but also enables me to focus on the people living and performing the state to provide an 
entry point for analyzing dimensions of statehood.   
  
Conceptually, and inspired by Bourdieu ([1990] 1997), I use categories of practices - everyday 
terms used by informants to describe social life, both objects and subjects – and categories of 
analysis – how I describe the object of scientific inquiry – as tools to approach and analytically 
develop the study. These categories of practices and analysis are not clinically separated, as 
these terms can be used by both social scientists and in everyday life by social actors, such as 
“the state”. In my scientific inquiry, the social world is studied, interpretively, by analyzing the 
meanings that social actors attach to certain categories of practices. Here, my inquiry starts 
with the meanings that consumers and providers attach to three categories of public goods: 
waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads. I see these case studies as a 
building block study, which entails studying types (public goods) of a phenomenon (statehood) 
in order to develop a heuristic approach to de facto statehood dimensions.  This, in turn, informs 
my categories of analysis within de facto dimensions of statehood that in turn make up some 
of the patchwork that we call “the state”.    
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4.0 Background chapter: The making of Bukavu and ideas of 
statehood    
 
“Observation is never neutral, the gaze is directed from a particular point of view. (…) There 
is no way of seeing from ‘nowhere in particular’.” 
 
(Hastrup, 1995, p. 4)  
 
The quote above is illustrative of how both scholars and those “producing history” construct 
plans, images and practices of statehood, nations and citizens. History can be seen as a 
production of thoughts, ideas, knowledges (connaissances) and sets of dispersed events 
(Foucault, 1998, pp. 301-302). As Foucault ([1972]2002, p. 8) argued, history “deploys a mass 
of elements that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form 
totalities.” According to this understanding, knowing a total history (e.g. of a nation) is 
impossible (Foucault, [1972]2002, p. 10). Rather, certain selections of history relating to the 
creation, effect, practices and performance of statehood dimensions will be emphasized. This 
chapter situates the subsequent discussion (Chapter 5-7) of my observations through 
interpreting historical trajectories and genealogies of the construction of Congo and Bukavu. 
In these cases, I argue that it is necessary to use history as a means to problematize the present. 
 
Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Neumann and Sending (2010, p. 20) argue that historical 
trajectories and relations are  preconditions for action. This way of thinking, the authors (ibid 
p. 20) argue, can also be applied to the political action of constructing governmentality. 
Governmentality is seen as techniques, rationales and mentalities for subject-making that 
authorities use for particular ends or power (Foucault, 1991). The relations studied between 
public goods provision and consumption need to be positioned in these historical relations, as 
no actors or groups can rightly be seen as independent, either from each other or from their 
context.  I will follow this principle through an interpretation of the literature on the Belgian 
Congo (1908-1960), the period known as Zaire (1971-1997) and the transition to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), supplemented by fieldwork interviews in and around 
Bukavu. Overall, the chapter is intended to interpret historical trajectories and relations when 
it comes to concepts surrounding public good provision, statehood and the state effect (colonial 
or independent) in Bukavu.   
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The chapter is structured as follows: First, I will begin with the story of Bukavu seen from pre-
colonial structures. Second, a history of the colonial authorities will be presented. These 
authorities invested in public good infrastructure and building, and were thus the creators of 
the Bukavu’s physical aspect. But they also contributed to creating the underlying relationships 
within the city, by creating identities and the body of colonial administration. As discussed in 
the theoretical chapter, the city can be seen as a difference machine that creates ways of being 
political that are different from those associated with the pastoral life of a village (Isin, 2002; 
Mamdani, 1996). Major investments in a piped water system, electricity, roads, sanitation and 
administrative housing occurred in the post-World War II period, primarily in the first half of 
the 1950s. In many ways, Bukavu approximated a European city in this period. In order to 
understand why these investments took place, I argue that it is important to look at the colonial 
governmentality through the archives available on these issues.  
 
Second, this chapter will review the post-colonial period and the rise of the Zairian nation-state 
through President Mobutu Sese Seko (henceforth Mobutu).  Understanding this period is 
crucial for understanding the broader picture regarding nation-building and, relatedly, public 
goods provision. Contrary to its common categorization as a pure kleptocracy, the Zairian 
government, in fact, invested much in public service provision and, thus, fortified an image of 
the importance of the state and its promise. Importantly, and even though the regime eventually 
fell, that promise of the state lives on among citizens. As in many post-colonial countries, Zaire 
was a state that promised much but that did not deliver on all these promises. I will particularly 
discuss what Young and Turner (1985, pp. 64-65) call the fourth stage, between 1970-74, 
which saw considerable state expansions in ideological and economic terms and, moreover, 
there was an expansion in the reach of the regime in terms of the domestic dimensions of 
statehood. It was in this period that nation-building techniques, rationales and mentalities 
(governmentalities) were at their peak. This will be discussed in relation to the politics of 
zairianisation and authenticity as a form of governmentality that had a major impact on state 
ownership, ideas of being political and the promise of the state. Specific national agencies will 
be discussed in this chapter, such as the water agency (REGIDESO) and the electricity agency 
(SNEL), to situate the state’s monopolization of services.  
 
The last section includes a discussion on the transition from Zaire to the DRC and some of the 
broader issues and specific aspects that concerns contemporary Bukavu. In this section, I 
discuss changes to the languages of stateness (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 6) in the country 
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as a result of the fall of Mobutu’s regime and conflict complexities in the eastern provinces. 
The section is also based on emerging issues from fieldwork, such as population growth, and 
international and domestic aspects of statehood that affect service providers and consumers in 
Bukavu.  
 
Creating a modern state effect in the DRC has been as much about alienation and othering as 
an articulation of citizenship under a state.  A significant number of academic and legal texts, 
dating back to Belgian Congo, reveals a considerable preoccupation with the identification of 
people as, for example, citizens, workers, slaves, evolved, ethnic, tribal or indigenous, on one 
hand, and the design of the modern administration (“the state”) on the other. Recalling the 
theoretical discussion (Chapter 2), the othering is seen as a condition of citizenship (Isin, 2002, 
pp. 3-4). Namely, defining who belongs and does not belong to modern state.  Simultaneously, 
the discourses emerging from these texts reveal equally how much there was no one Belgian 
Congo – a unified colonial state – but a plurality of political rationalities and techniques 
employed to govern different regions and people. The colonial period and the following 
decades after independence have undoubtedly pushed people and groups into new ways of 
defining “the public”. Various visions of what a nation state should be have coalesced with 
dual expectations of duties and rights. 
 
The particularities of the city, as where the colonial masters’ settled, administered and created 
divisions, create a space for interaction, sometimes conflictual, across a range of identities and 
practices (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 8). To take the example of colonial Leopoldville (Kinshasa), 
this city grew in the first half of the 20th century into what de Boeck (2011, p. 266) describes 
as “a segregationist, Janus-faced city, a city like a Bounty candy bar, with a white heart, La 
Ville, the home of the city’s European population (…) and a surrounding, quickly growing 
peripheral African city, commonly referred to as La Cité, home to an increasing number of 
Congolese.” Though smaller in size and established later as a colonial city, Bukavu had clear, 
segregationist lines of settlements and claims of citizenship and othering (subject-making). 
Although racial discrimination has long been abolished, I argue that there are still divisions 
based on the colonial structure and later conflictual relations when it comes to constructing 
identities of belonging and othering. These historical trajectories are relevant for understanding 
negotiations over public goods as dimensions of statehood.  
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4.1. Pre-colonial structures in South Kivu, Congo 
 
Looming in the background of the municipal apparatus of Bukavu’s formal state is its 
relationship with the traditional kingdom(s) of the Shi people, Bashi; a form of autochthon 
claim to the land of  South Kivu (see Boas & Dunn, 2013). It should be noted, however, that 
when the Shi arrived, hunter-gather “Pygmie”16 groups, Batwa or Bambuti, were already there 
and are believed to be the first inhabitants of the Rift Valley forests (today covering eastern 
DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) (Lewis, 2000, p. 5; Vansania, 2001, pp. 25, 32-34). 
Though these groups deserve more discussion, the Shi tribe is considered the first to have 
created central, hierarchical forms of governance in the region and will thus be prioritized in 
this thesis.  
 
The Shi tribe arrived in what is now known as Kabare territory around 1350 and was organized 
under different clans (Schneider 1996, p. 55). The Shi eventually consolidated their kingdom 
under one clan chief named Kabare Kaganda (Masson, 1960). However, in 1750, Kabare’s son, 
Kagweshe Bagweshe, rebelled against his father and the kingdom was split into two; Kabare 
in the north and Ngweshe in the South (Masson, 1960; Sosne, 1974). This led to conflicts over 
land between the two kingdoms. In addition, five other, smaller chiefdoms (Kaziba, Luhwidnja, 
Burhinyi, Nindja and Kalonge) have formed other elements of South Kivu’s domestic 
statehood (Bishikwabo, 1980, p. 89). As Bishikwabo (1980, p. 90) writes, “an ethnic unity 
[Shi] does not necessarily mean a political unity” and the region was inclined to rivalry and 
wars prior to colonization. In addition, immigration from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi 
has also been influential in political and economic spheres. However, unlike North Kivu 
province in contemporary DRC, the arrival of migrants from Rwanda and Burundi was largely 
due to the political dynamics in these neighboring kingdoms prior to colonization (Vlassenroot 
2013, p. 15). Though the exact dates and migration history are disputed, authors such as Alexis 
Kagame (1972 in Vlassenroot 2013, p. 16) have traced these Rwandan groups, who would later 
be known as Banyamulenge, back to the end of the 17th Century. The Banyamulenge, meaning 
“people of Mulenge”, consist of a small Tutsi pastoralist community speaking Kinyarwanda 
(Turner, 2007, p. 76). The Bashi in contemporary Bukavu regard the Banyamulenge with 
                                               
16 “Pygmies” is a generic academic term but also used actively by interest groups and Congolese nationals in the 
DRC.  
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suspicion; many of the latter live in Cyangugu town, Rwanda, across the border from Bukavu 
and are fearful of attacks during the night.17       
 
In the traditional Shi kingdoms, the clans were organized into hierarchical positions from the 
local king, Mwami, on top to the peasants without any political position, Bashizi, at the bottom 
(Tull, 2005, p. 73; Van Acker, 2000, p. 2).18 The Mwami, or Bami in plural (Bishikwabo, 1980, 
p. 92), are still in power today (though at varying degrees) but considered a territorial 
administration under the formal government as chef de chefferie. In the traditional Kabare and 
Ngweshe kingdoms, land was not owned per se by the Bami. Rather, land was administrated 
under a social organization known as kalinzi that can be described as a ‘structuring structure’ 
(Mugangu 1997 in Van Acker, 2000, p. 2). Instead of a formal contract, kalinzi can be seen, as 
Van Acker (p. 2) states, as “an institution that legitimizes the whole social organization by 
absorbing all persons within a given area into a network of dependent relations.”  Within this 
social hierarchy an annual rent in the form of products and labor would be paid by those 
working on the land to the given patron in the area and the surplus redistributed to sustain the 
social structure. Under this system, no one had full or no land rights as anyone, even 
immigrants, could rent land as long as they respected these rules. In that sense, land can be 
interpreted as a form of common good, although with certain prescribed roles. At the same 
time, this traditional organization was of an extremely hierarchical nature and subject-making 
under an autocratic, mythical king’s rule. Yet, the Bami rule can be seen as a state-like form of 
authority, as they absorbed classic approaches to statehood with regard to territory, population 
(subjects) and the creation of central governance forms.  Within this form of hierarchical rule, 
I argue, there is a limited space for transitions and changes in order for individuals to become 
politically engaged citizens.   
 
The traditional king of Kabare territory (Mwami de Kabare) is the closest monarch to Bukavu 
and is a direct royal descendent from the preexisting kingdom with an autochthonous claim to 
the city, as well as to South Kivu (Turner, 2007, p. 101). During my last fieldwork (October 
2014), I was told that due the popularity of this form of rule, tribal leaders are not allowed to 
officially stand for elections because it would usually mean a landslide victory to the Mwami.19 
                                               
17 “Banyamulenge” is  often used as a group term for the armed rebellion that started the First Congo War 1996-
1997.  
18 Also in personal conversation with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, 29 October 2014, Kabare, DRC 
19 In informal conversations during fieldwork September to October 2014 as well as with an intellectual, Déo 
Katwanyi Kabika, 28 October 2014, Bukavu, DRC.  
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A Mwami, then, is an authority closer to the population, having ethnic ties with the majority 
group (Mashi) in the region.  During the interview with the Mwami of Kabare, Jonathan, my 
research assistant, asked a very pertinent question regarding this claim, namely why the Mwami 
did not have armed guards to protect him, unlike politicians in Bukavu. The Mwami answered 
as follows:20  
 
“I am the Mwami, my family will always rule. When I am dead, my son will take over. This is not the 
case for politicians. If the governor dies, it is not necessarily his son that takes over. Also, if anyone 
killed me, the person who did this and his family would be ruined. He would be killed and his family 
would have their house and belongings taken away from them. I don’t have to safeguard my life; this 
is my people. But the politicians need to safeguard their lives because it is not their people.”  
  
There is a claim here that shows a considerable “closeness” to people under the Mwami’s rule 
that is dually based on threat of violent repercussions to anyone who makes an attempt on his 
life and a discourse of “eternal rule” through family inheritance and membership in contrast to 
the politicians and electorates in Bukavu. Using Weberian terms, the Mwami is using claims 
of legitimate rule, in the traditional ideal type of authority. Within this form of rule, legitimacy 
changes power from simple materiality (violence, corruption, and habit), to authority. Within 
this form of rule, as claimed by the Mwami, there is a shared belief between him and his 
subjects in his authority that makes it pointless for anyone to attempt to kill him. Of course, he 
may be killed, as predecessors have been, but the Bami’s legitimacy and their followers may 
persist. As I will discuss further in the section on contemporary administration in Bukavu (4.4), 
the Governor, the Mayor and the three Bourgmestre are not elected by citizens but imposed by 
the central government in Kinshasa. Thus, using the Mwami’s rationale, although these figures 
hold power over the citizens of Bukavu, they do not do so legitimately.  
 
Colonialism had a major impact on traditional Bami rules, although its impacts are disputed 
and used as political tools for creating certain histories about legitimate rules. From one point 
of view, the Mwami went from having a mythical status of “unchallenged and 
unchallengeable” to subordination or opposition under the colonial masters (Young & Turner, 
1985, p. 165). For instance, the story of Mwami Rugemaninzi I, the grandfather of the current 
Mwami of Kabare (cited above), is that he was imprisoned in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) due to 
his opposition to Belgian rule.21 When the Mwami returned after independence, the structure 
                                               
20 Interview with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, with research assistant Jonathan Magoma 29 October 2014, 
Kabare, DRC.  
21 Interview with Deo Katwanyi Kabika, an intellectual, 28 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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of Bukavu was completely transformed and the traditional kingdom was split into different 
smaller Mwami territories.22  In contemporary South Kivu, these smaller chiefdoms draw their 
legitimacy from both so-called traditional and modern forms of statehood. This includes, for 
instance, promoting modern forms of education, healthcare and administration and, at the same 
time, drawing on ethnic ties, traditional titles and rituals. The current Mwami of Kabare is no 
exception to this duality of traditional-modern statehood.23  
 
However, another version of history might be that colonialism had the impact of 
“territorializing identity”, as Vlassenroot (2013, p. 17) argues. This version sees a defining of 
identity in relation to territory and thus a strengthening of ethnicity as the organizing principle 
in the region. The arrival of the Belgian authorities thus partly consolidated and legitimatized 
chiefdoms outside the civic public (Ekeh, 1975). Sosne (1979, p. 194) argues that the Belgian 
rule profited Shi authorities, especially the higher levels of area chiefs, kings and their allies. 
This profit was particularly linked to plantation owners’ need for labor, largely drawn from the 
Shi population and facilitated by the traditional kings. Moreover, different sets of customary 
laws were created by the colonial masters based on an ethnic citizenship that recognized the 
assumed pre-colonial order (Vlassenroot 2013, p. 18). The result, as Mamdani (1996, 1997) 
has described, was a two-faced rule: One being the civic rule and the other an ethnicized and 
racialized power framed as native authority. The chief of a chiefdom was seen as a way to link 
the colonial state with the territories through African nobles (Dembour, 2008, p. 23). As I will 
discuss, the colonial experience in Bukavu, however, was modernizing in nature in the creation 
and construction of a modern city, partly constructed under the principle of civic rule but also 
encapsulating different politicized identities known as évolués.   
 
4.2 Colonial governmentality and the development of an urban 
administration in Bukavu 
 
Understanding colonial governmentality - mentalities, rationalities and techniques - has led me 
to archival sources from the Royal African Museum in Belgium, where in particular I consulted 
texts from Belgian colonial administrative experts. These texts do not offer reliable accounts 
qualify as of individual Belgians but rather describe the basis and rationale behind some of the 
                                               
22 Ibid, as well as interview with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, 29 October 2014, Kabare, DRC 
23 Reminding the reader that statehood can be perceived as a relative concept of the ability to enforce various 
collectively binding decisions on its members and hence a term not limited to formal state apparatus.  
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many ways of organizing and dividing the population from citizens and subjects. The colonial 
governmentality under King Leopold II’s Congo Free State (1885–1908) was in many respects 
more extreme than Belgian Congo (1908-1960) marked by a sharp contrast between outspoken 
ideals – anti-slavery, freedom, independence, “equality before the God of all” (Boulger, 1898, 
p. 1) – and practice – brutal slavery that led to millions dead and severe disruption to the lives 
of many others. The events of the Congo Free State are captured in a range of historical (e.g., 
Hochschild, 1998), fictional (e.g., Conrad, 1902), and journalistic writings and I will not focus 
on these happenings here as Bukavu and the surrounding region were largely “undiscovered” 
in this period. In brief, a typical description of the “natives” in the colonial imagining of the 
Congo Free State is captured below (Boulger, 1898, p. 340)24:  
 
 “The blacks are still in their infancy as a people. They may never attain manhood; and the one essential 
to their continued well-being is the presence of their white educators and leaders, who supply the 
initiative, in which they seem to be completely lacking. If they ever do attain an equality with white 
men, it will be the greatest human triumph in the history of the world.”  
 
Though these depictions were adjusted according to international pressure, especially through 
the declaration of International Human Rights (1948), there persisted an explicit or tacit 
tendency of sub-ordination and hierarchy based on “ethnicity” and “culture” in Belgian Congo 
(1908–1960). In Belgian law, for instance, there were whites (les blanches), evolved natives 
(les noir évolués), and tribalized or non-evolved natives (les noir non évolués)   (Hostelet, 1954, 
p. 303). These identities, however, were only a few of the many forms of different subject-
making claims by the Belgian colonizers; other such claims included workers, garçon (servant) 
and indigenous.25  
 
 Identity making also affected government techniques in dealing with land ownership and 
belonging. When the Belgian government assumed power after Leopold, the administrative 
foundation for public, commercial and private land was laid (Misch & Thron, 1909, p. 5). In 
the original text on land tenure in Belgian Congo, Misch and Thron (ibid pp. 6-7) argued that 
“[t]he natives do not understand the property or idea of vacant land. They settle in the territories 
where they come and go to harvest. The concepts of indigenous property and vacant land cannot 
                                               
24 The historian Boulger’s accounts serve as a time capsule to study a pro-Leopold and Congo Free State 
description of European colonial powers, administration and so-called natives.  
25 In reviewing the colonial literature, I noticed that the Belgians used considerable efforts in grouping and 
counting subjects in the colony.  
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be used as a basis for land legislation [in Belgian Congo].”26 Broadly speaking, the land was 
instead divided into: firstly, Belgian Congo’s state-owned land; secondly, land owned by 
individuals and companies or concessions; and, thirdly, indigenous land based on customary 
law (ibid). More specifically when it came to land rights (droit foncier), the Belgian colonial 
authorities distinguished between three types of land: les terres domaniales, the public land 
owned by the colony and for commercial exploitation (the companies and colonial state were 
often intertwined), les terres enrigstrées, private land for Europeans, and les terres indigènes, 
the indigenous or native land owned by clans (Hostelet, 1954, p. 303; Malengana, 2001, p. 
164). For the clans under the Shi, this meant that in mainly rural areas they could continue to 
cultivate land and use rivers and lakes for fishing but they did not formally own the land or 
production apart from subsistence farming.  
 
Moreover, the Belgians recognized three forms of native circumscription: firstly, the 
chieftaincy (chefferie), secondly, the sector (secteur) and, thirdly,  the extra-customary center 
(centre extra-coutumier, CEC) (see  Baumer, 1939; Dembour, 2008; Young & Turner, 1985). 
This was primarily done in order to link the Belgian colonial state in the capital and cities to 
the population at large. As Young and Turner (1985, p. 233) argues, “[t]he manner in which 
they were applied depended both on the Belgian perception of the nature of the pre-colonial 
polity and on the distinctive provincial administrative traditions.” For the Kivu (today divided 
into North and South Kivus), where Bukavu was the administrative headquarter, the chieftaincy 
formula was favored in the rural and semi-rural areas (ibid), while a CEC was established in 
Kadutu outside the city center of Bukavu. Several of these chieftaincies, as Turner (2007, p. 
81) argues, should have become secteur, as they encompassed populations of various origins 
rather than pre-colonial, ethnically unified chiefdoms. Instead, the Belgians territorialized 
ethnicity by creating these administrative chieftaincies where populations were grouped under 
ethnic characteristics. In addition, certain ethnic communities were prioritized, including Shi 
(Bashi), Lega and Bembe, all of whom had more self-conscious perceptions of their ethnicities, 
which the Belgians reinforced (Turner, 2007, p. 81). Furthermore, the chieftaincy division also 
reinforced pre-colonial conflicts between the Kabare and Ngweshe kingdoms. 
 
                                               
26 Own translation. Original text "Les indigènes n’ont pas la notion de la propriété, ni celle des terres vacantes. Ils 
sont établis sur les territoires où ils ont l’habitude d’aller et de venir et d’exploiter certain produits. Les notions 
de propriété indigène et de terres vacantes ne pourront donc servir de base à une législation foncière qui viserait 
à adapter un droit nouveau aux faites." 
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Turning to a discussion of the city, treating the urban space was an important occupation of the 
colonizers. As Boeck and Plissart (2004, p. 20) argue, creating the cities took “place in the 
European mirror of colonialism which invented and created the primitives idea of the Congo 
and its counter-image, the urban landscape.” Creating the African other in popular Western 
imaginary was especially aided by events such as the World Exhibition in Antwerp, Belgium, 
in 1930. This exhibition included a display of the African Village, positioned next to a Le 
Corbusier house, constructing a particular imaginary of traditional Africa (Boeck & Plissart, 
2004, p. 21). The cities rising from the jungle were seen as modernity, in contrast to the 
“backward” life of the villages.  
 
Bukavu city, or Costermansville27 as it was called until 1953, had a peculiar private-public 
foundation only similarly shared with Katanga.28 This foundation began with the establishment 
of the National Committee of the Kivu (le Comité National du Kivu, CNKi) in 1928 (Hostelet, 
1954, p. 216). It is evident that by “national”, when it comes to CNKi, the meaning was 
Belgian. As Rutten (approx. 1930, undated, p. 350), the head of the CNKi, expressed: “We will 
witness the rise of a truly Belgian province in the heart of Africa, where our traditions and 
national virtues will be perpetuated in a magnificent setting.”29 The purpose of this committee 
was, according to Frank (in Hostelet, 1954, p. 216), then Belgian minister of colonies, to “study 
and develop the Kivu region in terms of transport and communications, the related 
development of agriculture and industries and the mining exploitation.”30 At the same time, the 
committee had also “the obligation to assure the success of the white colonial settlers and 
enhance the material and moral conditions for the indigenous population” (Rutten, approx. 
1930, undated, p. 350). Thus, CNKi was formed with the purpose of creating an organized, 
central city to administer the eastern regions. This was partly due to a need for administering 
unskilled labor forces from their neighboring colony Ruanda-Urundi, known as Banyarwanda, 
                                               
27 Named after the Belgian sub-lieutenant in the Force Publique, Paul-Marie Costermans, who fought against 
German East Africa prior to World War I in the region.  
28 In Katange, le Comité spécial du Katanga (CSK), established in 1900, was a civic committee representing both 
the Belgian colonial state and the Katanga Company (la Compagnie du Katanga). Income and costs were to be 
distributed two thirds to Belgian Congo and one third to the company (Kovar, 1967, p. 747). The CSK constituted 
of six members; four from the Belgian Congo state and two from the Katanga Company (ibid). Contrary to the 
Kivu establishment, Katanga was “a golden tree [that] yielded phenomenal returns” (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 
284). For more details on creating the CSK, see especially Fetter (1976, pp. 20-23). 
29 Own translation. Original text : “[N]ous verrons surgir au centre de l’Afrique une province vraiment belge, où 
se perpétueront, dans un cadre magnifique, nos traditions et nos vertus nationales."  
30 Own translation. Original text : "L’objet principal du Comité du Kivu est d’étudier et d’aménager la région du 
Kivu au point de vue des voies de transports et de communications, du développement de l’agriculture et des 
industries qui s’y rapportent ainsi que de la mise en valeur des mines."  
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for the agricultural industries (Malengana, 2001, pp. 45-46). In a short time, span (1930-60), 
the construction of Bukavu transformed a society that had lived under a rule of chiefdom 
systems since the 14th century. This transformation of social space from traditional peasant 
societies to an urbanized and industrialized society is a cross-cutting phenomena much 
discussed by Lefebvre (1974[1991]). The pictures below taken from the same area (“La Botte”) 
of Bukavu illustrate the city’s physical transformation with major implications for the 
inhabitants of the city.  
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Figure 6 Costermannsville (Bukavu) in 1930.  
 
Photo collection of Pierre Gallez  
 
Figure 7 Bukavu in 1958.  
 
Photo collection of Pierre Gallez 
 
These physical and subjective transformations of the city space also had major impacts on an 
emerging understanding of public service provision. Broadly, the Catholic Church and other 
missionaries are known for playing a key role from the Congo Free State period onwards in the 
areas of education and public health in particular (Nzundu, 2013). The urban centers, however, 
were largely occupied by the Belgian authorities and thus related directly to the economic 
development of the colony. This was not a complete rural and urban divide but rather a 
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preoccupation by the colonial state, complemented where needed by the religious institutions.31 
As an example, the Belgian authorities divided school systems for the indigenous population 
into three types namely: official schools (les écoles officielles), subsidized free schools (les 
écoles libres subsidiées) and non-subsidized free schools (les écoles libres non subsidiées) 
(Hostelet, 1954, p. 244). The official schools were by law under the customary chiefs, the 
subsidized schools under the Catholic system and the least prioritized (the non-subsidized) by 
the Belgian state.32 I argue that these divisions and segregations created boundaries of 
citizenship and belonging that, in turn, affect how citizens continue to be distinguished within 
the modern state in urban spaces, such as Bukavu.        
 
In Bukavu, the Belgian authorities divided the space into urban territories (communes), which 
still divide the urban space. Ibanda was and continues to be the urban center and was home of 
many European citizens. Bagira, the third and most remote territory, was considered a 
missionary station. The Kadutu territory, in between these two communes, was considered an 
extra-customary center (CEC) area, where natives were referred to as detribalized (détrabilisés) 
(Dembour, 2008, p. 23). This term was based on a dichotomy between indigenous peoples who 
were or were not attached to custom and who continued to live under one or the other of the 
two former types of territories.  In the CEC area of Kadutu, “detribalized natives” could acquire 
small parcels of land that were considered outside les terres domaniales and enrigstrées 
(Malengana, 2001, p. 167). These subjects (détrabilisés) can be positioned in an in-between 
category of claim-making subjects (citizens) and subjects referred to as indigenous or natives 
with no claim to full citizenship under Belgian colonial masters. Figure 8 shows the CEC area 
Kadutu in 1960.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 Certainly, the Catholic Church, as a religious and “civilizing” force and with its central and dominating position 
in the city, also occupied physical and subjective space in colonial Bukavu.  However, the major infrastructure 
work studied in this thesis was conducted by the Belgian colonial state in the form of the CNKi.    
32 My claim that the state schools were the least prioritized is based on the readings of archival texts detailing the 
number of teachers per student, the number of official inspections and the amount of investment.   
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Figure 8 Kadutu (Bukavu) 1960 as a model of African cities.  
 
Picture by Luc Van Gremberghe, photo collection of Pierre Gallez 
 
These CEC areas, as found in different colonial cities in Belgian Congo, were constructed 
through the Belgian Office des Cités Africaines (O.C.A) to improve the living standards of the 
detribalized. They offered public services, such as schools, health services and piped water, in 
return for work in the industries (Baumer, 1939). However, they were also constructed as a 
model for modern city planning in African colonies. I.e., “scientifically planned, hygienic, and 
removed from the European settlement”, as Fetter (1976, p. 73)  describes them. The African 
cities, or CECs, can be viewed as being a technology for the supervision of the state by colonial 
masters (Boeck & Plissart, 2004, p. 24).  They demonstrate forms of social control and 
conceptualizations of normality and deviance within the urban space genealogy.   Capelle 
(1947, p. 25), writing on la Cité, the African cities, highlighted an important  difference  
between these urban spaces and the rural, “ethnic” organization: “Ethnic groups have no legal 
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existence organized in la Cité [CEC], and their notables [chiefs] have neither any rights nor 
power.”33 
 
These African CECs, near or at the margins of the European city, I argue, created ways of 
becoming political for the detribalized as a group. This does not mean that individuals within 
this group had the same experience. Rather, the conditions or habitus of the CEC areas created 
a group experiencing “similar conditions of existence and conditionings” (Bourdieu, [1990] 
1997, p. 59) that produced new ideas of integration and difference.  
 
More specifically, the detribalized were generally understood as évolué(e)s by colonizers. As 
évolués, they were neither seen as the African Other, as in the African village imaginary, or as 
European citizens. This term was not, however, used in a straightforward manner by the 
colonial authorities. As the territorial administrator of Leopoldville, Capelle (1947, p. 65), 
reflected:  
 
 “No one, among the high-ranking administrative authorities, moral or social, is venturing on the hazard 
to define what is meant by “evolved” when it comes to native Congo, [and we will not attempt to do 
this either]. Generally, this term is understood as those among the natives, who [achieved smaller or 
bigger accomplishments] towards our moral, spiritual, social, material and technical conceptions, to our 
conceptions of life and civilization. All humanity is moving towards the best and highest ideals - at least 
we can hope - all men are not evolved, but evolving (évoluant). The term “evolved” (d’“évolué”), which 
seems to mark the arrival at an inconceivable terminal, is particularly ill-chosen. As it stands, however, 
we will use [the term evolved], not to deviate from an inveterate habit already, and thus confuse 
minds.”34 
 
 
In this text, the term évolués comments on the indigenous who had climbed the ladder of what 
Capelle terms “our” civilization. This discourse of unified ideals of “civilization” stemming 
from a European conception marks the differentiations made between citizens, becoming 
citizens and the African Other. This represents a form of governmentality as the relation 
                                               
33Translated by author, original text: "Les groupes ethniques n'ont aucune existence légale organisée dans la Cité, 
et leurs notables n'ont aucun droit ni aucun pouvoir quelconque." 
34 Own translation. Original text :  "Personne, parmi les plus hautes autorités administratives, morales ou sociales, 
ne s’étant hasarde à définir ce qu’il faut entendre par “évolué” lorsqu’il est question des indigènes du Congo, nous 
ne nous risquerons pas davantage à le faire. On qualifie généralement de cette appellation ceux, parmi les 
indigènes, qui ont parcouru une étape plus ou moins importante vers nos conceptions morales, spirituelles, 
sociales, matérielles et techniques, vers nos conceptions de la vie et de la civilisation. L’humanité tout entière 
étant en marche vers des idéaux meilleurs et plus élevés – du moins peut-on l’espère – tous les hommes sont, non 
des évolues, mais des évoluant. Le terme d’« évolué», qui semble marquer l’arrivée à un inconcevable terminus, 
est donc particulièrement mal choisis. Tel qu’il est, nous l’emploierons cependant, pour ne pas déroger à une 
habitude déjà invétérée, et ainsi semer la confusion dans les esprits."      
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between an art of modern government (civilization) and ideas of social, moral and economic 
rationalities (Foucault, 2014, p. 17). At the same time, Capelle is uneasy about using the term 
évolués as it indicates an end state rather than a process of “evolving” (évoluant). In Capelle’s 
(1947, p. 66) view, the évolués existed but they were a rarity at the top of a pyramid.  By being 
évolués, they were considered by many colonial authorities as the ones to lead the nation 
forward, taking over the public institutions and retaining the interest of the indigenous. Évolués 
becoming citizens was seen as the long-term future as there were no sign of Belgium leaving 
the territory, even by 1960. For instance, Hostelet (1954, p. 334), the head of colonial studies 
reflected six years prior to independence that "[t]he day Congo will be politically and 
economically independent, indigenous people inherit a country excellently organized in all 
areas, in addition to a Congolese staff made fit to ensure the proper functioning of public 
services and private enterprises with more or less prolonged assistance from Belgian 
technicians and other Europeans (...). "35 This was far from the reality in 1960.  
 
In the latter age of colonialism, after the end of the World War II, Belgian Congo’s functions 
started to resemble what, many assume to be, the functions of modern states based on increased 
fiscal and administrative capacity (Dorman, Hammett, & Nugent, 2006, p. 5). In the post-World 
War II colonial administration of Belgian Congo the archives indicate that: 
 
 “[t]he rates of public services are subsidized, or even free, to the benefit of users. These are the transport 
services or the use of communication, roads and canals. The payment of a public service is dictated by 
the principle of national solidarity. Each resident must have in every place of the territory any important 
public service at the same price, or different rates as low as possible”36 (Hostelet, 1954, p. 257).  
 
This account says nothing about the differences among inhabitants in Belgian Congo nor how 
they were treated in practice. However, it is interesting to note the inclusion of a comment on 
public services being offered at affordable prices and the idea of national solidarity towards the 
end of the Belgian Congo. These ideas were emphasized as a part of the “civilization” task of 
the colonial power (Hostelet, 1954, p. 365). As an example, the national water company 
                                               
35 Own translation. Original text : "Le jour où le Congo sera autonome politiquement et économiquement, les 
habitants autochtones hériteront d’un pays excellemment organisé en tous les domaines, plus un personnel 
congolais rendu apte à assurer le bon fonctionnement des services publics et des enterprises d’intérêt privé, avec 
l’aide indispensable plus ou moins prolongée de techniciens belges et autres Europeens (…)."  
36 Own translation. Original text : "Les tarifs de ces services publics sont réduits plus ou moins, voire même 
gratuits, au profit des usagers. Tels sont les services des transports, ou l’usage des voies de communication, routes 
et canaux. La rémunération d’un service public est dictée par un principe de solidarité nationale. Tout habitant 
doit bénéficier, en tout lieu du territoire, de tout service public important au même tarif (postes), ou à des tarifs 
aussi peu différents que possible." 
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Regideso, was created in 1939 for the Belgian colonies of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi (today 
Rwanda and Burundi) (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 39). In Bukavu, the motivation for establishing 
the Kahele water station and Ruzizi I in 1954-58, both owned by Regideso, seems to stem from 
a practical concern for combined needs in the industrial economy and for attracting white 
settlers (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 92). There were thus certain boundaries regarding who “the 
public” were, namely the white settlers, where the larger infrastructure projects were directed 
for commercial and private consumption. Thus, the creation of public water and electricity 
services was predicated on the premises of certain commercial and client-based relations for 
the national company Regideso.   
 
4.3 Independent Congo and the Mobutu years (1965-1997) 
 
The role of President Mobutu in what would be known as Zaïre, in terms of public good 
provision, is important to examine when it comes to understanding expectations and ideas of 
state practices and performance. In the first years of the Mobutu regime (1966-1974), Zaïre 
perhaps came closest to exhibiting unified nation-state ideal; an ideal triumphed by the historic 
boxing match, the Rumble in the Jungle, in 1974. A number of domestic and international 
factors, however, would eventually lead to a decaying of the state ideal and state practices when 
it came to public goods provision (see especially Young & Turner, 1985). I will in this section 
prioritize certain elements of the build-up of the nation-state to demonstrate the historical 
trajectories to public good provision, in what is considered the fourth stage of the regime from 
1970 to 1974. This period falls in line with broader nationalism tendencies in sub-Saharan 
Africa (see especially Berman & Londsdale, 2013; Londsdale, 2013).      
 
The early years of the Mobutu regime were in sharp contrast to the immediate post-
independence year. Regarding the latter, political and economic conflicts, coupled with the 
instrumentalizing of ethnic divisions during the first four years of independent Congo (1960-
1964), are generally considered to have amounted to an international crisis. The period included 
secession of Katanga, the assassination of the first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the death 
of UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjold37 and Cold War proxy conflicts between the US 
                                               
37 Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash as he attempted to mediate the crisis through the UN led Congo 
Mission. His death has led to much controversy regarding Cold War interests and sabotage. The four inquiries 
and one commission following Hammarskjold’s death have never been able to rule out sabotage or attack (see 
especially Williams, 2011).  
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and Soviet Union. At the time of independence, the country was de facto split into four rules: 
The central government in Kinshasa (then Leopoldville); a rival central government by 
Lumumba's followers in Kisangani (then Stanleyville); and the secessionist regimes in the 
mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2011). Belgium 
authorities, as allies of the West, saw Lumumba’s ideological struggle as all too radical for 
their vested interests in the Congo (Reybrouck, 2011, pp. 249-250): For an example of this, 
one only has to look at his independence speech of 30 June 1960  – a thought-provoking text 
where he used specific  examples to criticize    the injustice of colonialism, describing the 
‘blood, tears and sweat’ of the oppressed and the robbery of the white men.  
 
These complex and interweaving conflicts were followed by a coup d’état in 1965, in which 
Mobutu took the position as one of Africa’s “strongmen”. The first independence period (1960-
1964) of the country, as Young and Turner (1985, p. 42) argue, was “a  shambles” (la pagaille) 
from the conflicts between politicians and their self-interests. This confusion eased the way for 
a seizure of power by Mobutu and his grand vision for the country. His reign would outlive the 
end of the Cold War, ending with the First Congo War (1996-1997), and had major implications 
for the country’s nation-state ideals, state-building practices and dimensions of statehood.  In 
the scholarly debate, the 1960s marked the prime of modernization theory and a belief in the 
state as consolidating the interest of development and “a major means of bringing about societal 
change and fulfilling economic and social aspirations” (Azarya in Rothchild & Chazan, 1988, 
p. 4). The literature was inspired by the historical events of independence from colonial powers. 
In their seminal work on Zaïre, Young and Turner (1985, p. 43) position the young Mobutu “as 
a leader [that] was privately contested by some, but the centralized, strong nation-state vision 
of the polity seemed to most the only salvation.” Mobutu resurrected part of the strict structure 
of a colonial state image based on a view that there was a need for firm command and central 
power (Tull, 2005, p. 65). However, in this early period, the president also had a wide range of 
policy advisors, from technocrats to veteran politicians to diplomats and this allowed for some 
of the more successful policies, such as the 1967 currency reform. Thus, the first period of 
Mobutu rule enjoyed a reasonable amount of popular legitimacy (Tull, 2005, p. 65).  
 
Regarding state practices of nationalism, Mobutu introduced a new ideology on the 27th  
October 1971 to move away from colonial history and return to  “authenticity” (recours à 
l’authenticité) (Malu-Malu, 2002, p. 164). This authenticity was articulated as a “move away 
from borrowed or imposed ideas toward an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous 
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cultural beliefs and values” (Dunn, 2003, p. 111).  Already began in 1966, Mobutu introduced 
the policy of changing the colonial names of cities, villages and even people to so-called 
“authentic” names, i.e.,  names that would have recognizable to African ancestors.38 This was 
done in order to ‘decolonize’ the identity of Congo and its people using a sense of nationalistic 
pride rather than striving to be a Westerner. Mobutu himself captures this vision for the Congo 
in 1970 (Dunn, 2003, p. 104): 
 
“Congolese! Show to the old world who claims to be more civilized than the black continent, that our 
ancestral African hospitality is not a vain word and that you are more human[e] than those in Europe 
who think they may submit people to the consequences of conflicts between African states and financial 
groups.”  
 
This was a break with the Belgian discourses of colonialism, where “civilization” was a 
governmentality of modern government techniques. The nation-building was not solely based 
on African ancestral inheritance, however, as Mobutu and his regime were also concerned with 
keeping in line with international recognition of sovereign states and maintaining de facto 
statehood. As a dimension of statehood, the concepts of father and family, as representing the 
Zairian state effect, were important for establishing and maintaining political authority in the 
country. The idea of the nation as a family with Mobutu as the eldest and wisest member was 
used frequently by himself and the regime as a way to legitimate his position domestically and 
abroad but also to justify a rather repressive rule (Schatzberg, 1991, p. 72). For the West, 
Mobutu was a figure that confirmed an idea of African Other while at the same time not 
threatening the way states were supposed to be organized as Dunn (2003, p. 119) argues. 
Mobutu managed in the period 1970-1974 to establish a sense of national belonging through 
using a mixture of African ancestral past, colonial imagery and Western political concepts of 
nation and citizenship.  
 
On the 30 November 1973, a deepening of authenticity politics was introduced as zaïrianisation 
(Young & Turner, 1985).  The zaïrianisation policy, though arbitrary, included a state 
monopolization of public goods, such as the road companies39, insurance40, water and energy41.  
                                               
38 The name “Zaïre” was also taken from a perceived authentic name for the river Congo, though it turned out to 
be a Portuguese interpretation of the name for river namely N’zadi, in order to rid the country of its colonial past 
(see also Dunn, 2003).  
39 The Road Office (l’Office de Route) and Office of Roads and Drainage (l’Office des Voiries et Drainage) 
(OVD) 
40 The National Insurance Association (Société nationale d'assurances) (SONAS) 
41 The Water Distribution System (la Régie de Distribution d’Eau) (Regideso) and the National Elecitrcuty 
Company (la Société National d’Électricité) (SNEL) 
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These services were and are still considered parastatal (para-étatique) due largely to the process 
of economic nationalism in this period of zaïrianisation (1973-74) (Young & Turner, 1985, pp. 
326-327, 331). Parastatal, in the case of Zaire/DRC, means a state monopoly on these services 
and where the government elects an advisory board (see also Chapter 7). The national water 
company Regideso was, in the Belgian colony, fused with the electricity company la Société 
d’Électricité d’État. Due to changes in judicial and organizational terms under Mobutu, the 
water company REGIDESO and the electricity company, renamed to la Société National 
d’Électricité (SNEL), separated into two companies in 1970 (Muhunduka, 2010, pp. 93, 96). 
During zaïrianisation, SNEL and REGIDESO became completely monopolized by the Zairian 
state under law 74/012, 14 June 1974 (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 97). These practices had an impact 
on the popular imagining of these services as state provided and owned, which continues to 
affect perceptions in contemporary Bukavu.   
 
A lecturer in history and political science at the Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu 
(ISP), Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, perceived the historical transition of zaïrianisation in 
the following way:42     
 
“In 1973, Mobutu had a political plan, a plan that was spoken of as a plan for social security of its 
citizens. This is known as zaïrianisation of the country. This is when things fell apart at several levels. 
First, for REGIDESO and SNEL, there was a shift in leadership…  The process positioned people who 
were bad leaders for the service. The payment made to these services by the public and more generally 
taxes paid were not going back to associations that provided the services. Secondly, the revenues people 
were getting were insufficient to pay for a quality public service. In fact, the salaries that people were 
earning made it impossible to pay the bills at the end of the month. Increasingly, the services that 
Regideso and SNEL provided were cut from people’s houses.” 
  
This period of nationalistic ideas and techniques of governance1, such as authenticity and 
zaïrianisation, has provided much inspiration for the literature on neo-patrimonialism and 
clientilism in Western scholarly debate. As Bach (2012, p. 31) claims: “It is the evolution of 
the Mobutu regime (1965-97) after 1974 that still offers the purest illustration of a thoroughly 
patrimonialized state”. Young and Turner (1985, p. 327) argue that its attempts at  state-
building illuminate the characteristics of Zaïre  in the following way: “The contradiction 
between its expansive ambitions and its practical capabilities, the inner logic of the symbiosis 
between state and class formation, and the limitations of the personalist, patrimonial structure 
of power.”  The authors (p. 327) argue that zaïrianisation – despite the outspoken logic of a 
                                               
42 Personal interview, own translation, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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‘return of the land to its people’ – sustained and enforced a privileged class - acquéreurs or 
acquirers - that rushed to grab assets in the commercial and light industrial sectors. The 
economic consequences became evident short after 1974, exemplified by the dislocation and 
shortages of goods. Mobutu, in the words of Vlassenroot and Romkema (2007, p. 9), “built up 
a network of patronage and converted economic assets into a stock of political resources for 
(re)distribution to those who had shown political loyalty.” I argue that the government 
techniques of zaïrianisation and authenticity, framed as nationalistic ideology, have provided a 
broad inspiration for scholarly literature on neopatrimonial and clientilistic rule (see also Bach, 
2012).    
 
Moreover, the economic nationalism (zaïrianisation) that took place created arguably great 
confusion about what “public” means. For instance, under the Mobutu regime’s Bakajika Law, 
all land became state property (Turner, 2007, p. 42). “State” and “public” ownership becomes 
synonymous but took the form of acquisitions (acquéreurs) by politicians and businessmen 
close to Mobutu (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 347). At the same time, however, the parastatal 
agencies of water and energy continued to run despite these challenges at the leadership level 
throughout the Mobutu regime (1965-1997) and thus upheld public service provision of these 
goods. These services have never completely ceased in the post-Mobutu era, even though 
secondary towns may no longer be serviced by REGIDESO or SNEL (World Bank, 2011).  
 
For Bukavu, zaïrianisation, as a form of economic nationalism, and authenticity, seen as a state 
ideology of autochthonous claims to land and belonging, had major impacts. The practices of 
zaïrianisation created further insecurity in land ownership and access to farmland that pushed 
peasants to migrate to urban centers such as Bukavu in search of a livelihood (Vlassenroot, 
2007, p. 34). However, the practices of zaïrianisation and authenticity also created space for 
political and economic mobility (MacGaffey, 1987, p. 96), which is proportionally far less 
recognized than national financial difficulties.43 This is not a claim in support of Mobutu’s 
political and financial practices but rather an insight into the dynamics of claim-making 
subjects in the Zairian landscape. In Bukavu, businesses owned by foreigners, such as 
plantations outside the city, were bought by Congolese nationals, who then established a 
business elite in Bukavu. However, turmoil in the economy and shortages of goods, partly due 
                                               
43 The problems related to economic nationalism in Zaire gave rise to a literature on «underdevelopment» or the 
«anti-developmental» state (see e.g. Gould, 1979) as well as emphasis on informal networks for survival (e.g. 
Peemans, 1997).  
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to zaïrianisation practices, also led to a considerable growth in the informal sector. Bukavu, as 
an economic hub for markets, trade and import, expanded. However, the authenticity policies 
also brought into light the subject-making and Othering, such as the defining of the 
Banyamulenge Other (allochthon) or the authentic (autochthon) Congolese, which would prove 
explosive in the Kivu region (see Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2008 for more on 
Banyamulenge, Banyarwanda, ethnicity and conflicts).  
 
Coupled with the reforms of zaïrianisation and authenticity, Mobutu also introduced in 1973 
Salongo – a Lingala word for work – interpreted as community labor inspired by an official 
state visit to communist China (Callaghy, 1984, p. 299; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 109). Salongo 
was framed as a way to mobilize the population in an educative manner and consisted of 
‘voluntary’ work, such as repair and rebuilding roads, administrative buildings and the 
cultivation of certain crops. Callaghy (ibid p. 302) argues that ordinary Zairians were skeptical 
due to “the realization that all the work goes to reinforce the power of the consolidating state. 
[Thus, p]assive resistance and minimum compliance are the norm.” This perspective, however, 
positions the state as an entity where citizens can choose to act or not act. Rather, I see this 
term frequently employed today in contemporary Bukavu, though with a variety of 
interpretations. For instance, every Friday, citizens are ordered to clean the streets and keep 
their shops closed from 8 to 10 in the morning. The term, as the empirical chapters illustrate, 
is also used for workers employed in Kadutu central market and used by people controlling one 
of Bukavu’s public water sources (Funu). This demonstrates the relational, dynamic and 
complex experiences of the state effect.   As Foucault (1998, p. 306) argued, “a language always 
constitutes a system of possible statements. It is a finite ensemble of rules, which authorizes an 
infinite number of performances.”   
 
4.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1997-present day) and 
contemporary Bukavu  
 
The last two decades of Congolese history is often a source of inspiration for failed states or 
state collapse literature (e.g. Rotberg, 2003; Zartman, 1995). Or, as authors like Herbst and 
Mills (June 24, 2013) claim; “Congo is not a failed state; it is a nonstate, incessantly at war for 
the last 17 years, and home to some of the world’s worst violence.” However, the transition 
from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s is not so much a history 
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of “failed state” or “nonstate”, but rather offers a history of the changing nature of the language 
of stateness (Dunn, 2003, p. 143; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 5). From a dominate discourse 
of a unified, Zairian state headed by Mobutu, the state practices and realities would increasingly 
demonstrate the political and economic complexities of Congo. For instance, economic 
pillaging by Mobutu, state officials and regime supporters took its toll on the national economy 
and thus on ordinary citizens. In addition, the limited control by the armed forces outside 
Kinshasa was increasingly clear as foreign and domestic armed groups made their presence felt 
in eastern DRC in the early 1990s. Mobutu was also struggling with prostate cancer, eventually 
leading to his death in 1997, which became a metaphor for his faltering grip on the state and 
Zaire as the cancer in the African region (Dunn, 2003, p. 140).  
 
Ordinary Congolese, however, also experienced early democratic forces in the transition from 
Zaire to the new Congo. After considerable domestic pressure, Mobutu arranged the Sovereign 
National Conference (CNS) in 1991 to allow different social, religious and political voices a 
say in shaping the future political landscape (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 189).44 In the CNS, 
political opposition, NGOs, churches and different interests groups (civil society) were invited 
to discuss and come up with solutions to adapt to the new political climate, domestically and 
internationally, as well as to the multiple challenges the country faced in economic and social 
terms. These democratic attempts were broadcasted live on national radio and TV. As a 
national, Congolese initiative, the CNS had little international support and the outcomes from 
the different commissions were partly weak and contained inconsistencies that Mobutu would 
use to his advantage (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 192-196). Yet, and in reference to languages 
of stateness, these political processes also strengthened a sense of nationhood and citizenship, 
as ordinary Congolese could follow the talks, participate in public forums and support civil 
society organizations (Dunn, 2003, p. 143; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 197). This discursive 
space had been limited during Mobutu’s reign prior to 1990 and often met with violent 
oppression by state actors.  
 
The outcomes from the CNS, however, would soon be overshadowed by the dramatic events 
in Rwanda and Burundi. In this section, I will first discuss some of the broader political events 
                                               
44 National conferences became popular in many francophone African countries in the early 1990s. In Benin’s 
National Conference of 1990, the success of stripping the then dictator, Matthieu Kérékou, of power and 
creating a peaceful transition to an interim government, inspired a wave of national conferences in Africa 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 190-191). The results, however, varied widely.  
                   108 of 250 
that took place in Congo and South Kivu province in the 1990s. Then, I will outline some 
demographic and economic background regarding Bukavu and, then, concentrate on more 
specific aspects of the political landscape of contemporary Bukavu.  
 
4.4.1 War and political turmoil in Congo 
 
The political turmoil and subsequent genocide and ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi in 
1993-4 would have an immense impact on neighboring Congo, generally, and South and North 
Kivu provinces in particular. Hundreds of thousands Rwandan and Burundian Tutsis and Hutus 
fled to North and South Kivu for refuge. Some of these Hutus were also génocidaires and fled 
to Congo to escape retribution by the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Zairian 
government in Kinshasa, still headed by Mobutu, established the Vangu Commission to 
investigate the new “foreigners” in the east (Turner, 2007, p. 88). The Commission, however, 
was ingrained in anti-Tutsi sentiments, and was highly suspicious of Banyamulenge groups in 
South Kivu and the seizure of power by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda. The 
Commission claimed the new Tutsi leaders of Rwanda planned to acquire Zairian territory 
(Turner, p. 89). In addition, the Zairian government claimed that the international community 
was secretly arming Rwandan and Burundian groups in Zaire to destabilize the Kivus (Turner, 
p. 90). This political tension between the neighbors led to the subsequent militarization of key 
towns in the Kivus by the Zairian army, including Bukavu, in 1996. There were executions, 
attacks and retaliations committed on both sides of the Zairian and Rwandan borders. In the 
midst of this, Bukavu was a center for Hutus fleeing genocide, rebels of various connections 
and Banyamulenge groups that used the city for camouflage to avoid attention.   
 
The fall of Mobutu in 1997 is seen as a consequence of the new RPF government in Rwanda, 
who were eager to hunt down Hutu extremists, known as interahamwe, in the Congo, and install 
a different, supportive regime in favor of RPF ideology (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 225).45 
However, a state coup by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) would not be taken favorably by 
most Congolese or for that matter the international community. Thus, the RPF, led by Paul 
Kagama, together with President Museveni in Uganda, decided to support the long-time rebel 
leader Laurent Kabila as the head of a more “authentic” Congolese liberation struggle in 
                                               
45 It should be noted that the complexity of this war, both historically and regarding the various parties involved, 
necessitates a much more detailed analysis, which is, however, beyond the purpose of this thesis.  
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September 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, p. 225; Prunier, 2008, pp. 115-116). Kabila’s fragmented 
movement was a coalition consisting of other armed groups under the name of Alliance des 
forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) (Prunier,  2008, p. 113). The 
AFDL, however, did not have the armed forces to secure its victory from Bukavu, Goma, 
provincial capital of North Kivu, to final destination Kinshasa. Apart from some Angolan 
armed support, it was largely the work of Rwandan soldiers that lead the way for a final seizure 
of power by Kabila in Kinshasa, May, 1997.  According to Prunier (2008, p. 124), Kabila 
acquired in this period the nickname of Ndiyo Bwana – “yes sir” in Swahili – because of his 
reliance on the Rwandese backers. This period, September 1996 to May 1997, is often referred 
to as the First Congo War.    
 
The installment of Kabila as president of the newly re-named Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) stands in sharp contrast to the politically more inclusive space of the preceding national 
conference (CNS) (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 231).  Kabila, a leader of guerilla movements in the 
1960s from his base in South Kivu, was not familiar to the new post-Cold War era and saw the 
political realities in Kinshasa, such as the CNS, as “Mobutist”.46 He excluded all the key 
political and civil society members of the CNS and imposed a single-party system, supported 
by his Rwandese backers, conducted arbitrary arrests and public executions of political 
opponents (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 231; Prunier, 2008, pp. 152-154). It is worth noting that 
contemporary discourses in Bukavu (and elsewhere in DRC) hold “father” Kabila as a more 
authentic, clear-sighted head of state in contrast to his son Joseph Kabila. As one of the men I 
interviewed in Ibanda, central Bukavu, argued:47 
 
“But [state] authorities can also be good. Like father Kabila, the old Kabila. He tried to change these 
robberies [i.e., corruption in the municipality and state apparatus] by the [state] authorities. He would 
take these bad people and burn them in front of people. Now the authorities have failed again.” 
 
From this point of view, violent retribution against those perceived as “Mobutists” was a break 
from Mobutu’s regime. Economically, however, Kabila’s regime (1997-2001) was equally 
corrupt.  
                                               
46 Initially, Kabila was famously supported by “Che” Guevara, who in 1965, with the support of Tanzania’s 
socialist government,  led a small group of Cuban revolutionists to Kabila’s base in Congo to support the 
“African revolution” (Prunier, 2008, p. 114). However, Guevara would soon be disappointed by Kabila’s main 
interest in whiskey and women and his nonchalance regarding the revolution. Guevara left the country only a 
few months later.  
47 Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu 
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Furthermore, Kabila’s connection with Rwanda was domestically disputed. His political and 
military entourage in 1997 consisted of key Rwandan and Banyamulenge personalities; a 
highly unpopular group with many Congolese, who increasingly saw Kabila as a puppet of 
Kagame, President of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009, pp. 231-232). In 1997, Kabila had to choose 
between maintaining links with his Rwandan and Tutsi backers or breaking off with them to 
gain domestic legitimacy (Lemarchand, p. 232). Kabila chose the latter and ordered all foreign 
troops to be expelled from the DRC, an act which would lead to what is known as the Second 
Congo War (1998-2003). Some of the key figures of his former entourage and Kagame would 
start the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), an insurgency group with 
Rwandan RPA troops that led the uprising against Kabila (Tull, 2005, p. 94).48 Had it not been 
for Angolan armed support for Kabila, Lemarchand (p. 233) remarks, “the DRC probably 
would no longer exist.” Following that conflict between Congolese Mayi Mayi groups, 
Interhamwe, factions of the Congolese army and branches of RCD would lead to mass 
atrocities against civilians in north-east and eastern DRC. 
 
Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard, 16 January 2001, and quickly replaced by his 
young, twenty-nine year old son Joseph Kabila (Prunier, 2008, p. 249). To everyone’s surprise, 
the young and inexperienced Kabila showed remarkable ability to play the political game by 
pleasing domestic and international human rights activists and respecting relations with UN 
Security Council members (Prunier, pp. 258-259).  It is also in this period that the UN mission 
MONUC was established with the blessing of Kabila. MONUC was initially established to 
monitor the Lusaka agreement of 1999 but later became one of the UN’s largest peace 
operations (later re-named MONUSCO). The Sun City agreement of 17th  April 2002 is seen 
as the end of the Second Congo War, though conflicts and armed groups have continued to be 
part of the daily lives of many citizens in the Kivu and Orientale provinces.  
 
In conclusion, the 1990s and onwards have brought forward multiple versions of statehood and 
complicated images of state effects and practices. For instance, some of the armed groups in 
eastern DRC have re-employed and invented state-like structures and orders (see e.g. 
Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014; Raeymaekers, 2014; Tull, 2005). At the same time, the central 
government of Kinshasa and provincial administration has never ceased to exist. On the 
                                               
48 RCD would later split into two factions; RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda and RCD-Bunia backed by Uganda. 
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contrary, their presence has been felt and experienced in cities throughout the political turmoil. 
As the focus in the aforementioned studies on eastern Congo is centered on violent actors, 
often, though not exclusively, in rural and semi-rural areas or outside provincial capitals, the 
contribution of this thesis is the focus on the formal state and state-like orders and everyday 
goods in the city of Bukavu.      
 
4.4.2 Contemporary Bukavu and Fieldwork Timing 
 
The empirical study was conducted during different periods in Bukavu. Three contextual 
(historical) aspects must be considered in particular regarding the timing of the fieldworks, 
which will be further elaborated below. First, Bukavu citizens in the period of research (2012-
2014) experienced a relatively peaceful time. The most recent major violent event was the 
occupation of the city in 2004 by members of the Rally for Congolese Democracy Goma (RCD-
Goma), who entered Bukavu with the claim of genocide threats against their supporters and 
members from the Banyamulenge communities. Second, and closely related, the broader 
instability in the region of South Kivu pushed rural and semi-rural citizens into the city of 
Bukavu, which in turn has had consequences for urban planning (or lack thereof), economy 
and settlements (claims of urban citizenship) that need some further elaboration. Third, the 
research took place between elections, namely after the national elections of 2011 and before 
upcoming election, due to be held 2016. This influenced perceptions, as one can see in the 
empirical chapters, because recent memories of election promises and campaign influence 
attitudes towards the state. 
 
First, the relative peace in the period of research allowed the level of security needed for 
conducting this type of research as well as the time to reflect on everyday needs by my 
informants. More fundamentally, the ideas of who belongs and who does not were less centered 
on “foreign” occupation (Rwandan influence) as have typically influenced scholars studying 
war time periods (fluxes of conflicts extending from 1994-2004) in the area. Rather, and as 
will be demonstrated, citizens of Bukavu looked to Rwanda (Cyangugu neighboring town) than 
would have been the case for scholars studying war time periods (such as the various conflicts 
extending from 1994-2004) in the area. Rwanda served as an example of successful state 
building in terms of public services (such as measures to control waste and provide access to 
water and electricity). Both before and during the research period, I witnessed Rwanda’s rapid 
                   112 of 250 
transformation of road building, environmental policy (e.g. banning plastic bags) and large 
investments in public service delivery. This stood in stark contrast to what was witnessed on 
the DRC side of public service delivery. In turn, this influenced perceptions in Bukavu on the 
study topic and shows the importance of historical contingency of the research.       
 
However, despite the relative peace during the period of my research, the regional instability 
has made Bukavu a peacekeeping and NGO hub which has affected statehood dimensions. The 
connections and disconnections between urban-rural spaces have been intensified. Bukavu, on 
one hand, is the center of formal governance structures, including both the Congolese 
administration and international staff. This stands in contrast to the surrounding rural areas, 
which are controlled by armed groups and traditional chiefdoms/sectors. Due to this, I argue, 
Bukavu has become a center for international and domestic statehood dimensions, affecting 
techniques, rationales and mentalities of governance. For instance, the UN49 presence is an 
everyday reminder of a particular form of governmentality. As Neumann and Sending (2007, 
p. 700) argue “[a] conceptualisation of the international as a socially embedded realm of 
governmentality sees the international as a structure (defined by relations of power) that 
generates different and changing practices of political rule (defined as governmental 
rationality).” Though the UN is not incorporated directly in this study, its presence is affecting 
language and mentalities of both the “governing” and the “governed”, or, alternatively, the 
“peacekeepers” and the “peace-kept”. This can be illustrated with interpretations of 
expectations towards state deliverables and usage of UN funded infrastructure as legitimacy 
tools for politicians (e.g., the road to the local airport in Bukavu). 
 
Second, and related, the issues of urban planning (or lack thereof) and local economy need 
some further elaboration.  Provision of the goods I study - waste management, roads, water and 
electricity – have been subject to growing pressure as Bukavu has experienced a considerable 
urban growth. The inflow of domestic and international refugees and a steady increase of 
people from the villages have consequences for planning, consumption and provision in the 
city. Reliable data on the number of inhabitants do not exist but estimates indicate a population 
size of around 1 million people in 2015. According to the City Hall’s records (Mapendano, 
2008), the total population in 1960 was 70.257, rising to 147.647 in 1977, and in 1996  reaching 
                                               
49 By the UN, I refer to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo or MONUSCO.  
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241.426. These population increases have been seen as steady and expected, based on 
demographic estimates in Bukavu from the viewpoint of the service providers such as 
REGIDESO. What was not expected were the wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) that led to a 
growing city. The increase to approximately 1 million people has happened over the same 
period as investment in public infrastructure has been limited, since the end of the 1980s. This 
historical context has had a major influence on the perceptions of my informants – ranging 
from service providers and intellectuals’ perspective on the “unruly” and “anarchic” new 
settlers to Kadutu citizens’ fight for equal rights as citizens. This historical context of urban 
settlement has intensified claims of what public goods mean and the dynamics of statehood.    
 
Further, Bukavu’s economy was also affected by these conflict/peace dynamics and settlement 
issues during the time of research. The city’s economy is a relative topic and one may focus on 
the informal or formal economy, illicit or legal trade, and, not least, official or unofficial forms 
of taxation.50 According to a World Bank report (March 2011, p. 82), “[d]ata at the city level 
[of Bukavu] is non-existent, and it has not benefited from the kind of scholarly and analytical 
interest that Kinshasa has.” Any numbers are thus tentative and rarely account for informal or 
illicit trade and/or unofficial tax incomes. I assume that these informal economic activities are 
significant, not just as part of total economic activity but also for the daily livelihood of the 
urban poor.  An estimate by the same World Bank report (March 2011, p. 83) suggests that 
urban poverty in Bukavu was at 84.6% above the national poverty rate of 71.3%. Though 
numbers should be taken with caution, poverty is widespread, something supported by my own 
observations in Bukavu.  
 
This context of widespread poverty is a key issue underlying this study and the situation during 
the time of this research. South Kivu province used to be the food production center of DRC 
and Bukavu its center for refinement, logistics and transport to other provinces and abroad. 
Today, and during the period of my research, the need to import food has been a sad 
consequence of the conflict and post-conflict political turmoil, both of which have destabilized 
the entire agricultural industry. On the other hand, instability in rural South Kivu and the entry 
of international humanitarian assistance and personnel have led to other booming industries, 
namely banking and house construction (see e.g. Jennings, 2015). However, this economy is 
                                               
50 All of these economic forms, however, may be considered legitimate depending on different interest groups. 
For instance, artisanal mining may be considered the main source of income for villages depending on this 
industry, while international bans on so-called “conflict minerals” may see this economy as illicit.  
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largely benefitting certain elites in Bukavu and Kinshasa and has little or negative impact on 
the urban poor, who are pushed out of the urban center (Ibanda). This context, in turn, 
demonstrates how statehood is a dynamic and ongoing process of negotiation.     
 
Finally, the political context during which this research was undertaken, namely between two 
national elections, has consequences for citizen-state relations and perceptions of statehood. 
The Congolese people have experienced two national elections in 2006 and 2011. A third 
election is expected in 2016, after the research period. Experiencing elections, e.g. mobilizing 
voters and anticipating political changes, shapes perceptions such as citizens’ expectations and 
service providers’ delivery of public goods. In the first, pilot research period (March-April 
2012), focus group discussions revealed for instance how neighborhoods received more 
electricity than usual prior to election (service delivery), as well stimulating heated debates 
among university students on how voters from poorer districts could easily be bought 
(legitimacy of election).51 As the empirical chapter demonstrates (see especially Chapter 7, p. 
181 and 202), the discourses of promises, expectations and actual practices of public good 
access and delivery, are influenced by the election experiences across different socio-economic 
layers of Bukavu citizens.   
 
Regarding election promises that influence de facto statehood dimensions, there are particular 
discourses and practices employed by the current regime under the rule of President Kabila 
(2006-). As an election promise prior to 2006, Kabila’s party introduced the so-called 
Révolution de la modernité – revolution to modernity – which incorporated the Cinq Chantiers 
(Five Public Works). These are state-led investments intended to modernize road infrastructure, 
health and education, housing accommodation, access to water and electricity and employment 
(see de Boeck, 2011, pp. 273-274; RadioOkapi, 20 December 2011). With the 50th anniversary 
of independent Congo in 2010 and an election coming up, President Kabila and his party geared 
up the efforts to improve road infrastructure, housing and access to water and electricity (de 
Boeck, 2011, p. 274). This has had a major impact in parts of the former European center of 
Kinshasa (la Ville), but also a lesser impact on the urban centers of Ibanda in Bukavu. These 
projects drive towards modernity are reminiscent of colonial times, but now with the new 
Global South urban centers, such as Beijing, Islamabad and Dubai, as role models. 
                                               
51 Two preliminary focus groups held 5 April and 23 April 2012 with university students and youth, both 
women and men, from Ibanda (Bukavu).    
                   115 of 250 
 
Although most of the Cinq Chantiers projects are funded by the World Bank, the EU and 
Chinese bilateral investment, the state engagement is an attempt to reassert state presence. 
These forms of state reassertions are visible in the city of Bukavu. State providers may use 
Cinq Chantiers terms for their legitimacy building (e.g., the representative at Foner, the 
taxation for road usage in Bukavu, in p. 155 of section 6.1) and consumer perspectives on state 
deliverables. All of these international and domestic actors make use of modernizing 
discourses, at the different levels that make up the state effect in Bukavu; presenting a unified 
state ideal of structure, modernity and order. These projects, however, also have major effects 
on citizen-state relations, as will be discussed further in Chapter 8 on dimensions of statehood. 
New projects and infrastructure divide citizens and subjects and questions the right to the city 
(Lefebvre, 1974[1991]).  
 
In the remaining of this section, I will describe Bukavu’s contemporary political structure to 
situate the reader in the following empirical chapters. In terms of the local administration in 
Bukavu, there are both continuities and discontinues with the colonial past. Administrative 
organization of Bukavu municipality has hardly changed in structure or position from the era 
of colonialism. For instance, the colonial structures of urban territories (communes) are upheld 
in Bukavu (i.e., Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira). The boundaries between the African city (CEC) 
Kadutu and Ibanda (European center) are both physical and subjective divisions, although with 
different perspectives from the colonizers’ terminology and techniques. The actual divisions 
can be seen in infrastructure, including buildings, road construction and availability of cables 
and channels for electricity and water. Yet, these physical city structures stemming from the 
colonial era are, I argue, specters of the modern state project. Buildings such as the grand post 
office in art deco architecture and Hotel Résidence with a wrought iron elevator are ghosts 
from the past. In contemporary Bukavu, citizens resort to Rwanda (Cyangugu town) for post, 
as there are no longer public post services.  The elevator is a memory of the past abundance of 
electricity; it can no longer run due to power shortage. Yet, provincial and municipal authorities 
still occupy colonial administrative buildings, such as the City Hall (Mairie de Ville) that used 
to be the building of the CNKi administration. The subjective divisions can be understood in 
the forms and modes of how subjects articulate themselves, their relations to the Other, and 
priorities of public good provision. These aspects come alive through the empirical data in how 
citizens and subjects, consumers and service providers, articulate their expectations and ideas.  
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The city also continues to be the administrative center in the province with a considerably more 
developed formal state structure of governance compared to its surroundings. However, 
through a national committee of the Kivus, more centralized and authoritarian rationales, 
techniques and mentalities, in part inherited from Zaire era, are used in governing the city. This 
includes in particular the close connection between the central government in Kinshasa and the 
election of representatives at the higher level of the municipality in Bukavu.  
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Figure 9 Organizational chart of the formal municipal structure in Bukavu52 
 
Given to the author by the City Hall (Mairie de Ville) (6 October 2014) 
 
This organizational structure is “real” in the sense that one can locate offices and 
representatives with these titles. Some of these representatives are interviewed in this thesis, 
especially in relation to waste management. In separate interviews with the head of the Urban 
Division and the head of the 2nd Bureau (IIe Bureau), the Mayor, the deputy Mayor and the 
three Bourgmestre as well as their deputies are chosen by the president himself.53  In practice,  
this means that the Ministry of Interior in Kinshasa chooses the candidates and then the 
president assigns the positions. At the level of chef des quartier (chief of the district) and below 
(chefs des cellules, chefs d’avenue, chefs de 10 maisons), the representatives are chosen by the 
                                               
52 There are 96 chefs des cellules with 96 assistants and 400 chefs d’avenues, while the number of chefs de 10 
maisons was not available. 
53 Interview with Mutikiv, the head of the 2nd Bureau and Shiko, the head of Division de l’administration du 
Territoire, both interviewed 2 October 2014, Bukavu.   
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governor of the province.54 I argue that the municipal representatives are chosen with 
authoritarian rationalities and techniques. These representatives are not elected by those they 
govern but rather based on links with the central government and affiliation with the 
presidential party.55 Also, the head of the 2nd Bureau explained that there used to be an advisory 
board in Bukavu that dealt with the candidates at the municipal level but that this was no longer 
practiced.56   
 
Thus, I argue that these municipal and provincial authorities may feel less obliged to answer to 
or serve a broader conception of “the public” in the city and serve instead the ruling regime. 
Certainly, this is far from unique to Bukavu and demonstrates forms of control and interests 
among public authorities. The bureaucracy in the municipal administration of Bukavu is 
manifested in the pervasive phenomenon of an official reporting solely to their superior, who, 
in turn, passes on their report to their superior and so on. These reports are often handwritten 
by people considered technocrats, i.e., technical staff in charge of particular public services, 
and it is only the Mayor himself that will have a say in policy making. Those with positions 
that concern the Mayor, such as the urban road office (OVD, see Chapter 6), have a closer 
engagement with him on a weekly or daily basis. The Mayor is thus a decision-maker and he 
chooses areas of attention, as the head of administration in the Urban Division out it:57   
 
“In Bukavu, the Mayor is the governor; he is concerned with all issues like electricity, roads… He is 
the one in charge. The sub-offices are technical offices; they carry out the services. They can propose 
the maintenance of different services but it is the Mayor that decides.” 
 
Forms of authoritarian control are also exercised through the means, or threat of, violence in 
Bukavu. This is not limited to the army, occurring also through the different networks within 
the secret police58 and other forms of police, the governor’s intelligence apparatus and various 
security services. However, the apparatus of violence is not a coherent entity but rather serves 
different interest groups. It is widely known that police officers do not have sufficient salaries 
and that traffic police are sent out to collect money from drivers (see Chapter 6). Further, armed 
                                               
54 The popular sentiment from the focus groups conducted in different neighborhoods seemed to be that the chiefs 
at the local quartier (district) level lacked the ability to mobilize the local population or enable better public 
services. Focus group interviews during the fieldwork in October 2014, Bukavu.  
55 The party of president Kabila is Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD) and L’Alliance 
pour la majorité présidentielle (MP), the latter being the coalition party of the regime. However, during my 
fieldwork in October 2014, there were efforts to re-establish local elections for the municipality. Thus, this could 
mean a beginning to more democratic forms of local governance techniques.  
56 Interview with Mutikiv, the head of Deuxième Bureau, 2 October 2014, Bukavu.  
57 Interview with Shiko, the head of Division de l’administration du Territoire, 2 October 2014, Bukavu.    
58 l'Agence Nationale de Renseignements, ANR.  
                   119 of 250 
security is found at different levels, like the United Nations peace operation MONUSCO, 
which secures, at least in legal and policy terms, Bukavu from attacks from armed groups found 
in the province. For the elites, security is commercialized either through companies offering 
private services or renting “public” armed or police forces. However, for those unable to pay 
these costs, there are also forms of citizen response to the lack of safety in the city, exemplified 
by the Forces-Vives (Chapter 6). The complex interweaved and parallel forms of policing and 
(armed) security illustrate different dimensions of statehood and differentiation of citizens and 
subjects in the city.    
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the creation of the contemporary state effect and interpreting 
dimensions of statehood in Bukavu follow certain historical trajectories, as I see no actors or 
groups as independent of each other. The modes of chiefdoms, colonial rule and the nation-
building of Zaire have all contributed to ideas and knowledge that make up the state effect in 
Bukavu. Creating the city as a contrast to the tribal villages was an important occupation for 
colonial authorities. Within the city-space, however, further distinctions were made to 
differentiate between European citizens, évolués (detribalized) and non-évolués. These forms 
of subject-making as an art of modern government (civilization) impacted ways of becoming 
politically engaged citizens in Bukavu.  The rationales for public good provision in the city 
stemming from the colonial authorities are complex.  These rationales are also interweaved 
with the theory and practices of commercial interests, European settlement providing the urban 
labour forces with certain privileges.   
 
During the nation-building years of 1970-74 in Zaire, public good provision became closely 
associated with economic nationalism (zaïrianisation). Several companies became national, 
monopolized services (such as REGIDESO and SNEL) and are often still now described as 
parastatal. The policies of zaïrianisation coupled with authenticity, as a claim to nationalizing 
companies to be authentically Congolese, have had a profound impact on contemporary 
Bukavu. Policies introduced by Mobutu, such as Salongo, have also survived, although they 
are practiced according to a variety of interpretations in today’s Bukavu. Zaïrianisation gave 
much inspiration to a particular scholarly literature on neo-patrimonial and clientilistic forms 
of rule. Less recognized in this literature, nevertheless, are the aspects of lower-level subject-
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making and mobility that have arisen as a result of the policies of authenticity and 
zaïrianisation.  
 
The recent political transitions in Congo, from Zaire to the DRC, and the conflicts in the eastern 
provinces all affect the language of stateness, as well as dimensions of statehood. Early 
democratic forces in the 1990s, exemplified by the CNS, were an introduction to governance 
changes, as insiders and outsiders of the state apparatus were allowed to take part in 
discussions. However, the genocide and resulting changes in Rwandan politics led to the fall 
of Mobutu and the installment of President Laurent Kabila. Still, tensions and relations with 
Rwanda are shaping ordinary citizens of Bukavu’s understanding of statehood dimensions.   
 
I have argued that these historical trajectories from both colonial and independent Congo/Zaire 
have affected various aspects of governmentality in contemporary Bukavu. Physical and 
subjective divisions continue as forms of ordering and subject-making of people living the city 
and the state effect. However, the colonial modern state project still casts a shadow over a state 
that continues to reproduce the state effect. At the same time, the state project from colonial 
and independent times is used, reinvented and projected in multiple forms in Bukavu. This will 
be seen through the eyes of consumers and providers as subjects living the state in the following 
empirical chapters.  
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5.0 “The political class does not take care of garbage here”: Urban 
Waste (Mis)management and the Politics of Neglect  
 
Urban waste management and sanitation are excellent themes through which to study 
state-society relations.59 Generally speaking, there is an expectation, or at least a desire, 
for clean public space that the local authorities should maintain. Of course, this needs to 
be positively enforced through citizens’ duties to appropriately dispose of waste in the 
public space. Simultaneously, citizens who wish to upkeep a clean personal space will 
need to have access to proper waste disposal. At the public service provider level in 
Bukavu, there are scarce waste depots and limited official recycling. Thus, citizens utilize 
rivers, a lake and colonial drainage systems to dispose of waste. However, citizens still 
find ways to recycle and reuse. It is important to note that what some see as waste, others 
see as opportunity. Therefore, waste can be defined as something “that ha[s] lost [its] 
value in the eyes of the first owner” (Contreau 1984 in Beall, 1997, p. 953). In particular, 
this chapter will discuss how a deprived area, Kadutu, deals with waste problems. It will 
examine the administration, starting from the highest officials, Mairie or the City Hall, 
and then examine down through the hierarchy of public servants in the municipality. 
Moreover, this chapter will discuss waste management perspectives from citizens both 
in Kadutu and Ibanda. These citizens are positioned as consumers but, revealingly from 
the empirical data, they are also providers of services due to the “politics of neglect” (van 
der Geest & Obirih-Opareh, 2009) at the local municipality level. This means that it is 
not only those formally in charge of waste management, such as the municipal 
authorities, but also private citizens of Bukavu who are involved in disposal or 
negotiation with local authorities. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to exemplify how waste management becomes a place for urban 
state-society frictions through negotiations and potential loss of control over public 
space. Here, the daily governance of waste becomes the center of disputes over what “the 
public” space constitutes. By daily governance, I mean what mechanisms are used, what 
institutions are in place and how actors individually or collectively organize in order to 
tackle sanitation problems, in particular waste management, on a day-to-day basis (van 
                                               
59 The main categories of waste that will be discussed are biodegradable waste (such as leftover food, 
plants and human waste i.e., excrement) – which are potentially recycled into compost for land 
fertilization – as well as solid waste (such as plastic, cans, paper and fabric) that generally have a more 
technically-demanding recycling process. 
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Eeuwijk, 2009, p. 303). In my research, both citizens from Ibanda and Kadutu expressed 
a perception of dismemberment from official, “public” places. Here, certain places, such 
as the Place de L’Indépendence (see map), have been kept spotless by a number of staff 
working for the municipality and it shows (unsurprisingly) how public authorities 
appreciate tidy ‘public spaces’. However, the Place de L’Indépendence symbolizes the 
power for the central authorities and is serviced by municipal sanitation resources that 
could have been used for clearing waste from more crowded neighborhoods (quartiers 
populaires). In many ways,  the Place de L’Indépendence is a good example of how a 
state is “capable of creating a definite and authorized nation-space materialized in 
boundaries, infrastructure, monuments, and authoritative institutions” (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2001b, p. 2). As such, the de facto statehood survives and rises in the midst of 
squalid surroundings.   
 
However, my observations reveal the tensions of belonging to a city associated with the 
issue of private versus public space. Though private spaces such as homes, clothes and 
so on are kept clean, the “indifference to the dirt [in the urban space] is indicative of 
[urban dwellers’] desire not to reproduce their social relationship within this 
environment”  (Bouju, 2009, p. 149). I argue that the poorer inhabitants are marginalized 
and viewed as “illegal” squatters who disrespect what the authorities perceive as the 
foundations of civic relations. With this marginalization, there is clearly a lack of 
incentive to foster the social relations of cleanliness that are important in private spaces. 
Waiting for the rain to flush the waste away or using rivers and broken water pipes as 
garbage disposal can all be perceived as responses to rejection by the urban authorities 
and feelings of abandonment. Those with financial means can easily get away from these 
“dirty” areas by moving to the leafier European style neighborhoods in Ibanda. In that 
case, the idea of a collective urban space is rejected on both sides of “civic” relations.  
 
In contrast to the other two categories of public goods (i.e., roads and water), waste 
management is not as clearly governed by one service provider like SNEL (electricity) 
and REGIDESO (water). Thus, waste recycling is mainly conducted by the private 
citizens of Bukavu or through certain commercial industries. However, Congolese law 
(de jure) states that the municipal authorities (Mairie) are responsible for managing 
waste, especially in urban centers. Thus, I will first present the perspectives from a sub-
office in charge of waste management in Bukavu’s Mairie (City Hall). The Kadutu 
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market is particularly relevant for studying waste management as a common societal 
concern and lies within the municipal authorities’ remit because they own the market. 
Thus, and secondly, I will present the perspectives of the local waste workers and the 
office for sanitation in the market. Further, I will also present the perspectives of a private 
organization for waste service, referred to as Poubel Net, which mainly serves elite 
consumers. Finally, I will discuss waste management among citizens from Kadutu and 
Ibanda in Bukavu. In these two areas, particularly Kadutu, there is a constantly increasing 
urban population, and there is, thus, an increasing necessity for more regulated waste 
management due to public sanitation and health demands. 
 
5.1 Waste Management from the Providers’ Point of View 
 
Compared to the other public services and institutions, it was a challenge to identify the 
formal, administrative level of waste management in Bukavu. As the next section will 
reveal, there are indeed views on where the waste should be thrown (into rivers, sewage 
channels, the lake and so on) but the identifying service providers in the public or private 
sector was more difficult.60 In this section, I will dissect the different levels of public 
administration when it comes to waste management. This starts with the Mairie (the City 
Hall), following then a commune or territorial level through Kadutu, where the 
bourgmestre is positioned, to the level of chef du quartier in Kadutu.61  Finally, the last 
level will include the Kadutu market administration together with the local waste 
workers. All levels are located within the municipal administration and demonstrate a 
high level of political neglect (Van deer Geest & Obirih-Opareh 2009). This in turn 
results in frustration regarding waste management in the lower level administration. 
Finally, there will be a discussion on waste management for the elite through examination 
of a private company operating in the more affluent areas of Ibanda. In Ibanda, many 
private households rely on what the people in Kadutu are missing, namely space in their 
own gardens to either burn solid waste (e.g. plastic) or use leftover food and other 
biodegradable waste as fertilizers for the soil.       
 
                                               
60 The search for public institutions, however, led me to important intellectuals working in research 
institutions and NGOs in Bukavu who throughout the two last field visits provided excellent 
opportunities and taught me significant lessons from their experiences.  
61 See chapter 4 for more detail on the municipal administrative structure of Bukavu.   
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My first encounter regarding waste management at the Mairie was particularly 
interesting. There was great confusion as to whom I should talk to in order to gain a better 
understanding of waste management in Bukavu. From the reception area, I was sent to 
the Chef de division urbaine, the head of the urban division, who wrote a paragraph on 
my purpose at the office that I in turn would give to another person at the secretariat of 
the Mairie.  This person, whom I would not meet in relation to this topic, was not per se 
in charge of waste management but might know who to talk to.62 Together with my 
research assistant, I waited in the office to see if the man would arrive. After an hour and 
no arrival, we decided to try again the next day, again with no luck. On the third day 
when he was still not in the office and it was not known when he would return, I asked 
one of his colleagues if he knew about any “state actors” in charge of waste management 
in Bukavu. He replied with surprise “étatique?! Non.”63  Compared to other public goods, 
waste management initially seemed to be an issue that was not perceived as formally 
supervised by any public institutions.    
 
After several more attempts, I was eventually pointed to L'Environnement et 
Conservation de la Nature, i.e., the Service for Conservation of the Natural Environment, 
at the Mairie.64 I conducted two interviews with the executive of the office, Augustin 
Chahihobwa Rukomeza, in two separate years.65  This office was found undesignated at 
the back of the building with no entry other than a small trail from the outside. The place 
may have been designed for a guard under the Belgian rule, or perhaps it had been a shed 
for gardening equipment, and there was no electric light. Rukomeza explained that the 
office was “a multi-sectorial service that coordinated efforts pertaining to the urban 
environment and the conservation of nature” 66 with the following sub-offices: 
 
                                               
62 In other encounters, however, this man working in the secretariat would prove valuable in fixing 
appointments and contact details for municipal bureaucrats.  
63 “Stat(e)/ist actors?! No.” Brief encounter at the Mairie, 15 September 2013, Bukavu.  
64 Though the municipal services are neglected, the Congolese government supports the preservation of 
nature,  as evidenced by the largely functioning Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature. 
There are reasons to suspect that the preservation of the rain forest holds more value in the global arena 
than managing the day-to-day issues of local sanitation problems for poorer citizens. As one Congolese 
student working on local environmental degradation put it: “The state does not work for the people but 
the international elite.” It was clear for this citizen that the public authorities were more interested in 
attracting international aid money, such as for reforestation and protection of the rainforest, than 
considering their own citizens that are blatantly in need for improved waste services. 
65 Interview with Augustin Chahihobwa Rukomeza, chef du bureau, 19 September 2013 and 28 October 
2014, Bukavu.  
66 Interview with Rukomeza, 28 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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1. Cellule de services généraux  (general service unit)  
2. Cellule de la surveillance continue de l’environnement (environmental 
monitoring unit)  
3. Cellule de contrôle et vérification interne  (inspection) (control and internal audit 
unit) 
4. Cellule de la conservation de la nature (+reboisement) (conservation unit + 
reforestation)  
5. Cellule de l’Assainissement de Milieu (environmental sanitation unit)  
6. Cellule d’éducate et informate environmentales  (environmental education and 
information unit)       
 
All of these units (cellules) are found in each of the three territorial entities (communes) 
in Bukavu, namely in Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira. Each unit is represented by a delegated 
person who has reporting responsibility to Rukomeza’s office. He claimed that his office 
coordinated these activities in the territories (communes) and each unit provided a 
monthly report and one annual report. Each of these six units were represented by an 
individual in each of the communes and, thus, there were eighteen staff for all the three 
territorial entities combined.  Moreover, Rukomeza claimed there was not a national or 
provincial agency in charge of domestic waste management services but that Congolese 
law gave the municipal authorities full responsibility for this issue.67 However, when I 
interviewed Rukomeza the second time, he elaborated that his office also collaborated 
with the provincial ministry of environment68 on particularly harmful  activities that 
would need his inspection and then the permission of the ministry to proceed, such as the 
construction of hotels. Considering how quickly hotels are developing in Bukavu, these 
processes seem to be fairly corrupt. The most cross-cutting issue, however, was the aspect 
of a designated waste disposal area for citizens in Bukavu. I asked him several questions 
about this concern in both interviews. In an extract from the conversation he explained 
the following (my emphasis):69 
 
Rukomeza: “We have a place for garbage disposal called Irabati. [Irabati] is an agreement with 
the plantation owner, located in the cheferie du Kabare [the chiefdom just outside Bukavu] but 
it is not yet finished. It is ten by ten meters and four meters deep. But we still haven’t constructed 
the walls so we are not using it yet.” 
 
Solhjell: “But if the waste is not taken to this place, where do these tricycles provided by the 
Mairie take the waste to?”  
 
                                               
67 Interviewed 19 September 2013, Bukavu.  
68 Formally entitled Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme de la 
République Démocratique du Congo, which  also has provincial levels of representation.  
69 Interviewed 28 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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Rukomeza: “Well, they do take it to Irabati. Before, they took it to a place in Bagira but the 
bourgmestre [of Bagira] asked us to stop because they did not appreciate the waste from Bukavu 
coming to Bagira. This was a place where an old REGIDESO70 sewage channel burst and water 
flooded and the population, as well as the Bralima [brewery] used it to dispose of their waste. 
There was a call for the Bralima to fix this issue, but we never heard back from them.”  
 
Solhjell: “Who owns Irabati?” 
 
Rukomeza: The plantation company (société plantation), but there is no tea plantation in Irabati, 
that is why we can use it. The company has tea plantations in other places like in Walungu and 
different parts of Kabare. But at Irabati there are only eucalyptus plants.      
(…) 
Solhjell: “But of all the public or common goods I have studied here in Bukavu, the issue of 
waste seems to be the most problematic and highly neglected area. What is really hindering the 
construction of designated waste disposal areas?” 
 
Rukomeza: “It is a lack of funding. But at the same time, there are so many priorities, like road 
construction, paying employees, funding petrol for different activities… This blocks the 
development of a waste construction place.” 
(…) 
 
Solhjell: “Still, the issue of waste seems to be the least prioritized of the Mairie considering the 
extent of the problem. Has it been forgotten completely?” 
 
Rukomeza: “It  hasn’t been forgotten, but there is a lack of will among the authorities. The people 
are poor… There are vehicles that can be used but the problem is the lack of space. During 
Mobutu, there were plots (parcelles), but these were sold. The good waste disposal areas are so 
far away from the city. There used to be also the waste disposal by Ruzizi, but this had to be 
removed when the refugees from Rwanda came because the problem of waste gave a very bad 
first impression when entering Bukavu. You know, the world’s image of us… Now people use 
dangerous places for waste disposal where there are problems of landslides that can affect 
everything.”   
 
Being unprioritized by the authorities, politically or financially, and problems of space 
for designated waste disposal were both emphasized by Rukomeza as the driving issues 
preventing proper sanitation. Rukomeza recognized the problems of using the water 
company’s (REGIDESO) broken-down installations for waste disposal but argued that 
there was no cooperation between their offices. The lack of relations between these state-
like institutions reduces the state effect in the domain of waste management. This was 
also a concern when it came to Irabati, the waste disposal area. This place was referred 
to on different occasions with administration at the territorial level (Kadutu and Ibanda) 
as well as by citizens complaining about the distance from Bukavu. As Rukomeza 
mentions, this is a place located in the chiefdom of Kabare, 12 km outside of the city,71 
and is also in proximity to the main water reserve (Kahele) for Bukavu (see Chapter 7). 
                                               
70 Regideso is the water company in the DRC and will later be discussed in Chapter 7.  
71 Distance according to Google maps, accessed 18 April 2014,  
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The infiltration of waste in this water reserve was a concern expressed during the field 
visits to Kabare.72 Yet, the limited or nearly absent coordination between the water 
agency and waste management affected overall state performativity.  
 
Some municipal investment in waste management does exist. This is largely in the form 
of tricycles; three-wheeled vehicles resembling motorcycles with room for carriage. 
Rukomeza claimed that these vehicles had been provided directly by the mayor himself 
to the three urban territories (communes). Thus, I met with representatives of the 
commune du Kadutu to inquire further about their work on waste management.73 The 
environmental supervisor, Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene, and the head of 
administration, Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi explained the following (my emphasis):74  
 
Solhjell: “How do you deal with waste management here in Kadutu?” 
 
Olomwene: “Every Saturday we have the Salongo. People collect their waste and put it on the 
side of the road. We then take the waste using a vehicle from the Mairie and take the waste to 
Irabati, the designated waste area in Kabare, outside Bukavu.”  
 
Solhjell: “Two questions, what kind of area is Irabati and do you collaborate with the 
environmental office at the Mairie [Le Service de l'Environnement et Conservation de la 
Nature]?” 
 
Olomwene: “Yes, we collaborate with the environmental office in Bukavu, the Mairie. He 
[Rukomeza] is my boss. The Irabati area belongs to a private plantation company producing tea 
leaves. The Mairie has an agreement with these land owners. You know, there is a certain wealth 
in waste, if it is treated well. But now we have no overview, all the waste goes together. It was 
in 2012 that we started this more organized waste collection, using the tricycles that we got from 
the Mairie. We have three of them but only two are working at the moment. We need bigger 
vehicles, especially with the Kadutu market.”   
 
Solhjell: “Can you ask the Mairie or other authorities for help on this issue?” 
 
Koabashi: “We asked the central government in Kinshasa for help, as we have a big urban 
population in Kadutu. But we get no help from the Mairie. The Mairie collects a lot of taxes from 
companies but all is sent back to Kinshasa and not used in our commune. Everything we get is 
from the central government. Though, we do get some small but insignificant funding from the 
Mairie.”  
 
Solhjell: “What about your own taxes? Can you use some of the income from taxes to improve 
and invest in waste management?”  
 
                                               
72 Interview with manager Daniel Kasereka, Regideso’s Kahele water reserve, 16 September 2013, 
Kabare, and the chief of Kabare (Mwami) Desiré Rugemaninzi, interviewed 29 October 2014, Kabare.  
73Interview with Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi, chef de bureau, and Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene, 
environmental supervisor, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.  
74 Ibid 
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Koabashi: “The taxes from the roads here do not come back to us. But we do have some local 
taxes. Like at the market in Kadutu, we own the markets that do not have roofs. The market with 
a roof is owned by the Mairie. In the dry season, we do get some income. But now in the rainy 
season, no one wants to stand outside with their goods.”  
 
Solhjell: “What about the issue of waste thrown in the rivers and lake, how do you deal with 
this?”  
 
Olomwene: “The problem is the mentality of people. We work now and then with students on 
sensitizing the people. But we lack means to educate people. But the lack of will from the 
government is also affecting people’s mentality. They [people in Kadutu] cannot keep their waste 
in their house. They have to dump the waste in the river, people have no other choice.”  
 
 
The expression “Salongo” is here used to evoke a specter of the of the Mobutist state for 
certain collective efforts of waste management. These representatives, whose commune 
level is positioned hierarchically just below the Mairie in the administration, expressed 
deep concern for the need for more support from the Mairie and for the lack of means to 
deal with the problems of waste, especially with regard to the Kadutu market. 
Comparatively, the representatives at the commune level of Ibanda, were praising the 
Mairie and particularly the Mayor’s support and appeared to be much closer to the central 
power of the administration.75 Koabashi and Olomwene expressed their concern at funds 
being sent back to Kinshasa and the limitations this created in the effectiveness of 
municipal services. This shows the tension between public authorities and service 
providers’ relations when it comes to waste management as an aspect of de facto 
statehood negotiations in an urban space. This municipal level (commune) did not have 
the right to collect taxes but appeared closer to the population in a rapidly growing urban 
space. This demonstrates potentials in de facto statehood relations.    
 
Lower down the municipal hierarchy is the chef du quartier, which is comprised of 
twenty representatives and an additional twenty deputy positions dispersed among the 
three territories. I met with one chef du quartier in Kasali, a neighborhood in central 
Kadutu, named Marcelin Ramazani, who was willing to share with me some critical 
views on the aspect of waste management:76   
 
Ramazani: (…) “When it comes to waste, we don’t really have a public waste place. All waste 
places that used to be here have been sold.”  
                                               
75 Interview with Bourgmestre and du Bureau at Commune d’Ibanda, 24 October 2014, Bukavu. It 
should be noted, however, that I was unable to conduct an interview at the level of Bourgmestre in 
Kadutu as both the Bourgmestre and his deputy were out of touch during the field visit in October 2014.   
76 Interview with Marcelin Ramazani, Chef du quartier of Kasali, Kadutu, 30 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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Solhjell: “What about the tricycles at the commune, do you use these and do you know if there is 
a charge on using this service?” 
 
Ramazani: “We don’t use them, but we have local private associations that charge 3-500 
Congolese Franc [30-50 cents USD] per sack of waste. Irabati is a long way for us. The tricycles 
are by the market, but they often lack money for petrol so they ask for donations. The private 
association we used to have, plaidoyen debout [standing plea], is no longer running because they 
did not make enough money transporting the waste all the way to Irabati.”  
 
Solhjell: “What would you recommend as solutions to the waste issues in your district?” 
 
Ramazani: “First, the authorities need to construct a public depot for waste. The problem is all 
over the city, not just in this district. We repeat this again and again to the authorities. Instead, 
there are street children who work for 200 Congolese Franc per bag of waste collecting it on 
foot.”  
 
Solhjell: “What is the central problem with waste issues in your view?” 
 
Ramazani: “It is not at the population level. I talk to the Bourgmestre, who talks to the Mayor, 
but they say nothing to us. So we keep quiet with the population because we have nothing to say 
or give them.”   
 
Ramazani’s perspective on the lack of space for public waste is of particular interest. He 
expressed, as shown, that what used to be public is now owned privately. This public 
turned private space in the city shows the contested living environment in Bukavu. These 
contestations will continue to shape state effect as urban citizens and service provider 
representatives become embedded in relations that are non-escapable. The perceptions, 
meaning and practice of what is public and what is private will shape the statehood 
processes. The technologies used for governing waste, such as used by the private 
association mentioned, were not profitable enough due to transport costs to Irabati and 
the charges that the Kadutu population were able and willing to pay, according to 
Ramazani. Waste thus instead became a livelihood option for street children who were 
going to households collecting bags. This provides an example of how citizens at the 
margin (street children) are sometimes engaged in providing services in the absence of 
government technologies.  
  
Finally, the common problems of waste in Kadutu are particularly elevated in the central 
market, as was consistently referred to throughout my fieldwork. Though this market is 
not directly positioned in the administrative hierarchy of the municipality, there is a direct 
link with the environmental office and Assainissement Hygiénique Marché Central de 
Kadutu, the hygienic sanitation office at the Kadutu central market, who are in charge of 
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hygiene including waste management. Kadutu central market is owned by the Mairie. 
The rent and income tax from the market seem to be important for the Mairie and thus 
the efforts of municipal waste services (such as tricycles) are directed to this area. The 
office for Assainissement Hygiénique was a dark, tiny room consisting of two senior civil 
servants, piles of paper work and an LED flashlight.77 The head of office, Ezekiel 
Mwomera, was willing to explain some of their concerns regarding waste and how 
difficult it was to keep order with a large number of people visiting this popular market:78  
 
“There is a lack of means to get rid of the waste here. We have nothing… Transportation is a real 
problem. People from nearby villages come to Kadutu to sell or buy products and they just throw 
away the plastic, the banana leaves and manioc leftovers here. We at this office also have some 
technical issues. We have a small staff that collects garbage from the market but the only option 
then is to throw it in the river. There are no options other than using the river or the lake even 
though we know it pollutes. The Mairie has never replied to our requests. There is no space to 
dispose of garbage here and the only option is far away [Irabati]. (…) The political class does 
not take care of garbage here. It is the Mairie’s responsibility. The land belongs to the state. If 
they really wanted, they could ask people to leave and use it for waste depots.” 
 
Based on what Mwomera was telling me, there was a frustration with the lack of political 
will from the municipal authorities. In particular, it is interesting how Mwomera 
describes the lack of space for public waste, on one hand, and the view that the state owns 
the land, on the other. The de jure aspects of land ownership are certainly disputed79 but 
it also demonstrates a considerable state effect on public space. The imagining of land 
being owned by the state has major implications for de facto statehood dimensions 
exemplified through the disputes over governing waste. Here, the politics of neglect by 
de facto public authorities was a concern to Mwomera.  
 
After the interview, Mwomera took me to the place where they disposed of waste, which 
was just across the street from the market approachable through a trail between small 
wooden houses. The ‘landfill’ area was spread in an area of numerous private houses and 
on a small hill leading down to the river Kahuha, which flows into Lake Kivu through 
the former industrial area.  
                                               
77 At first, these two men were reluctant to speak to me as I did not hold any official document from 
higher ranking authorities but they eventually accepted my presence thanks to my research assistant’s 
persuasion. 
78 Interview with Ezekiel Mwomera, chef du bureau, 24 September 2013, Bukavu 
79 Formally, the 1973 General Property Law (Law No. 73-021) provides for state ownership of all land, 
subject to rights of  use granted under state concessions in the DRC (see also Koen Vlassenroot & 
Huggins, 2005). However, the law also permits customary law to grant use-rights to unallocated land in 
rural areas. This is a source of considerable legal tension concerning land tenure.  
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Figure 10 Waste disposal by Kadutu Central Market.  
 
Photo taken by author, September 2013 
 
As the picture (figure 10) illustrates, the problem of waste mismanagement also affects 
public health concerns and access to clean water. Thus, waste management is a good 
interrelating with the other goods discussed (water management, including 
hydroelectricity, and roads). The citizens living in these surroundings find themselves, I 
argue, on the margin of the state. These waste sites create spatial relations for struggles 
of “a public that is yet to come” (Walters, 2008, pp. 203-204).    
 
As mentioned by Mwomera, his office also employed around twenty-three waste 
collectors, both women and men. I was able to conduct a focus group discussion with ten 
of these employees in his office the next day. The workers were from the villages outside 
Bukavu and had a relatively long walk, two to three hours each way, to get to Kadutu. It 
was not difficult to get the impression that these were poorer workers with little or no 
education and no knowledge of French. The income for each worker was stated to be 
around a few hundred Congolese Francs, around fifty cents USD, per day. The following 
is an excerpt of the discussion (my emphasis): 80 
                                               
80 Interview with waste collectors, six women and four men, all senior citizens, Assainissement 
Hygiénique marché central de Kadutu, 25 September 2013, Bukavu. Interview fully translated from 
Swahili/Mashi to English by Jonathan Magoma, interpreter and research assistant.   
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Woman 1: “We struggle in this work because we have no tools. We have to put the garbage bags 
on our heads and carry them to the dump. Sometimes the bags leak. We cannot carry them far in 
this way.”  
 
Solhjell: “Do you get any assistance from the Mairie?”  
 
[A group consensus follows that there is no help from the Mairie] 
 
Man 1: “It is the responsibility of the Mairie to help us with a place for waste, it is their duty. We 
expect help on this and they should provide us with transportation.”  
 
Solhjell: “Why do you expect anything from the Mairie when they are not helping you at all?” 
 
Man 1: “It is their [Mairie’s] duty, we still have hope. With the last mayor we did get some 
funding for salaries. It is our right to expect this from the state.”  
 
Woman 2: “We heard some time back that the Mairie would help us remove the bags of garbage. 
We collected all the bags and took them to the place we were told to but they never came to pick 
them up with their trucks. After some time, it began to smell and we had to get rid of it all. We 
lack encouragement.”    
 
Solhjell: “What do you think in terms of the public health issues, like smell and diseases, when 
it comes to this situation?”  
 
[A group consensus again that this is badly affecting the health of everyone, not just the workers.] 
 
Man 2: “There are all sorts of things at the garbage place. Dead animals, aborted babies… We 
[the waste workers and the hygienic office] got together and wrote a letter to the authorities 
[Mairie] to complain about these conditions, but they never replied back to us.”  
 
Solhjell: “Do you meet the central municipal authorities at all and do you get your salaries directly 
from them?” 
 
Woman 3: “The government does not come to us, they only talk to the market owners. It is the 
market owners that pay our salaries.”  
 
Man 1: “There are so many taxes paid by the sellers but they all go directly to the Mairie. Nothing 
comes back to us.” 
 
Solhjell: “Speaking more generally, what is your view when to it comes to the lack of government 
involvement in issues such as waste management, but also clean water and access to electricity?” 
 
Man 2: “The authorities have ill intentions. They take everything into their own pockets. Those 
who took over after the Belgians were brutal and their inheritance has continued in later 
generations.”   
 
Solhjell: “If they are so useless, why are you afraid to speak up against their bad deeds?”  
 
Man 2: “We cannot seem to shake them off [the state authorities].” 
 
The three tricycles that were meant for waste management in Kadutu were not available 
for these workers.  Elaborating on the latter aspect from the excerpt, i.e., that it was 
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impossible to “shake off” the state, the employees in further discussion explained that if 
they ever stopped working, the waste would pile up within two days. Then, the market 
place salesmen and women would call up representatives at the Mairie because the sellers 
paid taxes to them and the Mairie would send police to arrest the waste workers or worse 
the market owner, which, in turn, would mean serious repercussions for them and their 
families. At the same time, there are interesting aspects of these workers’ expectations of 
“the state”, seen especially as the municipality (Mairie) in this case, despite these 
workers’ difficult situation. The expectations stand in contrast to the practice of 
municipal authorities who have continued to disappoint in the domain of waste 
management service provision, according to the workers. However, it is also in contrast 
to the fear of the Mairie and the market owners. The workers’ relations with these 
authorities demonstrates acts of being political (Isin, 2002).  They have a solidaristic 
bond among themselves as waste workers for the market owners. These relations have in 
turn mobilized them into writing a letter to the Mairie; expecting certain rights as public 
employees and actions from their employer. These bonds and relations, I argue, are 
shaping the waste workers into political beings.       
 
Finally, there are commercial actors involved in the waste business in more affluent 
areas. Travelling through the neighborhood of Muhumba (see figure 4) where I lived 
during my stay, I discovered posters on the gates of restaurants and hotels advertising 
Poubel Net, which can be interpreted as “Clean Waste”81, and a picture of a modern waste 
truck. I gained an interview with the chief secretary at Poubel Net, Germaine, in her 
office.82 She explained that they were a part of a larger Canadian company named Groupe 
Ciel Ouvert (Open Sky Group) and that their focus was primarily on the disposal of 
household organic waste for paying clients. She explained that they had agreements with 
land owners in the area where they would turn the biodegradable waste into compost for 
land fertilization. The cost of their service varied from one to twenty USD per month 
depending on who the clients were. She explained the following:83  
 
“Our clients are paying customers. Poorer people rely on youth organizations that can get rid of 
garbage at lower costs. But in order to operate, the ministry of environment demanded a lot of 
taxes from us. [Group Ciel Ouvert] pays six thousand [US] dollars per year in order to be allowed 
                                               
81 The word net is an abbreviation of the word nettoyage, to clean, in French.  
82 Interview with Germaine, chief secretary, Poubel Net, 17 September 2013, Bukavu.  Germaine 
preferred to use her first name only in the thesis.  
83 Ibid 
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to operate. The lack of public waste disposals areas is a problem for the Government. The political 
authorities in la Botte [the provincial ministries’ neighborhood] use our services but they refuse 
to pay. The have a large debt to our company. The taxes they take from us and other companies 
are just pocketed. Sometimes when the bosses [in the public offices] are short on cash, they send 
lower ranking servants to demand payments from us on the basis of various taxation claims. It is 
fine to pay taxes, that is normal, but where the money goes is not OK. (…) We prefer clients like 
large humanitarian organizations, The Red Cross for instance, who have many ex-patriots and 
always pay at the end of the month. (…) People in the city are suffering as they cannot pay the 
money for this service. They have to throw their garbage on the streets and in gutter and sewage 
channels, blocking water and creating diseases. People send their kids to throw away garbage. It 
is a big problem for the city.”     
 
Thus, seen from Germaine’s perspective, the local government was primarily a problem 
and it saw Poubel Net’s service as a potential business opportunity rather than a source 
of waste management relief. The cost of these “high-end” services that Poubel Net 
offered were generally not an option for most citizens in Bukavu, as Germaine pointed 
out. Germaine points to the lack of waste disposal areas as “a problem of the 
Government.” This remark demonstrates a perception of close affiliation between 
managing public space and state performances. Thus, private companies like Poubel Net, 
is calling for state practices and performances on regulation, management and finance of 
public good provision. In the next section, I will present the views of consumers in 
relation to waste management services.  
5.2 Waste Management from the Consumers’ Point of View 
 
I conducted interviews and focus groups with adolescents, women and men in Ibanda 
and Kadutu, where we discussed, amongst other things, the issue of waste management. 
The men I interviewed in Kadutu were not involved in waste management, as this was 
seen as a woman’s and/or a youth’s task.84 The women I interviewed in Kadutu had very 
few material resources and lived in small houses with earthen floors and had on average 
eight children.85 For them, human waste problems (toilets) and the lack of space were 
particularly concerns. The following is an excerpt of our discussion:86    
 
Woman 1: “We don’t have any place to get rid of the [toilet waste]. When the toilet is full, we 
wait for the rain to take it away. We don’t have anywhere to dig for a new toilet; there is a lack 
of land.”   
 
(…) 
                                               
84 Interview with five men in Kadutu, 9 October 2014, Bukavu. 
85 Focus group with nine women in Kadutu, 4 October 2014, Bukavu. Translator translated from 
Swahili/Mashi to English.  
86 Ibid 
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Solhjell: “Can you organize, like get together and dig new toilets elsewhere in Kadutu? Or is 
this illegal?”  
 
Woman 2: “If we want to build something together, like a public toilet, then we lack the space 
to build this. It is not illegal to organize. It is just that we don’t have the space.” 
 
Solhjell: “What about waste more generally, what do you do with it?” 
 
Woman 3: “We put our waste in bags and wait for the rain to take it away.” 
  
Woman 2: “There is a waste place in Funu [one public water reservoir in Kadutu]. During the 
dry season we take it there to burn it or we take it to a stream. We also drink from the same 
streams. We live like some animals.” 
 
From what they shared with me, these women were not in a position to pay for waste 
services and instead were using water in the form of rain or streams to dispose of waste 
or, alternately, to burn it during the dry season. In addition, the women were extremely 
concerned with the issue of toilet facilities; a problem that was causing diseases and 
discomfort for them and their families. In the preceding field visit, I had also conducted 
several interviews with women working at the central market in Kadutu.87 Though a few 
were saying they paid small sums to youth groups who collected waste, they mainly 
relied on rivers, gutters, and the colonial drainage systems.88 During their attempts at 
disposal in the drainage system at Camp Saio (the main army camp, see map figure 4), 
two of the women I interviewed reported that they had had several run-ins with local 
police officers who would claim that garbage disposal was not allowed in what was 
considered to be public space.89 Rather than reporting the transgression to their chiefs or 
fining these women the local police would usually negotiate for small sums of money.  
 
As mentioned, local youth groups occasionally collected waste, however it was not clear 
where they would dispose of it. Although it is likely that they would also use the rivers 
and the drainage systems, since these groups did not have access to motorized 
transportation. None of the women I spoke to had considered buying services from 
private companies such as Poubel Net, as they had either never heard of them, did not 
trust them and/or could not afford them. One of the women argued that she would rather 
                                               
87 Interviews with different women working in stalls, either individually, in pairs or in focus group 
meetings, 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu. A total of sixteen women were interviewed. 
88 They especially depended on the Kahuha river which runs through the neighborhood and out to Lake 
Kivu, the streets, or colonial drainage systems, like the Camp Saio area (see map), for dumping their 
household waste. 
89 Ibid 
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support the local youth groups, because she knew them, instead of a company.90 For the 
women that lived further away, it was easier to dispose of their waste without needing to 
negotiate with the police as the outskirts were subject to lax controls. The “state density” 
in the urban space makes these relations and interactions between public authorities and 
citizens more frequent and harder to escape.   
 
Moreover, the issue of toilets and the possibility of a sewage system, was also discussed 
with the same women.91  As none of the women had access to piped water in their house, 
there was no such thing as water closets or flush toilets that they could access. One of the 
older women who had lived in the Kadutu neighborhood for decades stated that toilet 
needs had been much easier in the past when there had been far fewer people and more 
vegetation where they could ‘do their business’ without being disturbed. Now there was 
little privacy, as she pointed out.92 In sum, the primary waste disposal areas for these 
women were rivers, the lake, old drainage systems and streets, all of which can be 
conceptualized as public space.  
 
For the youth in Kadutu, they expressed similar concerns with a lack of options when it 
came to waste disposal and public toilets:93 
 
Girl 1: “We only have some public toilets in the market, but they are private. You have to pay 
the owners of the market to use them.” 
 
Boy 1: “There are no services for getting rid of waste here. We have to dump it in the river.” 
 
Boy 2: “I would like to start a business in public toilets. I would charge people and make money.”  
 
Girl 2: “Private toilets are a possibility. In people’s houses… They are very dirty, but after you 
pay you can use it like you please. But the longer you stay, the more you pay, like with diarrhea.” 
[Everyone laughs]. 
 
Boy 3: “When the toilets are full, people wait for the rain. They release it into the gutters, the 
rivers and they pollute the entire neighborhood.”  
 
Boy 1: “Like Salongo [community duties]. People collect the waste, but they have no place to 
put it.”  
 
Solhjell: “Concerning Salongo, does everyone in your community do this?  
                                               
90 Women interviewed 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid 
93 Interview with four girls and four boys aged 15-18 living and studying in Kadutu, 7 October 2014, 
Bukavu 
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Boy 1: “No, it is only in the market place. They are not paid workers but they work for the chief 
of the market. It is not done in people’s private houses.” 
 
During the discussion, these young people were expressing both frustrations with the 
sanitation difficulties but were at the same time joking and suggesting business models 
for much needed public toilets. It is also interesting to see in this excerpt, as well as in 
different encounters I had during focus group discussions, how certain institutions were 
talked about as both public and private in the same sentence. The discussion on “public 
toilets” was interpreted as places that were not in a private home but in the popular 
Kadutu market that everyone could visit. At the same time, the young people considered 
these “public toilets” as private because there was a user fee. Thus, there is an idea that 
for a toilet to be entirely public, there should be no cost associated with its usage. These 
perceptions of what public means, seen through the eyes of Kadutu youth, revealed a 
tension, which would become increasingly clear, between public and private service 
providers and consumers.    
 
Moreover, the sense of community duties, termed Salongo, was here being neglected; 
there was no assistance from the authorities to provide designated waste areas. Hence, 
the young people and their neighborhood resorted to using rivers and gutters that in turn 
caused hazards to the common good of the area, such as smell, diseases and difficulties 
of cleanliness.  
 
The youth in Ibanda were living with a slightly more organized practice of waste disposal 
and had better access to WCs compared their peers in Kadutu.94 Below is an excerpt from 
the discussion:  
 
Girl: “In our house, there is a group of people that come each Monday to collect waste. They 
are paid fifteen dollars per month, per family. In one house, there might be four families. Each 
family will need to pay this sum of money to have their waste removed.”  
 
Boy 1: “Where I live, there is a sort of business organization that collects waste. They charge 
one thousand Congolese francs [1 USD] per month and they come with a lorry to collect 
waste.”  
 
Solhjell: “And what about toilets; do you have access to those in your house?” 
 
                                               
94 Focus group with three students, one girl and two boys living in Ibanda, all students at ISP, 
interviewed 9 October 2014, Bukavu. The interview was conducted in English.  
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Boy 2: “Yes, but we empty it directly into gutters and sewage systems. There is a big tank in 
which to empty the toilets also but it is a long walk.”  
 
Girl: “In my house we have three toilets. They work and we don't have to use the gutters. 
 
 
However, although this group of youth young people did not need to dispose of the waste 
themselves, the organizations that collected waste were also dumping the waste into 
rivers, gutters and the lake. Thus, they could maintain more sanitary private space without 
needing to deal with waste themselves. The women in Ibanda were also struggling with 
waste problems and they explained the following:95  
 
Woman 1: “I keep the waste in bags and there’s a car belonging to volunteers [Salongo] interested 
in cleaning the environment in Bukavu that collects the bags once a week. But it’s not free of 
charge. Concerning waste from the toilet, I simply rent the vehicle from the Mairie.” 
 
Woman 2: “I live in an area where a car can’t reach. To get rid of the waste I pay some children 
who take the waste to an unknown place. There is no public waste place in Bukavu! My toilet 
hasn’t been full yet. But in my quarter, my neighbors are used to filling up the old toilets with 
the soil from digging a new toilet so that the old is covered by earth.96 Also, there are people, in 
my quarter, who wait until it rains so that they can use water pipes to flush their toilets and let it 
flow through the water channel. They do the same with solid waste and everything flows down 
to the lake.”  
 
Woman 3: “There was a large pit dug in Mukukwe by MONUSCO [headquarters] where we used 
to throw the waste. Since it was full, we had difficulty to get rid of the waste. Nowadays we’re 
throwing waste at the playground near the new MONUSCO camp set near the ISP roundabout. 
With this, the problem is that the municipal authorities are threatening with imprisonment in case 
they find us throwing [waste] at this place. But the question is where do they want us to be 
throwing the waste when there’s nowhere for it?” 
 
Woman 4: “They should provide us with another pit or just with any place for it.” 
 
Jonathan Magoma: “I heard that the Mayor’s office has got a vehicle that collects waste from 
different homes. Doesn’t it collect from your homes?” 
 
Woman 1: “I know they have got two vehicles; one for solid waste and another for waste from 
the toilet but they don’t dispose of waste from people’s homes free of charge.” 
 
Woman 2: “They collect for somebody who pays.” 
 
Woman 3: “I was told those vehicles were an aid [development assistance], so I can’t understand 
why they should charge us!” 
 
                                               
95 Focus group with four women living in Ibanda, conducted and transcribed by research assistant 
Joanthan Magoma, from Mashi/Swahili to English, 30 November 2014, Bukavu.   
96 This concerns traditional toilets: when a toilet is about to be full, people start digging a new one next to 
the old one. The dirt from the digging is thus used to cover the old toilet.  
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These women may be considered lucky compared to their peers in Kadutu, who have to 
dispose of waste themselves. The matter of using sewage systems, gutters, public places 
(e.g., the playground) and the lake for garbage disposal is a growing concern within the 
city.  This was further discussed with the men I interviewed in Ibanda. These men were 
also experiencing difficulties with waste issues but were relatively better off, in the sense 
that they were not as directly affected, living in better neighborhoods with WCs in their 
homes.97 Due to the fact that the issue of waste spurred a long discussion, this passage 
length is longer. Nonetheless, this conversation demonstrates a number of interlinked 
problems and private initiatives (my emphasis):98      
 
Man 1: “Waste should be managed by public services. In my area, there is no designated place 
for garbage. People just wait for the rain. It ruins the houses. Even during the dry season, we 
wait. The waste is just outside the house. Rain water is the garbage disposal.”  
 
Man 2: “In my neighborhood, there are associations. I pay five dollars per month for them to 
collect waste. I don’t know where they take the waste. They come three times per month if they 
are regular or only one time if they are irregular.”  
 
[This focus group continued during the following meeting.] 
 
Solhjell: “What can be done about the issue of waste in Bukavu, do you have any solutions?” 
 
Man 1: “The population has no other option than to dump their waste in the river or wait for the 
rain. The NGOs cannot finance the waste issue for the entire city of Bukavu. Even myself, I own 
a car, but there is no other place to dispose waste. The NGOs only have limited project time and 
finance.”  
 
Man 2: “There are some public places…” 
 
Man 1: [Interrupts] “Really? Define a public garbage place. Have you ever been to Kinshasa? 
Things are even worse there. No, the lake is our waste place. People lack opportunities and it 
affects the lake. It will create serious pollution problems.”  
 
Man 2: “But here are lots of initiatives, like local organizations. People deal with waste using 
their own means and they recycle into compost. Another initiative is to let the waste dry in sand 
and then burn it. The problem is to finance the transport of waste and to construct the place for 
turning waste into electricity, biogas and so on. But also there is a need to change people’s 
mentality.”  
 
Man 3: “The city is dirty. The first method people use is to throw waste in the river. People leave 
waste in the roads during the night. Look at the government in Rwanda where they focus on 
biodegradable waste and where they have banned plastic bags. This dirty city [Bukavu] is why 
we have cholera and mosquitos causing malaria. You know, sometimes during the night, people 
just leave their waste bags outside other people’s houses. Or they leave them in a pothole in the 
                                               
97 Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda, interviewed 14 and 21 October 
2014, Bukavu. I had two sessions with them as there were many follow-up issues that I wanted to discuss 
further.  
98 Ibid 
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road before it is repaired. This causes problems with flies and mosquitos. The plastic bags left in 
the road are not biodegradable. The [Congolese] government should invest in biodegradable 
products like in Rwanda. But the government has given up (démissionnaire) in the DRC. It has 
given up in that domain [waste].  
 
Man 4 [medical doctor]: “The impact on people’s health is important. After the dry season in 
June-August, when it starts raining in September, there are always epidemics like cholera. In this 
period [the start of the rainy season], five people per day come to the hospital to receive treatment 
for cholera. And there’s also typhoid fever… These patients always arrive from the combined 
problems of waste and rain.” 
  
(…) 
 
Man 1: [Interrupts] “But look at the Mairie, they don't even have toilets! And the waste truck that 
they possess is tiny!”  
 
Man 4 [medical doctor]: “There are many consequences when it comes to waste. The children 
play in the waste without shoes and they cut themselves on glass and get diarrhea and other 
diseases. We take the cases of cholera to the provincial hospital. In the worst months, September-
October and January-February, the MSF takes charge. We know all the solutions to the problem 
but the issue is lack of funding and also the mentality of ‘new’ inhabitants from the villages. They 
have not been educated and they don’t understand the problems with waste.”  
 
Man 3: “But the government must also be sensitized, not only the population. There is also the 
problem of applicability. You see, there have been several studies done to find solutions to non-
biodegradable waste. But there are business interests in the market of importing plastic bags and 
other goods from Dubai and China. These people are afraid of losing their lucrative businesses if 
there are bans on goods, like in Rwanda.”  
 
Though more affluent than the women and young people in Kadutu, these men expressed 
great concern with the waste situation. On one hand, they could see the potential 
resources in waste, such as biogas, yet on the other hand they saw the poverty of the 
Mairie (who are responsible for Bukavu) and that the level of investment required to 
harness these resources could not be placed on individual NGOs. In addition, they 
expressed concern with business interests importing non-biodegradable goods from Asia 
and the lack of government policy (“the government has given up…”), similar to that of 
Rwanda, that could end some of the problematic consumption. These comparisons to 
Rwanda were frequently mentioned in other interviews and focus groups and 
demonstrated how another form of state performance was possible that was dissimilar to 
the form found in Bukavu.   
 
These men can be considered middle class and they expressed frustration with the ‘new’ 
inhabitants of Bukavu. These were mainly seen as war-affected, uneducated villagers 
who were unaware of the interlinkages between clean water, proper waste disposal and 
preventing diseases. However, as I judged from the women in Kadutu, some of whom 
                   141 of 250 
were from the villages and many of whom were illiterate, there were also concerns with 
the problematics of waste, poor drinking water and diseases. Therefore, what I found to 
be the most cross-cutting daily issue was the lack of proper disposal areas for waste rather 
than a lack of knowledge among citizens. Nevertheless, this image of “the Other”, i.e. 
subjects unaware of proper civic relations, is a central part of understanding dimensions 
of statehood and will be further discussed in Chapter 8.         
 
It is important to note that there is a large informal economy regarding waste recycling 
in Bukavu. What some consider waste, others perceive as a resource that will be 
thoroughly checked, recovered, sorted and finally reused or resold. In Kadutu, the lack 
of official waste disposal areas and functioning public service forces citizens of Bukavu 
to handle household waste themselves or organize collectively. From my understanding, 
the problem of waste in Bukavu would be an even larger concern if the population were 
more affluent and hence more wasteful.  
 
For instance, what is considered waste in Western countries would be considered a 
resource for both private and commercial use in Bukavu. For many Congolese, t-shirts 
from the Western world, regardless of what is printed on them, are of value and there is 
a major business in selling second-hand clothes in Bukavu. In addition, old textiles can 
be remade into ‘new’ clothes and are an important source of urban income. Another 
example is plastic cans for fetching water or selling petrol. During one personal 
experience, I was throwing my waste into a designated place for burning and a woman 
immediately came to fetch the empty water bottles that I had placed there.  Furthermore, 
an everyday observation along the roads are trucks and taxis filled with jerry cans that 
are sold and used to hold water, petrol or cooking oil. There is also an important industry 
of recycling glass bottles from soft drinks and beer; these need to be returned to the 
brewery Bralima or seller. As I experienced personally, the housekeeper or fixer who had 
bought drinks for me (as it was not always easy to figure out where to buy these outside 
of restaurants and bars) had many worried looks if they were unable to find a bottle that 
was missing or if I was too slow to drink what they had bought. What I perceived, with 
a carefree attitude, as common disposable items were, however, a precious resource to 
them as they had to return these glass bottles to the brewery or sale depot to avoid trouble.   
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In another interesting case, when I was visiting the hydroelectric power station Ruzizi I99, 
I saw waste flooding from a disused tunnel constructed by the Belgians right next to the 
power station and from the Ruzizi river itself.100 The waste in this tunnel came from two 
places: One source was the waste which blocked the turbines in the Ruzizi power station 
and was taken out and dumped in the tunnel entrance. The other source was from waste 
entering the colonial drainage system through the tunnel from the nearby Camp Saio101. 
Outside the tunnel was a group of women collecting various items. The women explained 
that they were collecting any useful things they could find for their family or, potentially, 
to sell at the local market.102 From what I could see, the women had collected plastic 
sandals, plastic cans and some sticks for firewood. This waste recycling by local women 
may not mean much to the overall sanitation problems in Bukavu, but it illustrates local 
initiative in making use of waste as an informal waste recycling process.   
 
There are also privately owned, commercial actors involved in recycling, such as the 
warehouse Société Kotecha, who has specific requests for items during certain times of 
the year. For instance, this could be a collection of itemized cans twice per year where 
the provider will earn small sums per unit. I also witnessed how metal was collected in 
large trucks, which was then transported back to Kenya where re-melting installations 
are used for production for various industries. The examples of Kotecha and metal 
collection appear to be at the highest level of the recycling business in Bukavu. Here, the 
receivers of the products can simply state “yes” or “no” to the suppliers of the desired 
material and avoid getting their hands dirty. This can be compared to the ‘petty pickers’ 
of waste for personal or commercial use, such as the aforementioned women. For those 
at the bottom of the hierarchy, it is likely that the work they conduct in sorting waste also 
creates an increased likelihood of infections as there is no hygiene control in these areas. 
In between these two ‘extremes’, there are local collectors and sellers of recycled waste. 
Based on my observation, these collectors and sellers could be street vendors or those 
who have more permanent shops selling repurposed goods, such as small toys made of 
plastic or used car parts. Regardless of these recycling activities, there is certainly 
                                               
99 See further discussion in chapter 7 on the power station.  
100 Visit to Ruzizi I on 12 September 2013, Bukavu. 
101  Camp Saio is the main military camp in Bukavu, see figure 4 for location.  
102 Ibid, informal  discussion with women.  
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negotiation over the urban space that affects perceptions of public space and 
responsibility through the issue of waste management.   
5.3 Concluding remarks 
 
There are two interdependent spaces of concern when it comes to waste management or 
the “politics of dirt”103: The city’s private and public spaces. The city’s public space is 
largely positioned under the responsibility of the municipal authority, the City Hall, in 
Bukavu. What stands out from my fieldwork is the neglect of any form of public waste 
disposal system. This neglect is in turn affecting pollution, public health, access to clean 
water, public roads and even the hydroelectric power station as waste becomes lodged in 
the turbines. The main public outreach from the municipal authorities seems to be 
sensitization campaigns, planting trees and a few tricycles that require user fees. Major 
efforts are instead directed to world heritage sites, such as national parks and rainforests, 
what some would term “donor darlings”104. Though these latter sites are of global 
importance, the neglect of urban citizens demonstrates a serious challenge to the de facto 
statehood. The disregard of waste management in a collective space is one of the main 
health hazards and causes numerous deaths.  
 
At the same time, it is puzzling to see how people’s private spaces, such as their homes 
or clothes are kept exceptionally clean. Individuals’ polished shoes, for instance, are 
remarkably spotless as citizens navigate their ways along the muddy trails of peripheral 
Bukavu. These forms of cleanliness demonstrate, as Bouju (2009, p. 146) argues, “the 
will to reproduce the social relationship fostered with those who share this space”. Thus, 
there is no resonance in claiming that people of Bukavu do not understand cleanliness, 
as municipal authorities may argue. They clearly and visibly do. A question to be asked 
is then, rather, why public spaces are neglected, both by municipal authorities and the 
urban citizens? At the core of answering this question lie the challenges of state-society 
relations, the political legitimacy of municipal authorities and the perception of local 
                                               
103 Title borrowed from research project led by Prof. Stephanie Newell, Sussex University.  
104 The term refers to political connections such as former colonial countries, trade partners and media 
favorites, such as protection of silverback gorillas. In the DRC, a specific “donor darling” is the 
considerable attention to female victims of sexual violence with limited focus on the much broader issues 
of maternal health care or the complexity of human rights violations against both men and women (see 
e.g. Baaz & Stern 2010).  
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governance structures in the eyes of the public. These are all dimensions of de facto 
statehood. 
 
One broader aspect to answer this question of neglect is to go deeper into interpretations 
of public space in Bukavu. In all the focus group discussions I asked the participants 
about the idea of public space (inductive concept formation) and examples of such places 
in the city.  A public place was assumed to be a place that was free of a user charge, and 
where anyone could spend time or speak freely without coming under surveillance. 
However, the participants assumed that such a place did not really exist in Bukavu. 
Certain places, such as the central market in Kadutu, the stadium, two spaces used as 
football fields and playgrounds, the pubs and the churches were discussed but none of 
these really fitted with the concept of public space as perceived by the citizens. As one 
woman in Ibanda explained:105 
 
“No, there is no such place in Bukavu even though the authorities tend to say that markets, 
football grounds and schools are public spaces. They aren’t!  What I know is that in other 
countries, there are places that people go to at any time for enjoyment or relaxation, public talk 
or for any discussion and we don’t have such things in Bukavu.”  
 
Out of curiosity, I also asked all the participants if the Place de L’Indépendence – a large, 
well-maintained roundabout centrally located with sculptures erected by current 
president Joseph Kabila – was a public space, even though the participants never 
mentioned it. A consistent “no” resonated and revealed a tension when it came to the 
public authorities’ legitimacy. As one of the other women from Ibanda explained:106 
 
“In my opinion, Place de L’Indépendence shouldn’t be called that. I would suggest it to be named 
“place du président” or simply Majority Square (Majorité Présidentielle). I stand there only if 
there is a governmental authority holding a meeting; and as you can see, there are chains 
surrounding the big circular section and people don’t cross them outside of these [special] 
occasions. If you stand there for a while, two policemen or more will walk toward you and chase 
you away.”       
 
In many ways, both citizens from Ibanda and Kadutu expressed a perception of 
dismemberment from official “public” places. The fact that this was a place kept spotless 
by a number of staff working for the municipality shows, unsurprisingly, how public 
                                               
105 Focus group with four women living in Ibanda, conducted and transcribed by research assistant 
Joanthan Magoma, from Mashi/Swahili to English, 30 November 2014, Bukavu.   
106 Ibid 
                   145 of 250 
authorities appreciate tidy ‘public spaces’. However, this particular space was a 
demonstration of power for the central authorities, accompanied by municipal sanitation 
resources that could have been used for clearing waste from more crowded 
neighborhoods (quartiers populaires). Politicians that were not a part of the presidential 
majority coalition (Majorité Présidentielle), such as the presidential candidate Vital 
Kamerhe, have been ejected this place.107 The citizens I spoke to in Bukavu thought of 
this as a political rather than public space.108 In many ways,  Place de L’Indépendence is 
a physical evidence of a state that is “capable of creating a definite and authorized nation-
space materialized in boundaries, infrastructure, monuments, and authoritative 
institutions” (T.B. Hansen & F. Stepputat, 2001b, p. 2). As such, the de facto statehood 
survives and rises in the midst of surrounding squalor.      
 
Though private spaces, such as homes, clothes and so on are kept clean, the “indifference 
to the dirt [in the urban space] is indicative of [urban dwellers] desire not to reproduce 
their social relationship within this environment”  (Bouju, 2009, p. 149). The newer 
inhabitants in Bukavu arriving from rural areas are often illiterate and struggle with 
employment and livelihood in the city. They also live in small houses with little private 
space for dealing with waste compared to the leafier residential areas. In many ways, they 
are rejected by the authorities who perceive them as squatters who disrespect the 
foundations of civic relations. With this rejection, there is clearly a lack of incentive to 
foster these social relations of cleanliness that they nourish in their private spaces. 
Waiting for the rain to flush the waste away or using rivers and broken water pipes as 
garbage disposal can be perceived as a response to their rejection by the urban authorities 
and feelings of abandonment. These actions can also be interpreted as “weapons of weak” 
(James  Scott, 1985) by slowly destroying the living environment of an imagined 
collective space. Those with financial means, such as the ‘elected representatives’, can 
easily escape these “dirty” areas by moving to the European style neighborhoods with 
gardens and fresher air. In that sense, the idea of a collective urban space is rejected on 
both sides of a perceived civic relationship.  
 
                                               
107 Vital Kamerhe, originally from Bukavu, came third in the presidential election in 2011 and continues 
to be one of the most popular politicians in eastern DRC. Kamerhe attempted to hold a highly anticipated 
political speech on 20 February 2014, which resulted in the provincial authorities using excessive force to 
remove both Kamerhe and the thousands of people gathered around  Place de L’Indépendence.   
108 Focus group discussions September-October 2014.  
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The state, represented by the municipal authorities in this case, upholds cleanliness in 
certain spaces attached to the regime (political spaces) and central urban spaces (certain 
roads or roundabouts) in which their offices are found. The citizens, represented by 
Kadutu and Ibanda residents, uphold cleanliness in their private spaces. In between are 
the public spaces that are not “owned” politically or privately but that are used, to varying 
degrees, as wasteland. When citizens are rejected and treated as subjects outside the 
state’s responsibility they may also act in ways of resistance. This shows the tension in 
state-society relations when it comes to waste management as an aspect of de facto 
statehood negotiations.   
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6. State Persistence: Perspectives from the Roads   
 
Usually, roads can be seen as a public good, although some roads may be solely utilized 
by private owners or members of exclusive groups. This chapter focuses on the roads that 
are considered public in the urban areas of Bukavu. These are the main roads that 
everyone can use, although vehicle drivers are taxed at various levels depending on the 
size of their vehicle. Contrary to the other goods discussed, there are a plethora of actors 
working on road construction, taxation and “safety” and maintenance and construction 
of public roads are also held to be a key focus for the Mayor of Bukavu. Moreover, in 
many ways, roads represent an aspect of state-building and connectivity to the world. 
Roads connect the countryside to the urban centers, as well as the local with the national 
and the national with the international. Roads are often seen as promoting economic 
prosperity by enabling the mobility of goods and people. As Dalakoglou and Harvey 
(2012, p. 459) argue “[r]oads and the powerful sense of mobility that they promise carry 
us back and forth between the sweeping narratives of globalisation, and the specific, 
tangible materialities of particular times and places.”  
 
However, roads in Bukavu also represent spaces of contestation from relations between 
authorities representing public institutions and between different authorities and 
consumers. During colonial times, roads enabled exploitation from raw material to 
slaves; benefitting a few but often worsening the living conditions for the indigenous 
population. Road construction in colonial Congo involved forced labor and expropriation 
of land from the population to provide routes to plantations and mission stations 
(Fairhead, 1992, p. 21; Reybrouck, 2011).  As this study will show, road control in 
contemporary Bukavu is a system for exclusion or inclusion, depending on your position 
within the society and perhaps one of the most visible displays of state-citizen 
negotiations in the city.  
 
These negotiations are partly due to the limitations of paved roads. In Bukavu, there is 
one main road to the city center that stretches between the Rwandan border (Ruzizi I 
entrance) and the peninsula leading to the provincial government (La Botte or “the boot” 
because of its shape). During my last field visit in October to November 2014, there was 
also major construction work on roads (in particular on Avenue l’Hippodrome) in 
Bukavu that will be discussed. In addition, there is a newly built (2009) road out from 
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Bukavu leading to the local airport (Kavumu Airport) where small humanitarian flights, 
helicopters and private jets can land. The limited and concentrated public roads make the 
motorized mobility space limited and concentrated. I argue that the public roads are 
densely governed by multiple agents and agencies, whereby movement is restricted due 
to public infrastructure limitations and authoritarian control. Figure 4 with detailed map 
of Bukavu shows the road restrictions and the locations of traffic police.   
 
The division between consumers and providers becomes less clear in the study of roads 
as some of the public authorities act in an extortive manner and thus consume more than 
they provide. On the other hand, citizens utilizing roads are providing much needed 
‘taxes’ to the municipal authorities, local traffic police as well as national road 
maintenance agencies. The focus on consumers in this chapter is largely from the 
perspective of the taxi drivers of Bukavu. Indeed, the taxi drivers are service providers 
as they represent the main form of transportation and drive to, from and around the city. 
They are represented as consumers in this chapter because they enjoy the public paved 
roads and they are in daily contact with the service providers of road maintenance and 
safety. Critical to their livelihood is to conduct as many travels back and forth on the 
main roads to secure both an income for the owners of the vehicle and the drivers’ 
salaries. This is well known among the regulators of traffic, which intensifies day-to-day 
engagement and negotiations between public servants (e.g., traffic police) and these 
consumers (i.e., taxi drivers).  
 
The roads, and in particular junctions, form a major safety concern, however, they also 
serve as public spaces. They allow a space for thinking about being political (Isin, 2002), 
the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996), and enable service providers to perform the state 
(Doty, 2003; K. C. Dunn, 2010). Thus, I have provided perspectives from citizens on 
these aspects as well as a local program called Forces-Vives run by an organization called 
SAJECEK which provides local security at one of the main junctions in Kadutu (Place 
Major Vangu, see  Figure 4).  Regarding public service providers, the main institutions 
are the Road Office (l’Office de Route) (OR), the Roads and Drainage Office (l’Office 
des Voiries et Drainage) (OVD) whose authority is in the urban areas, the National Fund 
for Road Maintenance (Le Fonds National d'Entretien Routier) (FONER) and finally the 
National Insurance Association (Société nationale d'assurances) (SONAS). However, 
there are also international and regional organizations that play a major role, such as the 
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World Bank and the European Union (EU), as well as public authorities like the Mayor 
of Bukavu, Philémon Lutembo Yogolelo. Negotiations with the World Bank and EU 
donors will be included here. Their views will be analyzed from the perspective of the 
OVD and FONER followed by secondary sources for some practical considerations, such 
as terms of conditions.   
 
Finally, the role of the Congolese traffic police, formally entitled La Police de la 
Circulation Routière and informally roulage, operate in a largely undefined space 
between the consumers and providers of public services. De jure speaking, an 
examination of the roulage as a public service, may reveal some perspectives on the ideas 
and practice of the rule of law. Though certainly a contested concept, the rule of law is 
often understood as a core functioning of the modern state and can be seen as “protecting 
citizens against the state and against one another” (Bedner, 2010, p. 48). In practice, or 
de facto, the Congolese traffic police operating along the main road junctions are using 
laws, regulations and fines in a parasitic manner, i.e., using public goods for private gains. 
Rules are thus not protecting citizens from the state, but rather protecting the state at the 
expense of its citizens. Controlling the access to and taxation of roads provide an income 
for those who enforce them. Furthermore, I argue that roads form a visible space in which 
the public authorities perform their role through control and regulation, which creates the 
state effect. That is an effect of practices that make structures of control and separation 
appear to exist (Mitchell, 1999).   
 
6.1 Road construction and traffic control from the providers’ point of 
view  
 
Compared to the other public goods discussed, there are multiple public offices charged 
with road construction and maintenance. To my knowledge, there are three main state 
institutions for road construction. The best known, due to its national outreach, is the 
l’Office de Route (henceforth OR), which is responsible for road construction at the 
national and provincial level. The second is the l’Office des Voiries et Drainage 
(henceforth OVD) their authority is primarily in urban centers, such as in Bukavu. The 
third is la Direction des Voies de Desserte Agricole, which maintains rural roads and 
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rivers for agricultural purposes.109 Additionally, there is the office le Fonds National 
d’Entretien Routier (henceforth FONER), which collects taxes for road maintenance and 
provides funds for the abovementioned road construction offices.           
 
I interviewed Albert Tsongo, who was the head of the technical division in OR.110 When 
I explained the purpose of my visit he informed me that their office, contrary to popular 
belief111, was not in charge of the city center of Bukavu but rather the roads leading out 
from capital provinces. I nevertheless continued the discussion in order to gain a better 
insight into the broader issues of road construction within the province. Tsongo gave me 
a brief history lesson of the OR’s establishment and he explained how there were no road 
works between independence in 1960 and 1971.112 The OR was established in 1971 and, 
as Tsongo stated, the World Bank financed its operation between 1975 and 1988. When 
I asked him why the Congolese government rarely paid for any of the roads themselves, 
considering all the wealth found within its borders, he simply stated that this was only 
potential richness, it was not tangible. He demonstrated this by stretching his hands out 
together as if he was holding something.  
 
Further into our conversation, Tsongo asked his secretary to fetch a map for illustrative 
purposes to explain the current and planned activities for road construction in the South 
Kivu province. Interestingly enough, there were no maps in his office, neither on the 
walls or his desk when I was there. When he showed me the map with the 2011-2016 
plans, it took him some attempts to locate the main roads, such as the one between the 
two major cities Bukavu and Uvira. Throughout my visits in Bukavu, it has been evident 
that conventional cartographic maps are not much used either in formal or informal 
settings, so Tsongo’s trouble with locating this road was understandable.113 On studying 
the maps, I realized that the road plans seemed rather ambitious, if not a case of outright 
wishful-thinking. I asked him why the OR made these ambitious plans when considering 
the cost and he stated the following:114  
 
                                               
109 The OVDA was not consulted, as their remit falls outside the territory of Bukavu.  
110 Interview with Albert Tsongo, chef de division technique in the OR, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.  
111 In informal discussions with citizens in Bukavu, the problems of roads were often blamed on the 
Office de Route.  
112 Interview with Albert Tsongo, 13 September 2013, Bukavu. 
113 In fact, maps can be seen as highly controversial and a power tool in a deeply contested political 
climate, such as eastern DRC. See for instance Turner’s (2007, p. 62-66) accounts on this subject.   
114 Interview with Albert Tsongo, 13 September 2013, Bukavu. 
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“We send the project plans to Kinshasa and they will provide some funding for part of the roads. 
Other parts of the roads will have to wait. We also have a collaboration with the EU and the 
World Bank. For the road to Uvira, this has the highest priority in the province and is financed 
by Sinohydro [a state-owned Chinese construction company]. The second on the list is the road 
to Goma, which is financed by the EU. But the road to Kavumu [the airport outside Bukavu] is 
half funded by the DRC government and the rest with the help of the Chinese. (…) Money is the 
problem. The Congolese state is not able to mobilize all the funds needed for road construction 
and it is not a dictatorship. The government cannot simply dictate what needs to be done.”  
 
The construction plans in the OR revealed the plethora of different actors engaged in road 
construction in the DRC. Tsongo explained how the roads could be supported partly via 
Congolese central funds (le budget d'investissement) and significantly from external 
funds, most importantly including the World Bank, the EU, the Chinese government and 
the UK Department for International Development.115  
 
I was able to conduct two interviews with the provincial director of the OVD, Alain 
Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, who is in charge of constructing the roads in Bukavu.116 Acting 
as a participant observer, I judged Ntambwe as an authority eager to demonstrate his 
superiority over his employees or over whoever would enter his office with lower status 
than himself. He is also highly visible and active in supervising road construction 
activities, as I could often see him together with the Mayor of Bukavu on the road Avenue 
Hippodrome (see figure 4), which was being developed during my field visit in October 
and November 2014. In my view, urban road construction is a form of legitimacy 
reservoir for these authorities since it visibly demonstrates performance and tangible 
results for the common good. In other words, these visible signs of authorities reclaiming 
the urban space form a way of performing and reasserting the importance the state.  
 
In particular, during both discussions, Ntambwe emphasized two issues; financial 
support and the ‘illegal settlements’ along the roads that the OVD were reconstructing. 
These two aspects, however, collide as financial support is primarily external from the 
World Bank (see e.g., Diop 2014) or the EU117 and comes with terms of use, which often 
lead to conflict between settlers and public institutions. First, Ntambew explained how a 
                                               
115 Ibid. Tsongo mentioned all of these as important external funding.  
116 Interview with Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, directeur provincial, OVD, 13 September 2013 and 8 
October 2014, Bukavu. 
117 On the EU project, see for instance 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/eu_rwanda/devlopment_cooperation/infrastructure/index_en.ht
m  downloaded 8 December 2014.  
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majority of the OVD’s work in Bukavu was sub-contracted to private companies, 
especially Chinese companies, financed through the World Bank.118 He explained that 
allowing this private-public relationship was an obligation for the DRC in line with 
World Bank conditions.119 Secondly, as mentioned, there is clearly a considerable friction 
between citizens who have built houses and shops along the roads and authorities, such 
as Ntambew. Though there are variations, many of these local constructions have been 
built with the blessing of the Congolese administration and so their houses and shops can 
be officially documented. Donor conditions, set by both the World Bank and the EU, 
stipulate financial compensation for those individuals and families who will have their 
homes or livelihoods removed by the state. From my understanding, this is non-
negotiable and it is causing frustration by bringing road construction in Bukavu to a 
standstill. To give an example, there is a new steel bridge funded by the EU. It is located 
between the busy overpass of Cyangugu in Rwanda and the city of Bukavu. It was 
puzzling to see that, two years after its construction, the bridge was still not in use. When 
I inquired about this at the OVD, as well as in other less formal settings, it became evident 
that the financial issue halting further construction was the need to compensate around 
thirty families who would have their homes torn down to allow for a new road that leads 
to the steel bridge. Though there are no permanent World Bank or EU representatives in 
Bukavu to my knowledge, the deadlock seemed to have been a result of the donors’ strict 
condition that financial compensation be documented and signed by all families and the 
EU’s unwillingness to trust the local government representatives in Bukavu before this 
was done.  
 
There is clearly a conflict between the presence of local governance and absence of 
international governance that affects local actions. International donor funding and 
visions are affecting statehood dimensions and state performativity by dictating 
conditions and to some extent practices. However, the international donors do not have 
(and probably never will have) full control over the practices and this opens up a space 
for maneuvers and negotiations locally. Regarding this issue, Ntambew in a question on 
who were financing the aforementioned Avenue Hippodrome, said the following:120 
                                               
118 The Chinese companies tend to win the World Bank bids through low cost contracts.  Interview with 
director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew , OVD, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.  
119 Interview with director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew , OVD, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.  
120 Follow-up interview with director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew, OVD, 8 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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Ntambew: “This is financed by the World Bank, we need to answer to them. For example, we 
are required to deliver on environmental levels and standards of roads. We have to pay for 
houses that are torn down to build roads. Before we had agreements, now we have to respect 
everything.” 
 
Solhjell: “But shouldn’t people be compensated for their houses if they are torn down?” 
 
Ntambew: “These houses were built with illegal documents.” 
 
Solhjell: “Given by whom?” 
 
Ntambew: “The Mairie, those who were supposed to give legal documents for house 
constructions. We have arrested some of them, but others have escaped. Those who were 
working in the administration.” 
 
These donor conditions seemed to irritate Ntambew, who perhaps would rather demolish 
houses or pay small sums directly as compensation without entering into legal 
proceedings. Based on Ntambew’s statements, there are also processes of maneuvering 
between donor standards, local practices of house compensation and dealing with 
débrouillez-vous (improvised) practices among the local administration. In the previous 
interview, I also asked Ntambew about the relationship between OVD and Bukavu 
citizens and he replied as follows:121  
 
“(…) It is a problem of illegal settlers because of the displacement of people during the wars 
[from 1996-97 and 1998-2003]. The drainage system we have tried to maintain was destroyed by 
their anarchic house building. Sometime back we had an incident where three children were 
swept away from their houses when we were undertaking a large drainage project. This is a 
tragedy but people cannot blame us [OVD], it is the illegal settlers who have ruined everything. 
These people are unwilling to pay taxes, which makes our work difficult.”  
 
Other than describing the death of these children as a tragedy, Ntambew held little 
empathy for what he considered illegal settlers and their anarchic housing who, in his 
view, were people that did not understand the principles of taxation and road and drainage 
constructions. As long as these illegal settlers were disrupting and disrespecting proper 
governance structures and civic relations, Ntambew did not feel responsible towards 
them. The city space becomes important as it encapsulates much of the dynamics 
involved in producing and performing the state, as I argued in the theoretical chapter. 
Relations between public authorities, such as Ntambew, and poor inhabitants with few 
options are particularly strained and affect local dimensions of statehood.    
                                               
121 Interview 13 September 2013, Bukavu 
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Although the majority of the funding for road constructions come from international 
donors, the DRC also has FONER, which is used to construct toll roads for the routes in 
and out of Bukavu. I interviewed the provincial director of FONER, Dieudonné 
Kuburhamwa Ngaboyeka, in order to understand the role and position of this institution. 
The following is an excerpt (my emphasis): 122  
 
Ngaboyeka: “FONER is the source of funding for roads. We are not an NGO, we are an 
autonomous public service. We have an administration and staff. [Ngaboyeka fetches a large 
booklet with reference to FONER’s rights and duties.] The legislator has allowed us to finance 
road construction through taxation on the roads and from carbon tax in the city and the villages. 
Offices like OVD, OR, DVDA are the ones that are actually maintaining the roads. We ensure 
the funding. As you know, the roads are in a bad condition and FONER was established in 2008 
by president Kabila on his ‘revolution to modernity’ (la révolution de la modernité). There was 
a need to standardize the building of the country and FONER was established to help secure 
founding on three levels: the national, the urban and the agricultural levels. In the city, the roads 
are public, we struggle with funding to maintain them. (…) FONER has been in Bukavu since 
2010. Thanks to us we have avenues and roads. In Kinshasa, though, they have little power. But 
here we have a good reputation. But since FONER was created only in 2008 and established in 
2010 in Bukavu, it means that you have to limit your expectations. How much can you expect of 
a four-year-old child? But if a child can achieve 98% of the expectations, the performance of the 
child will be great in the future. There is still much to be done but we have produced a high 
performance so far.” 
 
Solhjell: “In order to enforce these road user charges, do you collaborate with the traffic police?”  
 
Ngaboyeka: “We have two normal police officers in each junction, not the traffic police. The 
collaboration works well with the PNC [the national police]. The two policemen in each junction 
are armed. It is sometimes necessary to use force to make people pay.” 
 
Throughout the interview, Ngaboyeka was referring to and showing me the booklet with 
laws and regulations regarding FONER. Since this is a new public service, it was perhaps 
important as a form of de jure legitimization of FONER and their power to impose taxes. 
The example of FONER demonstrates a reassertion of state performance through 
establishing taxation systems for road improvements as a common good that citizens can 
enjoy. The reference to president Kabila’s revolution to modernity (see chapter 4) 
reproduces the intention of strengthening the state effect. Part of the state effect, as it is 
practiced in Bukavu, is road development, both in terms of construction and maintenance, 
as a visible sign of state-building and state deliverables.   
  
                                               
122 Interview with Dieudonné Kuburhamwa Ngaboyeka, provincial director, 8 October 2014.  
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Moreover, the aspects of roads in Bukavu being public and taxation being problematic 
meant that FONER could not set up road blocks as they do outside the city. The idea of 
public, I argue, seems to be interpreted by many citizens in Bukavu as “free of charge”, 
which was evidenced throughout the focus group interviews in this thesis. Instead, 
FONER had to rely only on funding from carbon taxes and taxes on the import of cars, 
which limited income. Since Ngaboyeka did not trust the traffic police, there was only 
collaboration with the national police, who do not oversee traffic junctions or the public 
streets in Bukavu. I argue that, rather than there being a lack of authority, norms or rules 
in the case of policing public roads, there is, in fact, a plurality of competing 
arrangements, which challenge a unified ideal of statehood but also reinforce de facto 
statehood and the state effect.  
 
The difficulties of collaborating with the traffic police also came up during discussion 
with the national insurance company, SONAS. Registration with SONAS is compulsory 
and argued to be the most important documentation needed for drivers according to the 
drivers’ union ACCO. This national company, established in 1967, has a monopoly on 
insurance in DRC after a law passed on 5 January 1973, during the period of 
Zairianization (C. Young & Turner, 1985, p. 331, see also chapter 4 in this thesis). This 
gave SONAS the absolute right to collect car insurance from all car owners and other 
forms of taxable goods (such as real estate collection). After several attempts, I finally 
gained an interview with SONAS, which had one of the plusher offices in Bukavu, and 
managed to talk to the deputy director, Hamuli Theodore Muzalia.123 He explained that  
the only compulsory insurance needed for car owners, namely the responsabilité civil or 
civil liability, was a form of insurance based on private wrongs, such as crashing your 
car. This is used mostly to distinguish one’s liability from motoring violations. I also 
asked whether SONAS collaborates with the traffic police and Muzalia replied:124     
 
Muzalia: “In principle, we work together. We at SONAS are not on the road, it is the traffic police 
that check documents. The problem is when the police don’t take in those who are lacking the 
correct documents. Some drivers can drive for years without the correct documentation. When 
the car crashes, it will not be covered.” 
 
Solhjell: “So what happens when people don’t have the right documentation?” 
 
                                               
123 Interview with Hamuli Theodore Muzalia, assistant chief at Sonas insurance, 6 October 2014.   
124 Ibid 
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Muzalia: “There is a penalty by law if you are driving around without it. I do not want to discuss 
the internal problems of corruption in the traffic police. In principle, we have a good relationship, 
but in practice, we have some problems.(...)” 
 
Solhjell: “What are the most important documents needed?” 
 
Muzalia: “Carte rouge [details of car identity], responsabilité civil and finally the driver’s 
license. All three are needed for you in order to drive legally. If the driver has all these documents 
in order, SONAS can play a role. The traffic police do not help us much, but this comes back to 
the fraud issue.” 
 
Solhjell: “So when I spoke to the chief of traffic police last time, he said you had a very good 
relationship?” 
 
Muzalia: “He would say that, and it is true at the level of chief. We have a very good relationship 
at that level. But the problem is on the ground. It really depends on who is working and with 
whom at the road level. (…) We only send SONAS staff to investigate accidents. The police will 
not always accept that we send our own staff. It can be a challenge to work with them. It’s always 
difficult. In a few days, October 10, we will do a general inquiry on the roads regarding insurance. 
The traffic police will secretly warn their friends about this.” 
 
In this discussion, Muzalia only listed three documents that were needed. This contradicts 
the experience of the taxi drivers and the drivers’ union (ACCO) with documentation on 
the street level, which will be discussed in the next section. Muzalia was open about the 
challenges of working with the traffic police in Bukavu, as long as I did not discuss this 
issue with the Chief of traffic police.125 Based on our conversation, it seemed obvious 
that these police officers were more interested in settling disputes at the local level 
without having to involve SONAS. It also seemed to be a tactic among traffic police to 
neglect the insurance document as a mutual deal between some drivers and the police.  
The competing arrangements of a national, monopolized insurance, on the one hand, and 
local handling at the street level on the other, demonstrate an interesting form of the 
combined de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood. As Bierschenk (2014, p. 238) 
argues: “A bureaucracy is not a machine but a configuration of social processes.(…) [A]ll 
formal organizations require informal rules and practices in addition to formal ones to be 
able to function.” Thus, there is nothing extraordinary about these practices. They rather 
show how static definitions of the state and statehood can hinder social scientists in 
understanding de facto practices of “doing the state” (J. Migdal & K. Schlichte, 2005, p. 
14).   
 
                                               
125 An ethical note is that Muzalia had no problem with me referring or quoting him in my thesis on the 
issue of traffic police corruption. He only emphasized that I should not discuss this directly with the chief 
of police.  
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Since la Police de la Circulation Routière is important and visible as the public authority 
on the roads in Bukavu, I conducted an interview with the South Kivu commander of the 
traffic police, Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka.126 The police wear bright yellow shirts and 
sometimes wear helmets or sun glasses. There are no traffic lights and accidents happen 
daily from the increased use of the urban roads combined with poor driving skills, 
overcrowded and overloaded vehicles and the lack of proper sidewalks. In that sense, a 
system of dedicated traffic police could have positively contributed to road safety. 
However, as a participant observer, it can appear as if these officers are not necessarily 
enforcing the rule of law but rather ruling by law: They use traffic regulations in order to 
govern for their own interests. The institutional structure of la Police de la Circulation 
Routière also closely resembles the armed forces with a central, hierarchical command.    
 
Two observations during my visit to the provincial police office are illustrative. First, 
when arriving at the police station, I stated my purpose to the commander Buyoka and 
he instructed me to obtain permission from the police general. When the general arrived, 
he was protected by five police bodyguards half pointing their AK47s at us and the rest 
of the police force, while circling the general as he walked from the car to his office. As 
Nlandu (2012, p. 27) states, the Congolese national police are based on hierarchies and 
structures of a military nature and many police officers have a military background, either 
from the national forces or former armed groups. The militarized protection around the 
general keeping him safe from his own staff, I argue, demonstrates a certain unease and 
mistrust within the circles of public authorities. Secondly, at the police station, there were 
a number of confiscated taxis, such as mopeds (motos) and other vehicles. While waiting 
for the commander, I witnessed an owner of one of the mopeds together with the driver 
negotiating with the traffic police in order to retrieve her taxi. Though these negotiations 
might seem trivial, they constitute relations between public authorities and citizens based 
on both parties’ livelihood (income). These forms of relations also constitute 
“perfoming” and “living” the state, such as negotiation around laws, regulations and 
practices in the public space as citizens are forced to engage with public authorities.      
 
                                               
126 Interview with Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka, Commandeur  de la Police de Circulation Routière Sud 
Kivu, 13 September 2013, Bukavu 
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In the interview, commander Buyoka was reluctant to share and so, as the conversation 
progressed, I attempted to push him on the challenges within the traffic police as 
discussed above:127 
 
Solhjell: “What kind of documentation is required by car owners?” 
 
Buyoka: “Insurance, vignette, driver’s license, you know, all the usual.” 
 
Solhjell; “So where can you get all these documents? 
 
Buyoka: “There are so many state services, I can’t name them all.”  
 
Solhjell: “What happens if drivers are caught without all the right documentation?” 
 
Buyoka: “Usually, drivers are fined between twenty to hundred dollars depending on what they 
have done. We [the traffic police] have the authority to provide drivers with a document, if they 
lack documentation, for ten dollars, which lasts for fifteen days. This is to help drivers because 
they often need some more time to get all the documents in order.” 
 
(…)  
Solhjell: “You sometimes hear people complaining that ‘having a car is to be in constant debt to 
the traffic police’. What is your view on this perspective?”  
 
Buyoka: [Laughing] “This is true only for people coming from cultures without need for 
documentation, people who can’t read... All the actions we are taking are solely for the purpose 
of the safety of the citizens.”  
 
Solhjell: “How are these officers selected then?” 
 
Buyoka: “It takes a particularly attentive person with a good head and the ability to relate to other 
people on a day-to-day basis. It is the police general that selects them.” 
 
Solhjell: “But it is not a secret that there are some corruption issues in the traffic police?” 
 
Buyoka: “There is no proof of corruption. Tell me specifically which officers you are talking 
about and I will fire them personally.” 
 
In this interview, the commander was unwilling to share information on the specific taxes 
and documents regarding traffic regulation. However, the sums discussed by Buyoka 
(20—100 USD) were also considerably higher than the ones paid to individual traffic 
police officers, which were often less than one USD and paid in Congolese Francs, 
according to the drivers’ union (next section). Again, these relationships show a space to 
maneuver within the de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood.  
 
                                               
127 Interview with Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka, 13 September 2013, Bukavu 
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It was also interesting during the meeting with the commander to observe what was going 
on around him.128 First, during the interview with the commander, two smartly dressed 
men entered his office. I had seen these two men trying to find the commander earlier 
while waiting outside his office and they were, despite wearing civilian clothes, saluted 
by the traffic police officers. Buyoka also addressed them as military officers (colonel). 
The meeting would last less than a minute and the two men were saying to the 
commander that they were thirsty. Buyoka replied that he hardly had anything and then 
gave them twenty USD. After they had received this money they seemed satisfied and 
left the office. Another incident during the meeting was when the commander received a 
phone call regarding a major’s vehicle that was being held by the traffic police. He 
commanded the person he was talking to on the phone to immediately release the car and 
let the man go. Thus, it is likely that the regulation laws are applied differently depending 
on the position of the driver and not depending on the principle of equality under law.  
Overall, these two incidents show the position of the commander in a hierarchy of patron-
client relations. However, it also shows how public authority figures such as Buyoka, 
have state qualities in their ability to produce, enforce and sanction rights.129   
6.2 Consumers  
 
Seen from a pedestrian perspective, any form of movement along the main roads in 
Bukavu is a risk. There are no longer any sidewalks, which there were in the 1950s, so 
the only option is to walk along the streets themselves. Vehicles and motorcycles always 
have precedence over pedestrians and there are no (functioning) streetlights, cross walks 
or traffic lights that might provide some safety. Drivers’ licenses require no driving tests 
and can be bought for thirty USD at La Division Provinciale des Transports et Voies de 
Communication in Bukavu. These dangers and the resulting traffic accidents provide a 
source of income for the traffic police, as discussed above. Below is a picture taken 
during the field visit in 2013 to illustrate a typical popular road in Bukavu with stalls that 
have replaced sidewalks: 
 
 
                                               
128 Spoken in Swahili, translated by research assistant Jonathan Magoma after the interview. 13 
September 2013, Bukavu 
129 Christian Lund, 15. September 2014, lecturer entitled Occupied! Property, citizenship and Land in 
Rural Java” at the PhD course Governance at the edge of the state, organized by Koen Vlassenroot, 
Ghent University . 
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Figure 11 Road near Place de l'Indépendance.  
  
 
Photo taken by the author, September 2013 
 
Furthermore, roads in Bukavu are generally in a treacherous state, although they are in 
much better condition than the rest of the province, where there are few or no asphalt 
roads. Of course, this is apart from the aforementioned road leading to Kavumu airport 
and the roads in Uvira, the other urban center in South Kivu. However, during my field 
visits from 2012 to 2014, there were many infrastructure projects taking place. Because 
roads are needed by most, if not all, citizens in Bukavu and are highly visible urban 
spaces, they are both of interest to donors and used by elites, as discussed in the previous 
section. However, these projects are not solely a blessing for the inhabitants of the city. 
For instance, in Ibanda, where most of these projects were taking place due to its city 
center location, the focus groups revealed considerable frustration over these road 
developments. As one man from Ibanda explained: 130   
 
                                               
130 Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 14 October 2014, Bukavu 
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“You know, the authorities are tearing down the houses now in Bukavu to construct roads. The 
houses are perceived as illegal by the authorities. But you know, it was the authorities who signed 
the documents in the first place. The people wanted to build small houses for living, for a 
barbershop… They had the correct documents. They were given the right orders by the 
authorities. Now the authorities don’t care if they ruin people’s businesses.”  
        
From October to November 2014, while passing the road constructions every day, it was 
clear that stalls and small houses were being torn down to make way for wider roads, 
similarly to those seen in colonial times. The new road construction demanded space for 
sidewalks, drainage and potentially some trees and separate lanes. In the more crowded 
area of Kadutu, where this work had not yet started, I was told by the representatives of 
La Commune de Kadutu that people were coming to them fearful that their house would 
also be torn down. The most worried citizens in Kadutu had a red cross sprayed on their 
door were the new roads were to be built, the representatives explained.131 Generally 
speaking, during my visits, both issues of demolishing private property and the issue of 
taxation were frequently discussed in Bukavu. The youth I spoke to in Kadutu all had 
part-time jobs, which included movement along or presence on the roads. These included 
motos taxi (moped) work for the boys or selling consumer goods in stalls along the road 
for the girls.132 The boys said the following:133    
            
Boy 1: “When I drive the moto, I get taxed sometimes by the authorities and other times by 
clandestine who set road blocks.” 
 
Boy 2: “When drivers do ‘bad parking’, they are fined and threatened with being arrested and 
taken to the Mairie. There they have to pay 300.000 Congolese franc [approximately 300 USD] 
and to avoid this they pay the traffic police or other authorities directly.” 
 
It is interesting to note that these boys used the term tax, not for instance extortion. 
According to them, there was the use of taxation by different authorities and a more 
covert/illegal form of taxation, referred to as clandestine. The use of threats, such as 
threatening to take offenders into the Mairie where more functionaries would become 
involved, is also common to push people to settle fines on the spot when the driver has 
broken some regulation. However, the majority of these ‘fines’ are paid as bribes in small 
bills, for instance a 100 Congolese franc (10 cents USD), that the driver will pay by 
                                               
131 La Commune de Kadutu is the central administrative office under the Mairie de Ville/City Hall. 
Interview conducted with Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi, chef de bureau, and Jean de Dieu Tchalumba 
Olomwene, superviseur de l’environnement, 22 October 2014.   
132 Interview with four girls and four boys aged 15-18 living and studying in Kadutu, 7 October 2014, 
Bukavu. 
133 Ibid 
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closing his/her hand, as if making a fist, with the window half down. The traffic police 
officer will then take the money and let the offender pass. This is an acceptable gesture 
in Bukavu and it is usually done either because the drivers lack all the necessary 
documents, a situation that will be described below, or because the driver wishes a speedy 
resolution. It also may be simply understood as a mutual understanding of paying the 
police salary since ‘everyone’ knows that traffic police officers pay their superiors to 
keep their positions.  
 
The perspective of the roads’ most frequent users, namely the taxi drivers, provides 
useful elaboration. Despite lacking an official public transport system, Bukavu’s taxi 
system is a tightly governed and organized industry. Each car and driver is registered 
under the drivers’ union Association Congolese de Conduire (ACCO), which is a 
compulsory union established by the Mairie. Through different meetings with the 
Congolese public in Bukavu, it seems that the unions are reasonably strong but that they 
function more as a form of governance and tax control rather than fighting for labor 
rights. I will show this through my interview with ACCO. The transport system cannot 
be seen as either “public” or “private” ownership. Officially, there is no public transport 
and owners of motorized transport (vehicles, minibuses and mopeds) are different private 
citizens. Yet, at the same time the system is carefully controlled and taxed by the 
municipal authorities. The transport system can be seen as an institution that operate in a 
twilight between private and public, or state and society (Lund, 2006b, p. 686).  
 
The transport system is popular and used by the majority of citizens who does not own 
their own vehicle and can afford the fares. There is a fixed sum of 500 Congolese francs 
(50 cents USD) along the main road for taxis and less for minivans or mopeds, usually 
around 100 to 200 Congolese francs (10 to 20 cents USD) depending on the journey. 
Moreover, the vehicles are also more or less identical; ancient Toyota Carina cars, Toyota 
Hiaces or Noah minivans. These vehicles are known for their simple but robust 
construction and easy and cheap maintenance. There is also an important economy 
around fixing these cars through the many garages or young men who are quick to assist 
if a car breaks down on the road. The minivans seem to be the main link between the 
commune of Bagira, which is the third and most peripheral territory of Bukavu, and 
Kadutu market and central Ibanda. In the minivans there will be young men between 15 
and 18 years old, hanging out from the side door shouting the stops and collecting money 
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from passengers. There is one taxi station by the road in Katana leading to and from 
Bukavu in the Kabumba area close to Place de L'Indépendence and Bukavu port. Here, 
I conducted both an interview with the ACCO representative, Justin Musaka Bahati, and 
a focus group with five taxi drivers.   
 
First, I interviewed Bahati in his modest office at the taxi station to ask what the purpose 
of ACCO was and he said the following (my emphasis):134  
 
Bahati: “The drivers come from different levels of the society, such as the army, the villages, and 
they struggle to collaborate with each other. That is why we have ACCO. Like, the drivers that 
come from the army might not understand why they need all the documents and maybe they can’t 
read. We at ACCO sensitize the drivers to make sure they have all the documents needed. We 
also help them to understand that they have to faire rapport [pay] to the traffic police. This means 
that the chief of police will get 1000 Congolese franc [I USD] per day from each traffic police 
(roulage). ” 
 
Solhjell: “How come the drivers need to pay the traffic police so that they can pay their boss? 
Can’t you as a union fight those practices?” 
 
Bahati: “If these officers fail to faire rapport, they will not be sent back to the road the next day. 
How can you battle that? The traffic police (roulage) have an order from the chief and everyone 
is afraid of the government. The traffic police are simply looking for faults, such as having too 
old cars or damage, and force people to pay in order to avoid problems for themselves and the 
driver. The drivers will be harassed if they don’t have all the documents. 
 
Solhjell: “But isn’t it the purpose of the drivers’ union to fight for the workers’ rights?”  
 
Bahati: “You cannot fight the state; we have to collaborate with the government. You can 
negotiate on sums for the taxes but you can never say no. We always collaborate. The drivers 
will also need to pay the Mairie for parking. There is no public parking here, débrouillez [to 
improvise] is the rule. Like here [at the taxi station] it is the SNCC [the National Society of 
Railways] that owns the parking space. There is a good relation between SNCC and the Mairie 
and it is the Mairie that negotiates the terms for us when it comes to taxes.”  
 
During our discussion, Bahati made no attempts to hide the practice of police harassment. 
More profoundly, Bahati made it clear that there was no escaping the state. Based on 
Bahati’s perspectives, I argue that through the governance and control of roads, the state 
effect is one of fear, oppression and subordination. Of interest is also Bahati’s use of the 
expression débrouillez – a discourse dating back to 1960 from the secessionist 
constitution of Sud-Kasai, referred to as “article 15”, whereby state authorities were 
encouraged to fend for themselves or improvise in finding ways to cope with their tasks, 
                                               
134 Interview with Justin Musaka Bahati, president of ACCO in Ibanda, 24 September 2013, Bukavu.  
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financially and otherwise (C. Young & Turner, 1985, p. 228).135 More generally, the 
difficulty of life in DRC has popularized this term and now it refers to all the de facto 
ways of coping and surviving.  
 
Bahati also explained that local governance structure of the transport system was the 
municipal authorities as the overarching control body. My interpretation was that the 
drivers’ union does not work for drivers’ rights but rather ensures the streamlining of 
government rules and taxation among drivers. Since Bahati frequently mentioned the 
need for documents, I asked if he could list them, which he did without any hesitation 
and in a hierarchical order:136       
 
Table 4 Required documents for drivers in Bukavu137  
Type of document  Issuing Authority  
1. Insurance La Société Nationale 
d'Assurances (SONAS)  
2. Urban road maintenance tax 
(Taxe voirie urbaines )  
City Hall, Mairie de la ville de 
Bukavu 
3. Technical Control  The Provincial Division for 
Transport and Communication, 
La Division Provinciale des 
Transports et Voies de 
Communication  
4. Vignette (Correct labelling of 
vehicle) 
The Import Directorate, 
Direction Generale d’Impots 
(DGI) 
5. Authorization of number of 
persons allowed in the vehicle 
La Division Provinciale des 
Transports et Voies de 
Communication 
6. Driver’s license La Division Provinciale des 
Transports et Voies de 
Communication 
 
 
This overview provides an insight into the different public offices that drivers need to 
consult before legally driving in Bukavu, according to Bahati. There is nothing 
                                               
135This expression since spread and was also popularized by the Congolese musician Pépé Kallé in 1985 
with the song “débrouillez-vous!”(Ayimpam, 2014, p. 12). An extract of the song (translated by 
Ngoyarto 2011 in Ayimpam, 2014, p. 12): Article 15, mes chers, débrouillez-vous pour vivre ; pour vivre 
vous devez chercher, débrouillez-vous pour vivre.  
136 Interview with Justin Musaka Bahati. Bahati listed them himself in my notebook.   
137 Described by ACCO representative Bahati, Bukavu. 
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controversial or unique about these documents in themselves, however their potential use 
in extortion by public authorities creates problems and tensions with the general public. 
Some of these documents will, in many cases, need to be renewed on an annual basis, 
such as the driver’s license. Since the driver’s license was listed at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, I asked Bahati if proof of driving skills should be most important and he said 
no and argued that insurance (SONAS) was essential. In order to obtain a driver’s license 
in Bukavu, you need an ID card, a passport photo and twenty to thirty USD depending 
on ‘administration costs’. If an accident happens, you have to be insured unless you want 
to end up in jail or be ruined completely by financial settlements, as Bahati explained.138 
If a person is killed in traffic, the family of the deceased can settle on large sums for 
funerals and livelihood compensation. Moreover, Bahati could also list with precision 
the taxes required by the FONER, which are paid daily when passing certain road 
blocks:139  
 
 2300F (approximately 3$) for small cars (4 passengers) 
 3100F (approximately 4$) for minivans (Hiace or Noah) (10 passengers) 
 4500F (approximately 5$) for minibuses (18 persons) and jeeps 
 9000F (approximately 10$) for smaller trucks (camionnette) of 6-10 tons  
 18000F (approximately 20$) for trucks (camion) 
 
With the help of Bahati, I was able to conduct a separate focus group with five male 
drivers aged between twenty-five and forty. The focus group took place in a bar across 
the street from the taxi stand to allow for a more secretive discussion. The focus group 
was conducted in the local languages of Mashi and Swahili through the help of my 
research assistance as the drivers were not comfortable in French. I asked questions 
regarding their relations with the authorities and the need for documents and below is an 
excerpt from the discussion (my emphasis):140  
 
Driver 1: “We try to give something back to our children. But the police harass us. The best thing 
would be to never see them again.”  
 
Driver 2: “The real problem is not the ones on the road but the chiefs, the people in the 
hierarchy… They require a minimum fixed sum from every officer on the road depending on 
where they [the officers on the road] are positioned in the traffic.”  
 
                                               
138 Interview with Bahati, 24 September 2013, Bukavu. 
139 Ibid 
140 Interview with five male taxi drivers, 24 September 2013, Bukavu.   
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Driver 3: “Transport is not well organized in Congo. Even if we have all the documents, the 
police will find a hundred-and-fifty other problems with your car. They will always be 
discovered. Some time back, ACCO complained to the governor and there was a reduction in the 
number of traffic police.”     
 
Solhjell: “So can you raise your voice against the oppression of the police or others harassing 
you, for instance through using the union (ACCO)?  
 
Driver 2: “They [ACCO] can’t do anything. If you raise your head too high, there is a coffin 
reserved for you on the roof [local proverb]. It is a problem that concerns us all. ACCO is afraid.”  
 
Driver 5: “Everything is political. If we unite to fight for our rights, ACCO will see us as rivals. 
The chiefs in the government will react. (…) When you ask about your rights you will be arrested 
and the price will be higher. Protests are costly. When you work against the government you will 
not succeed.”    
 
The group seemed generally to agree, although with the exception of contact with the 
governor, that the union did not fight for their rights and there was an underlying 
assumption that if you start to demand rights, it would be in separate networks and not 
through the ACCO. There was a considerable level of fear of the government and the 
reluctance to raise voices against the oppression was specifically discussed in terms of 
death threats, the potential of jail time and the very costly fines that could be around 200 
USD. These fears worked as disincentives to the drivers, who could lose their and their 
family’s livelihood and potentially, even risk their lives. Again, from the perspective of 
the taxi drivers, the governance and control of roads demonstrates the state effect as one 
of fear, oppression and subordination. 
 
Moving from the discussions with taxi drivers, the drivers’ union and the various focus 
group settings, it is useful to examine both local security concerns and the streets as a 
public space for protest. First, when it comes to security, bad driving or corrupt traffic 
police are not the only dangers at the main intersections. The fin d’heure – urban banditry 
after dark – thieves (larrons), and swindlers (escrocs) pose considerable risks for citizens 
utilizing and dependent on transport in one of the roundabouts formally named Place 
Major Vangu (popularly called Essence), see Figure 4 and a satellite photograph (Figure 
12) below. This intersection connects Bukavu and three national roads (N2, N3, N5) as 
well as connecting South Kivu to Rwanda (exit Ruzizi II) for heavy trucks and lorries. It 
is also the main bus and taxi station in the Bukavu. Needless to say, this is a strategic and 
profitable space for criminal activity and banditry.  The Congolese police and traffic 
police are for many different reasons reluctant to deal with these issues, especially after 
dark when they themselves are at risk.    
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Figure 12 Place Major Vangu141  
       
Place Major Vangu in the big red circle and the red cross of the approximate position of office of 
SAJECEK that provided local security based on networks for citizens.   
 
As a response to these insecurity challenges, but also reclaiming the idea of the roads as 
a public space, a local organization called SAJECEK142 provides security for citizens 
through a program called Forces-Vives – living force.  This group organizes private 
investigators for the return of stolen goods and is an interesting example of both a 
consumer and a provider. They represent the general public in demanding better rights 
and improved services from the public authorities by frequently contacting these 
authorities to arrange meetings with local communities but also by using the roads as a 
space for protests to demand citizens’ rights.  
 
The SAJECEK office was a container a hundred meters from Essence (see the red x for 
the approximate position on Figure 12). I interviewed the president of the organization, 
Robert Njangala, and the executive secretary general, Hugo Guy Luwese, in relation to 
Forces-Vives but also their broader work on citizens’ rights and the responsibility of 
                                               
141 Satellite photo from Google maps  
142 The full title of the NGO is La Synergie des Associations des Jeunes pour l’Education Civique, 
Electorale et la promotion de leadership cohésif au Sud-Kivu  
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public authority figures.143 First, Forces-Vives is a voluntary service for citizens who, for 
instance, have had their cell phones or laptops stolen. Victims can call Forces-Vives to 
ask for an investigation, provided that they pay the transport costs of the investigators. 
These investigators are young men who follow-up on leads to search for stolen goods. 
When I asked why specifically young men were the investigators and not women or men 
generally, Njangala replied that this was simply because of time constraints for both adult 
women and men from their daily work. Young men, on the other hand, were more 
available. However, I suspected that it might be easier to maneuver for the young men 
against other young men who form the majority of the urban banditry.  
 
In response to my enquiry as to how Forces-Vives conducted their investigations, 
Njangala replied that, to avoid confrontations, it was essential never to ask who had 
committed a crime but only to focus on where the robbery had taken place. Though 
payment for returned stolen goods was voluntary, it was normal to provide a 10% fee of 
the total value of the good. For instance, a laptop bought for two-hundred USD was often 
given back with a payment of twenty USD from the rightful owner. Moreover, regarding 
potential imprisonment, Njangala told me that Forces-Vives did collaborate with the 
police, but he also highlighted that minor crimes, such as cell phone theft, were not 
viewed from their perspectives as important enough to warrant a trial.  
 
Since Forces-Vives has become a relatively successful program and with resourceful and 
outspoken individuals (see also Scheye, October 2011), they have been partly coopted 
and silenced. The former president of SAJECEK, Christian Wanduma, was given the 
position as chief of the Cellule d’Investigation du Gouvernorat de Province, the 
investigative unit of the governor’s office, which has an agenda of improving security. 
Yet, my understanding is that his role is to keep a close watch on citizens or organizations 
that give negative reviews of the governor or his network. From the interview with 
Forces-Vives, it was made clear that having Wanduma in the Governor’s office was not 
an advantage in terms of ameliorating the state-society relations of public good provision. 
Instead, Wanduma had started his own Forces-Vives close to the Kadutu market, which 
he on different occasions had claimed was reducing crime significantly in Bukavu. In 
                                               
143 Interview with Robert Njangal, président de SAJECEK, and Hugo Guy Luwese, Secrétaire Exécutif 
Géneral, 21 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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contrast, the Forces-Vives representatives considered the security situation to be grave 
and that the public authorities were not taking the necessary responsibility.144 Overall, 
the program of Forces-Vives demonstrates how citizens themselves take an active 
responsibility for security along the roads but also how they use it to express views on 
public needs.     
 
Secondly, in conversation with Luwese, I inquired further about their relations with the 
authorities on how they dealt with the issue of the bad roads in the area.145 He told me 
that they had attempted the most peaceful means first, namely to write and invite the 
relevant public authorities to talk to them about citizens’ needs in the neighborhood. The 
next step would be to demonstrate as follows (my emphasis):146       
     
Solhjell: “Are you free to demonstrate?” 
 
Luwese: “It is not easy but it is a last resort. We arrange ‘sit-ins’. Last time, we arranged a 
demonstration against the bad roads here. The mayor (maire) threatened us by sending a text 
message stating that ‘I will treat you like the M23147’ if we conducted the demonstration. But the 
constitution allows us to demonstrate, though in practice they cancel our applications. We do it 
anyway against their will. Then they send police who will shoot at us and threaten us with guns.”  
 
Solhjell: “So you feel threatened?”  
 
Luwese: “Yes, every day. The criminals are making us suffer. We have become their enemies. 
The office [of SAJECEK] has been burned twice during a day. If we work at night, they threaten 
us and you might even end up getting killed. The government also threatens us with text messages 
promising death to us. The police also... But we will continue our work. The situation here in the 
DRC is difficult if you want to conduct demonstrations… It means you will be pursued. The 
government does not want you to denounce them. They are afraid of having their bad deeds 
broadcasted. They want to camouflage them, they are afraid of revolutions, like in Tunisia.” 
 
Solhjell: “But speaking from an international perspective, the bad deeds of the Congolese 
government are well known. Why are they so afraid of being broadcasted?” 
 
Luwese: “Because the authorities are trying to regain their position. They try to enforce their 
position. They don’t want people to be united, this can be a cause of revolution against their 
government.”  
 
As the conversation with Luwese shows, in order to gain sufficient attention for the need 
for public goods, such as improving the roads, it is necessary to resort to the last option, 
                                               
144 Interview with Robert Njangal, Président de SAJECEK, and Hugo Guy Luwese, Secrétaire Exécutif 
Géneral, 21 October 2014, Bukavu. 
145 Interview with Hugo Guy Luwese, 21 October 2014, Bukavu. 
146 Ibid  
147 M23 (2012-2013) was an armed group that caused considerable challenges for the Kinshasa regime 
and is often blamed as the ‘bad guys’ by the government.    
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namely to use the public sphere for demonstrations. Again, the image of the state from 
this perspective is one of oppression through threats, but also a regime fearful of losing 
control over its citizens. The public authorities, from the perspective of Luwese, are 
fearful of citizens’ uniting, such as through demonstrations, and prefer a fragmented 
population occupied with internal disputes rather than a common, state-like enemy.     
 
When it comes to the broader issues of state-society relations and roads in Bukavu, I have 
in the following discussion included perspectives from two intellectuals. These 
intellectuals are “consumers” but also add some interesting state-society perspectives. 
Déo Katwanyi Kabika, who has spent his entire life in Bukavu, described the issue as 
follows:148  
  
“During Belgian rule, there used to be a plan du ville in Bukavu on how things were constructed 
and their purpose. After independence, people thought they were free from rules, like laws on 
how to drive. This confusion still exists and has resulted in the construction of anarchy. 
Independence is a concern for all citizens, the nation… But with liberty come laws, duties and 
rules. Instead, independence is practiced as anarchy. Maybe we are just at the beginning of re-
establishing order in Congo. (…) I was ten years old when independence happened. There used 
to be avenues with sidewalks and separate traffic lanes. When independence happened, people 
started building houses on the sidewalk, crossed the street without thinking and drivers would 
drive as they wished. The problem started in particular with zairianization. The authorities were 
just given things without working for them. It created an expectation that if one belonged to a 
certain class, one would get things for free. If my father is appointed, I will get things for free... 
This is our country’s biggest sin.” 
 
As with other intellectuals I spoke to, Kabika is pointing to the lack of mutual respect or 
social contract for laws, duties or rules from both citizens and public authorities. Through 
Kabika’s discussion, there is a discourse of anarchy or the anarchic, which refers to the 
disrespect by certain groups of citizens breaking an elusive social contract. “Anarchic”, 
“disrespect” and “negligence” were all words used by lecturer Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa 
Viancy in this respect:149   
 
“(…)[T]he roads are a national property, they are public. To use the roads, the constitution gives 
the right to free movement. The individuals walking along the roads do not pay for their usage. 
However, there is a tax for community improvements of the roads. This can be in the form of 
Salongo [community duties] among citizens, which is still applicable today but regarded with 
much more indifference. The citizens are neglecting this because they are not given anything in 
                                               
148 Interview with Déo Katwanyi Kabika, director at the NGO Initatives et Actions pour la 
Developpement Local (IADL), 28 October 2014 
149 Interview with Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, lecturer in history and political science at the Institut 
supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu, 22 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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return for their work. In addition, there are taxes on vehicles (…) [and] the use of roads, like 
urban taxes, vignette [correct labelling of vehicles imported] and insurance, which also needs to 
be paid. This is an obligation of the state to demand taxes from citizens. (…) The traffic police 
(roulage) are the ones that regulate these taxes. The state is concerned because of the anarchic 
housebuilding along the roads. As you can see in the city, they are in the process of demolishing 
them. (…) People misuse the public spaces to set up their own shops along the roads. They have 
their own markets along the roads that are not regulated. This is disrespect of public space.”      
 
I interpret Viancy’s and Kabika’s perspectives as indicating the dimensions of de facto 
statehood intensely negotiated over in Bukavu. What they sometimes refer to as 
“anarchic” use of public roads, such as constructing houses and shops and conducting 
arbitrary forms of taxation by the public authorities, shows the dynamic rather than static 
processes of statehood. Both Viancy and Kabika’s category of practices, when it comes 
to their understanding of state-citizens relations, builds to a certain degree on the 
philosophical idea of a social contract150 as well as the de jure versus the de facto forms 
of domestic statehood. The de jure elements discussed in these perspectives are Viancy’s 
and Kabika’s references to the legal texts, such as the constitutions, laws and regulations 
formally established in the country. The de facto elements, or the functioning of 
statehood in practice, on the other hand, are the violations on both sides of the state-
citizens’ relations of the de jure. 
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has been concerned with certain consumers of the roads in Bukavu, on the 
one hand, and a plethora of actors involved in construction, controlling funds and 
policing along the public streets, on the other. The public roads in Bukavu demonstrate 
the strong hold of the state through the multiple sites of state agencies and service 
providers. The public roads in Bukavu and the everyday livelihood they provide for a 
number of public authority figures, taxi drivers and citizens travelling back and forth to 
markets forms an important contribution to ideas of public goods and collective space.  
 
Road constructions are high politics and a priority for international donors and for public 
authorities who use these constructions for their own legitimacy building. As Dalakoglou 
and Harvey (2012, p. 460) argue: “Beyond the moral complexity of establishing the 
                                               
150 This includes philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke who 
have discussed these bonds between “the state” and “the citizens” from different viewpoints. 
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infrastructures as a ‘public good’ – in the majority of cases roads are constructed as public 
works – the realisation of such works involves financial, regulatory and technical 
relations that often fold international, national and local regimes into a single and specific 
location”. Tension arises when requirements on the donor side, such as documented 
compensation to families losing their homes, goes against the interests of local regimes, 
e.g., the authority of the OVD. Moreover, these donor relations with national and local 
regimes (from Kinshasa to Bukavu) have led to a return to colonial style roads in the 
urban center (Ibanda). As the head of OVD explained, the priority of road re-construction 
was first the colonial roads in boulevard style with trees, separate lines and sidewalks.151 
Though perhaps “pleasant” in a European sense, this also questions who has the right to 
make and re-make the city (Harvey, 2009; Lefebvre, 1996). This is a highly excluding 
process as it inhibits the right to set up shops or homes for many inhabitants in Bukavu.  
The public roads are thus at the center of a negotiating arena of state reassertion 
(Hagmann & Péclard, 2011). Resources that the state employs are drawn from both 
national and international agents and institutions. There are also symbolic resources such 
as regime promises to the public. The negotiations that take place locally demonstrate the 
tensions when policies and plans are implemented. More importantly, such negotiations 
demonstrate that there is space for manoeuver and that both state agents and citizens, 
who are in the midst of these processes, may employ different de facto strategies.  
 
It would be interesting to understand better the issue of road construction in the long-
term context and as a means of oppression, as mentioned in the introduction. 
Constructing and maintaining roads in Congo will inevitably require significant labor 
hours due to its vast size and challenging terrain. In colonial times, the use of forced labor 
was used to construct rapidly the roads and railway tracks that were needed to extort 
rubber and other valuable materials (see e.g., Hotchild 1998). During the years of Zaire, 
Mobutu’s attempts of Salongo, which was communal work, including repairing and 
maintaining roads, were often met with resistance by the ‘average’ Zairian man, 
according to Fairhead (1992, p. 25). Furthermore, he noted (ibid) that, “many of those 
who will have to build the road are not in favour of road building, as they would 
effectively be building the vehicle of their own oppression”. While women at the time 
(1980s) were generally exempt from Salongo, only men with privileged status and correct 
                                               
151 Interview with Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, Directeur Provincial, OVD, 8 October 2014, Bukavu 
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documents were excused (ibid). Road construction can thus be seen as a form of 
oppression by the state towards citizens of “lesser worth”, who are not well connected in 
society. 
 
In contemporary Bukavu, there are no visual forms of forced labor when it comes to road 
construction but there are clearly frictions that traverse international-national-local 
boundaries. The World Bank and other donors are connected only with the national 
authorities in Kinshasa and these donors have rules for compensating families who will 
lose their homes or shops. There is thus an internationalization of road construction, and 
this strains the relations between public authorities (e.g. the OVD) and the citizens.        
 
The issue of taxation forms another key aspect of controlling roads more broadly. 
Taxation is closely linked to the heavy presence of coercive forces on the roads and main 
junctions. Some of these forces circumvent taxes from the official bureaucracy and others 
enforce official taxes. Those who circumvent, like the traffic police, use official 
regulations, on for example the number of passengers allowed in a taxi, to extract fees. 
A share of these fees is sent back to the chief of traffic police. The traffic police 
demonstrate an institution that uses and interprets official rules and adopts them to the 
social context. Part of the reason for these taxation systems is the plurality of institutions 
affiliated with road safety, maintenance and construction, intensified by the interest of 
international donor and finance communities in infrastructure.  
 
Another issue is the inadequacy of the budget set aside for these institutions and hence 
the need to acquire funds from the public. These various practices of taxation form a 
significant part of the daily lives of citizens and the “management mode of the state in 
everyday life” (Blundo, 2007, p. 126). It is interesting to note that political rhetoric in 
Congo often focuses on what the state will deliver but rarely addresses these (unpopular) 
issues of arbitrary taxation. An example here includes the focus on “Les Cinq Chantiers 
du Congo” – president Kabila’s infrastructure projects, such as road construction in 
addition to health, education, safety and improving civil servant functions - but never a 
debate on how to mobilize funds or revenue collection from the public.  These issues are 
rather debated through civil society organizations or by certain scholars or critical 
journalists in Bukavu and elsewhere in the DRC (see e.g. Pole-Institute, June 2012). 
Though perhaps avoided in public debate by the state, the issue of roads constitutes in 
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many ways the center of state-citizens’ relations. The promises from international donors, 
the importance from higher level political figures and the multiplicity of public sector 
institutions involved in road construction, safety and various forms of governance and 
administration are all interlinked issues. It is a story of a state rising up from the aftermath 
of war and decay. It also shows the dynamic negotiating arenas for statehood, such as the 
position of state agencies in the local and international arenas. 
 
There are frequent disputes and conflicts relating to both taxation and road constructions 
where the latter affects citizens’ private homes and shops. The representative at the 
drivers’ union ACCO demonstrated how deeply embedded the transport system is in the 
public sector and the importance of following the conduct of these authorities rather than 
fighting for drivers’ rights.  Based on the discussion with ACCO and the drivers, I view 
the role of the traffic police in the road system as resembling what MacGaffy (1987) calls 
“parasites” meaning actors that utilize their positions in the state to extract wealth from 
the society. Or as Dalakoglu and Harvey (2012, p. 460) argue, “(…) roads can disconnect 
as effectively as they forge connection. Too often they fail to fulfil their promise, too 
often they entrench the violent exclusions of established political and material orders.” 
Transportation infrastructure in Bukavu acts as a strong-hold for the parasitic state, where 
any attempt at speaking up against oppression or harassment inevitably results in a 
worsening situation for road users. Road users, in turn, seem to be neither in the club that 
can escape these public authorities nor afford the cost of speaking up against oppression.  
 
The state, represented by the different road agencies, taxation bureau, insurance company 
and traffic police, are arenas of intense negotiating regarding de facto statehood. The 
citizens, including the frequent user of the roads, such as the taxi drivers, are kept under 
continual surveillance by competing and complementing service providers attached to 
the construction, taxation and safety of roads. The issues surrounding local roads overstep 
international and national boundaries of what constitutes de facto statehood. Road 
construction is a visible sign of state building and can be used by a number of agents both 
in service provision and consumption. The variety of practices regarding taxation and 
safety illuminates how service providers invent strategies within, at the interface of and 
outside the formal procedures of bureaucracy (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011).  
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7.0 From Public to Private Goods: Water and Hydroelectricity   
 
Simply stated, water supports life. It is a good that is non-excludable, meaning that people 
(consumers) should (in an ideal world) never be excluded from accessing water. Examples, 
such as rainwater, freshwater lakes, rivers and streams are common goods that anyone should 
be able access regardless of payment. Water is considered a basic human right (UN, 1992), 
meaning that no one legitimately can prevent people from using common resources, such as 
rainwater or streams and that water must be offered at affordable prices. At the same time, 
however, water can be excludable when captured and sold as bottled water or tap water for 
private consumption. Providing water at affordable prices requires, amongst other things, clear 
regulations and significant investment to ensure supply to the less privileged. Moreover, in 
many countries, the commercialization of water via tap water systems has foreshadowed the 
transition from public to private (or even public-private ownership). Nonetheless, it is true for 
some countries that allowing more competition in the water sector could reduce prices and 
improve efficiency. However, in other places it can cause class exclusion and social unrest, 
such as occurred in the Water War in Bolivia.152  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the practices of water supply in Bukavu and the 
excludable nature of transitions of public to private ownership that are taking place. 
Furthermore, I also consider electricity as a sub-category of water in this case as the focus is 
on hydroelectricity generation as a sub-category of water supply in this case study. Electricity 
generation is not a life or death matter, as drinking water supply is, but it is needed and desired 
(enjoyed) in ‘modern’ societies. That said, the limited availability of electricity in Bukavu has 
created a space for alternative forms of energy provision such as charcoal (makala), generators 
and solar panels. I will not address the aspect of hydroelectricity at the same length as drinking 
water supply but will treat it as a sub-category of the water resources with particular emphasis 
on two empirical phenomena of consumer-provider frictions – dahoulage (stealing electricity) 
and délestage (load shedding) – and to a lesser degree institutional cooperation.  
 
There are three main sources of water for citizens in Bukavu. The first and most desired is tap 
water, which many consider to be the cleanest. The supply of piped water in the urban and 
                                               
152 The Water War in Bolvia (studied by Baer, 2008 and others) is an example of a successful mobilization. This 
mobilization was led by La Coordinadora in Cochabamba, Bolivia, against a water privatization policy that had 
caused inequitable water management in their community.  
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semi-urban areas is run by Régie de distribution d’eau (REGIDESO). This water distribution 
system was undergoing (at the time of the research) transitions from a national, parastatal 
(which will be further discussed) agency to a private, shareholder company. Taps are mainly 
located in private homes although REGIDESO also have at least one public tap located at the 
state-owned school Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP), and in other state-owned 
institutions, such as army camps, hospitals and schools. Secondly, there are public water 
stations named “Funu”, “Kaduru” and “Nyakliba” in Kadutu that are not owned by 
REGIDESO.153 Additionally, there are alternative purification systems provided by the 
government and international humanitarian organizations. Finally, the third source is generally 
accessible water from rain, the rivers and the lake. This last group (water from rain, rivers and 
lake), which may be highly contaminated due to the waste problems, is mainly used for washing 
clothes or bodies but also as drinking water in the dry season.    
 
As mentioned, water is also used in the production of hydroelectricity which is the only source 
of domestically generated electricity in the region. There are private alternatives, such as 
generators or solar energy, but these are not nationally owned by the Société National 
d’Électricité (SNEL) which holds the governmental monopoly on hydroelectricity. In Bukavu, 
the delivery of electricity comes from a hydroelectric power dam completed by the Belgians in 
1958 named Ruzizi I after the river Ruzizi which flows from Lake Kivu to Lake Tanganyika.154 
It has a generating capacity of about thirty megawatts (MW), however, there are usually 
obstacles to running the MW to full capacity. There is a second dam called Ruzizi II, which 
was funded by the World Bank in 1989 and which is shared by the three neighboring countries 
of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC under the regional name of Société Internationale 
d’Électricité des pays de Grands Lacs (SINELAC). It generates at most about forty-five MW, 
hence one-third (i.e., fifteen MW) of its power goes to each country. Based on my encounters, 
there is limited cooperation between these two institutions. The Congolese government has 
claimed that an additional two dams will be built, named Ruzizi III and IV, but this depends on 
improving cooperation between SINELAC and SNEL and the integration of Ruzizi I and II. 
This study will focus mainly on SNEL’s distribution within Bukavu and the local dynamics of 
its access and provisions.  
 
                                               
153 See Figure 4 for approximate location of Funu and Kaduru. Nyakliba is not considered in this thesis.  
154 See Figure 4 for location of Ruzizi I.  
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7.1 Controlling Water Distribution 
 
In order to better understand the dynamics of organizing tap water supply in Bukavu, I 
conducted two interviews with the same director of administration and finance at REGIDESO, 
Swedy Maneno.155 Maneno was a difficult man to get hold of and was not particularly 
interested in meeting with a PhD student. However, the last meeting proved to be particularly 
useful as I had a much better overview of the tap water supply situation in Bukavu and was 
able to ask specific questions. In the first interview, Maneno explained how the distribution of 
drinkable water was a challenge in the province since “the demand is too high and the 
equipment is too old”.156 He argued that this was mainly due to the “anarchic urbanization” 
happening in Bukavu where “it is difficult to identify the real clients”, in which he means those 
who pay for their usage.157 Maneno argued that many houses lacked functioning meters to 
measure water use, which was the normal way of charging citizens for the service.158 Maneno’s 
perceptions demonstrate a relation of differentiation between inhabitants he considers anarchic 
and unwilling to pay for services and inhabitants he calls “real clients.” I argue that this client-
service provider relation that he favored is an example of a neo-liberal turn in the policies of 
tap water provision in Bukavu.    
 
In the second interview, these neo-liberal policies became clearer when he gave a more detailed 
account of his views on the privatization process which had been unconfirmed during the 
previous field visit. I discovered that REGIDESO has undergone considerable institutional 
changes over the period of my research from 2012 until 2014. This is in line with the World 
Bank’s support to privatize previously nationally owned companies targeting in particular 
REGIDESO and SNEL (see especially World_Bank, 2006).  Maneno explained the transition 
from a so-called para-etatique or parastatal to a shareholder company. The following is an 
excerpt from the conversation (my emphasis): 159    
 
Maneno: “As it is today, the price of water is not sufficient to cover the cost of the maintenance and 
improvements of the installations. Water is seen as a social service. Generally, in Africa, water is 
perceived as a social good (bien social) but not for economic interests and investment. We cannot 
                                               
155 Interview with Swedy Maneno, Chef de Division Administrative et Financière, REGIDESO, 16 September 
2013 and 28 October 2014, Bukavu. The interviews were conducted with approximately a year separation and 
both times in his office. 
156 Interviewed 16 September 2013, Bukavu 
157 Ibid 
158 It is interesting to note here that Maneno is complaining about the lack of meters in private households while 
the men interviewed in Ibanda were complaining about the manual measures of meters. 
159 Interviewed 28 October 2014, Bukavu 
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modify the prices due to politics. People think it is expensive already and they will demonstrate in the 
streets in response to any price increases. We cannot invest with prices at this level; we can only pay 
for personnel in REGIDESO. We are forgotten by the external actors when it comes to financing, like 
Oxfam, who are not helping us. The political situation doesn’t allow us to increase the price. There 
might be demonstrations which will be directed to the president and they might result in the departure 
of the leadership.”  
 
Solhjell: “But isn’t the purpose of privatization to make money out of water, since you are now a 
shareholder company?”  
 
Maneno: “Yes, the purpose is to both improve the service and to make money. These things go 
together; by improving the installations, we will start to make money. The one affects the other 
(engrenages). We are in a process of state disengagement regarding the service. We are searching for 
shareholders, so when one invests, the whole company will benefit. The state will always be keeping 
an eye on the services though, like education and health… but they will not control them directly, just 
control the price of water. This is due to politics, as I mentioned. The consequences for an increase in 
water prices will cause demonstrations and in turn affect the president.” 
 
Solhjell: “When I speak to different people, REGIDESO is often referred to as para-étatique (parastatal). 
Is this incorrect then?” 
 
Maneno: “This is no longer the case. Before it used to be and it meant that the state monopolized the 
service and the leadership would be nominated by the state and rule for a given term. This used to be 
the case and the leaders of REGIDESO then had to directly report back to the state. Today and for the 
last two years, we have had a general assembly that decides on the leadership.” 
 
Maneno was explaining the relation of state disengagement (neo-liberal reforms) with 
governing water supply and how water is perceived as a social good closely linked to regime 
stability (“the state will always be keeping an eye on the price of water”). Any attempts at a 
complete separation from the public sphere in regards to tap water seemed impossible in 
Maneno’s view. Nevertheless, he, as head of administration and finance, appeared to be very 
keen on the idea of a purely commercial service with high costs for consumers. In both 
meetings, Maneno seemed to hold little empathy for consumers who were unable and/or 
refusing to pay the current charges of REGIDESO.  
 
In terms of the possibility of a public outcry from an increasing cost of water, I argue that there 
is a large potential for social unrest. This is because, first, there is a pattern of high expectations 
of state deliverables among consumers in Bukavu, which will be demonstrated in the second 
section on consumers. Second, these expectations are coupled with grand promises during 
election campaigns by political candidates, such as establishing Funu.160 This shows how 
elections, such as the one held in November 2011, intensifies the experience of statehood and 
expectations. Third, there are deficiencies in the actual city space when it comes to materiality 
                                               
160 See section 7.2 in this chapter and also Chapter 4 on President Kabila’s Cinq Chantiers 
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of services, infrastructure and financial capacity, all of which in turn affect citizens in their 
daily access to water. These interlinked processes may create alienating relations that could 
cause social unrest and the deposing of political leaders.161 I argue that services like tap water 
supply is closely associated with “the state”, understood in this relation as the central regime, 
which will be discussed further in the analysis (Chapter 8). Moreover, these de facto statehood 
concerns are overlooked by international donors, such as the World Bank, who instead take an 
economist’s view: “The financial situation of REGIDESO continues to be critical as revenues 
collected (both from private and public consumers) do not cover expenditures that are incurred 
by the company” (captured by World Bank analyst Fall, 2014, p. 2).162 There is thus an external 
donor pressure on improving commercial success that, to little extent, considers de facto 
dimensions of statehood. As mentioned, the Water War in Bolivia serves as an example of 
these commercial and financial issues for World Bank donors in relation to domestic socio-
economic realities  (Baer, 2008). The relations between authoritarian regimes’ need for stability 
and potentials for solidaristic bonds uniting groups against regimes seem to be overlooked by 
technocratic and neo-liberal donor communities.   
 
Meeting Maneno was also useful as it allowed me to visit the primary water reserve Kahele for 
Bukavu, located in the nearby village of Kabare, 12 km outside of the city.163 When the 
Belgians constructed the city in the 1940s and 1950s, they located the main water reserve in 
this high altitude district, allowing the water to flow using gravity rather than electric pumps. 
This is different from supply to Goma and Kinshasa, where water is pumped up from a 
freshwater reserve (Lake Kivu and the Ndjili River, respectively). At the Kahele water reserve 
station, I managed to arrange a guided tour from the water production manager Daniel 
Kasereka.164 Kasereka gave me a brief history of the reserve, explaining that it was built by the 
Belgians in 1954 to serve mainly Bukavu. In the 1980s, construction and maintenance were 
                                               
161 See also Chapter 6 regarding Forces-Vives perspectives on political leaders’ fear of unity and 
demonstrations. 
162 There is also perhaps a tendency to ignorance in the World Bank’s representation of water consumption. For 
instance, in an article about the Urban Water Supply Project in the DRC (webpage accessed 2 June 2015 at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/10/improved-access-to-drinking-water) the authors write 
the following: “The project also includes an educational component, the aim of which is to sensitize the 
authorities as well as citizens about the need to economize in their water use and to promote behavior change, 
because without collective awareness, if water flows abundantly, it runs the risk of being wasted.” I have never 
encountered in my field visits any Congolese who are wasteful of water. In addition, any infrastructural work to 
improve supply will take a long time to accommodate the rapidly urbanizing population (see also Maractho  & 
Trefon, 2004).   
163 Distance according to Google maps, accessed 18 April 2014. Maneno acted as a gate keeper in this relation.  
164 Personal interview with manager Daniel Kasereka, REGIDESO’s Kahele water reserve, 16 September 2013, 
Kabare, DRC. 
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undertaken in order to increase the water supply to a growing urban population. They managed 
to triple the supply from 450m3/h to 1380 m3/h. He reiterated what many have argued during 
my field visits, namely that the water reserve supply is not sufficient to match the demand of 
the city and that the output varies considerably with the seasons.  
 
As he was showing me around the river that was the source of the supply, Kasereka explained 
how local people in Kahele were stealing the water. This caught my interest and I asked several 
questions to better understand these relations. Kasereka stated that during the dry season, 
people would take water from the installation for their private farming activities. On some 
occasions, they would report repeat offenders to the police. The rule is that local residents had 
to stay ten meters away from the river. On other occasions, REGIDESO had tried to buy 
people’s farm land so that they would stop stealing water. Yet, since people’s survival was 
contingent on land, they had refused to sell it. Another measure to prevent theft that was 
suggested during the conversation was the construction of another river that the local residents 
could use. But for this, Kasereka explained, REGIDESO had been dependent on external 
funding. These days, he elaborated, it was Oxfam that provided water for local residents in 
certain villages. REGIDESO provides water only for the cities and thus these tensions create 
alienating relations between rural inhabitants and service providers. Villagers would instead 
seek service provision from humanitarian agencies and chiefdoms (Kabare in this case).   
 
After we completed a tour of the Kahele station, Kasereka explained the technical aspects of 
the water purification process and we ended with a political discussion in the research lab 
together with a technical expert. The technical expert in the research lab had wondered what I 
was doing there since I was a political scientist. I explained that I was trying to understand 
negotiations over public goods and the connections between different public institutions. Based 
on this, Kasareka said the following (my emphasis): 165 
  
“People in Bukavu suffer. On average, they only have two liters of water per day when they should 
have about twenty liters. These two liters are supposed to cover drinking, cooking, washing and 
sanitation and it goes without saying that it is an insufficient amount. We try to do our best with limited 
means and resources, but what comes out of the tap in Bukavu is affected by the poor maintenance of 
pipes. The distribution of water is not equal either… It is commercialized. We deliver most of the water 
to Bralima [a brewery in Bukavu]. REGIDESO was a social service in the 1970s and it was set up to 
cover water delivery to the entire Congolese population. Though it is still parastatal (para-étatique), 
REGIDESO is now handled by a private company from Senegal and they only deliver to those who are 
most likely to pay. You see, Senegal had the same problems with water in their country but they solved 
                                               
165 Ibid   
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it with privatization. Because of this, water is no longer seen as a public resource but a private good 
for paying clients. We could be seen as saviors, by bringing clean water to the Congolese people, but 
that is not how the Congolese government sees it. We [workers at Kahele water reserve] need to keep 
a clean conscience, we can never stop production. We need to continue serving clean water to the public 
even though it is private.” 
 
Through this discussion, it is easy to see Kasareka’s frustration with unequal distribution and 
how REGIDESO is currently only for commercial or private clients. The shift from the idea of 
a social service to a private good for paying clients is in line with the neo-liberal agenda of the 
World Bank and REGIDESO’s financial manager Maneno. However, it also demonstrates the 
tensions among service providers themselves. Such relational tensions also demonstrate the 
complexity and dynamics within state-like agencies. I argue that the political shift 
(domestically and abroad) to a neo-liberal agenda impacts by differentiating citizens and 
subjects, making the former clients and the latter irrelevant.   
 
Another concern that also became apparent throughout the guided tour was that the lack of 
electricity seemed to hamper the various processes of filtration and quality analysis of water to 
Bukavu. I asked about relations with SNEL, but there seemed to be no collaboration, even 
though they were mutually dependent on the same natural resource. Kasereka commented the 
following on this issue: 166  
 
“The responsibility if something goes wrong is placed at one person, one individual, who makes an 
error rather than blaming the failure of the system. We need electricity to work but the system is not 
working.”  
 
In Kasereka’s view, the practices and performance are dependent on individuals rather than on 
the structure or institution. This perception, I argue, follows the broader pattern of service 
providers’ lack of connectivity and cooperation across agencies in charge of public good 
provision. As discussed in Chapter 5, the waste management service in the municipality 
(mairie) was not in contact with REGIDESO and vice versa.  These observations illustrate a 
system of individuals in charge of services and their practices, demonstrating that there is not 
one, unified state that comes preformed. Rather, there is a plurality of individuals taking part 
in, practicing and performing “the state”. At the same time, the perspective of “the system”, I 
argue, aggregates an idea of a coherent state, i.e. the state effect.     
 
                                               
166 Ibid  
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With limited access to tap water in Bukavu, many consumers (especially in Kadutu) resort to 
utilizing public water sources, called Kaduru and Funu. These two places are very different 
from each other. Kaduru is located at the beginning at Kadutu, closer to the urban center Ibanda 
of Bukavu, where fewer people live.167 Funu, on the other hand, is located in the most densely 
populated area of Kadutu.168 Kaduru was considered a good source according to consumers I 
encountered in my field visits. Here, water seemed to be flowing ‘endlessly’ and with a 
relatively high quality speaking from the viewpoint of consumers. This water source, I 
witnessed, appeared clearer than the muddy water in Funu. From my understanding, the quality 
of water was due to it coming from a deep water source that was unpolluted unlike the open 
rivers and lake.  
 
During my fieldwork in October 2014, it was impossible to find any reliable information on 
the Kaduru installation, as everyone I spoke to had conflicting ideas. The responses I received 
variously described Kaduru as a missionary contribution during Belgian Congo, a local 
organization in collaboration with Belgian engineers, or simply as a REGIDESO plant. 
Speaking with REGIDESO, it was clear that it was not their installation. One scholar explained 
that Kaduru was the original name of Kadutu when the first missionaries came to Bukavu more 
than one hundred years ago.169 Judging from the many unknowns and varying explanations, no 
one seemed to really know the origin of Kaduru. Moreover, no one seemed to be in charge of 
the five water taps from which water was pouring plentifully. This was confirmed by the people 
I spoke to fetching water at Kaduru, participant observation and in focus group settings. 
 
The only limitation to Kaduru was its location: It was far from where most people lived and 
the walk back to their homes would mean a very steep and exhausting climb while carrying 
water cans. Most women working in the market would first have to walk further away from 
their homes to fetch water and then to return via a long walk home at night and this was 
deterring their use of this source. However, Kaduru also serves Congolese working in 
international NGOs with access to company cars that contained large water tanks. They go to 
Kaduru because they have problems with REGIDESO in their neighborhoods in Ibanda. Thus, 
                                               
167 See Figure 4 for approximate location of Kaduru.  
168 See Figure 4 for approximate location of Funu.  
169 Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, a lecturer in history and political science at the Institut supérieur 
pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP), interviewed 22 October 2014, Bukavu.  
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Kaduru is serving clients of REGIDESO, not only consumers who have been excluded from 
REGIDESO services for varies reasons.170         
 
Funu is a very different place, as it was set up by a parliamentarian called Jean-Pierre 
Mukubagnyi Mulume during his election campaign in 2011. At Funu, control and access is in 
sharp contrast to Kaduru. It was clear from visiting Funu that this water source is in a bad state. 
There used to be thirty water pumps but now only one works and it was strictly controlled by 
people who called themselves Salongo, meaning “volunteers”.    I spoke to two of the three 
people that claimed they were in charge of supervising the water source.171 My engagement 
with these two Salongo was informal: It was not possible to conduct a formal interview with 
either of them as the crowd was extremely rowdy. One person, who was clearly subordinate to 
the main Salongo, had been severely beaten and was unable to focus his eyes. The apparent 
leader of the Salongo was standing on top of the water pump in a domineering manner and 
either had his arms folded or gave instructions by pointing. In our discussion, the subordinate 
Salongo stated that, while Funu was being established, the MP had used his own well-paid 
police officers and soldiers to protect the construction area and ensure safe access to water for 
the public.172 He explained that, once these guards had gone, the area had been left to the local 
police (referred to as police de proximité173) who then did nothing to ensure the safe upkeep of 
the pumps. According to the subordinate Salongo, as a result of this lax security, the pumps 
and the batteries for the solar panel lights had been stolen, events that prompted the fin d’heure 
to patrol the area at night.174 When I asked both Salongo if the still had contact with Mulume 
or his guards, the replied that they did not. The subordinate Salongo claimed that Mulume was 
very disappointed with people in the neighborhood because of the misuse of the construction. 
The Salongo said that the police had appointed them to protect Funu, and when I followed up 
by asking if they were police, they insisted that they were just volunteers or Salongo.  
 
The position of these Salongo with respect to the users of Funu or the public authorities (e.g., 
the local police and Mulume) was unclear. Salongo, which is the term they used of their 
position, dates back to Mobutu’s Zaïre as community work on a voluntary basis (see also 
                                               
170 The reasons for exclusions will be further discussed in section 7.2 
171 Participant observation and informal conversations conducted on 10 October 2014, Bukavu.  
172 Ibid 
173 This police force is an example of donor initiatives, in particular from the EU mission in the DRC, to support 
security sector reform of the national police force (PNC). Reporting on their performance varies considerably 
from donor reports, journalistic and scholar articles to citizens living the experience of these forces.  
174 Due to the dangerousness associated with fin d’heure, I did not conduct interviews with them. 
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Chapter 4). The use of Salongo ideology in this study, conducted in 2012-2014, shows the 
influence and interpretation of history in contemporary forms of statehood.  Salongo is form of 
statehood relation that appear to have survived based on the intensity and complexity of 
relations between those controlling access and those accessing a public good (water) in a city 
space where public water sources are limited. Therefore, it seems undoubtedly important to 
untangle relations between consumers and service providers in order to understand the different 
dimensions of statehood and actors enacting the state. Salongo will thus be further discussed 
in Chapter 8 as an aspect of governance and languages of statehood.  
 
Finally, in terms of payment, the volunteers claimed that they were not taking any money from 
Funu users and that they were motivated purely by welfare concern. The claim, however, 
seemed somewhat incredulous given my understanding of the situation gathered from focus 
group discussions and also from my participant observations. Although it was difficult to 
persuade anyone fetching water there to speak, especially since the Salongo were keeping a 
close eye on me, I managed to talk briefly to one woman who simply said that you only pay to 
be first in line.175 Other than that, this was a free service, according to her.176 This was, as 
mentioned, not what I have been told in the focus groups with youths or with women, both of 
which groups stated that they pay around 100 Congolese Francs (10 cents USD) for a gallon 
of water in Funu. Nevertheless, this source was less exclusive than the REGIDESO client-
provider model in that it lacked the barriers of bills, the costs of tap installation and the 
necessity of possessing home-owner documentation.    
 
7.2 Consumers of Water  
 
The most desired water, tap water, is a precious good in Bukavu. Even in affluent areas with 
tap water connections, water rarely flows and usually will only be accessible for a limited time 
during the day. Moreover, obtaining a connection to REGIDESO may be a complicated process 
in the first place, due to the fact that REGIDESO requires an ownership title to the house or 
building as well as to the land. This complicates access for many Kadutu residents. The service 
provider, in this case Maneno from REGIDESO, claimed that many houses had been built 
without the proper documents for land ownership or safety regulation. Many of these living 
                                               
175 Participant observation and informal conversations conducted on 10 October 2014, Bukavu. 
176 Ibid 
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spaces did not include installed tap water systems. In addition, potential clients of REGIDESO, 
on top of having to pay connection fees, are required a form in French to register, which is a 
process that presupposes reading skills and thus excludes many inhabitants in Bukavu. By 
requiring these French forms and housing documents, the city can be seen as a “difference 
machine” (Isin, 2007) that incorporates strategies and technologies for exclusion.  
 
At the same time, those who do have access to REGIDESO’s services may sell water on to 
non-clients; thus REGIDESO might not be particularly motivated to establish a water 
connection to one household as they are bound to lose out on revenue from further 
redistribution to other households.177 There seems to be a mutual mistrust between public 
service providers, such as REGIDESO, and consumers. Some consumers that would like to 
enjoy tap water and electricity services may be perceived as thieves by the providers since they 
do not pay or conform to usage rules. The providers of these services, on the other hand, may 
not be trusted by paying consumers, who often fail to receive regular tap water (or electricity) 
due to REGIDESO’s and SNEL’s (the electricity company) limited infrastructure. There is thus 
a network of relations between consumers and providers that need to be analyzed in order to 
understand the dimensions of statehood. The following sections will discuss first the consumers 
of REGIDESO services (tap water) and then the alternative water systems used by those 
citizens without access to REGIDESO.              
 
To investigate those with access to tap water through REGIDESO, I conducted an interview 
with an elite consumer and three separate focus group discussions with middle class women, 
men and youths, living and working or studying in Ibanda. For the elite consumer, Pharmakina 
(a pharmaceutical company), it was the first and only time I heard that access to water and 
electricity was not a big issue in Bukavu. Although my informant at Pharmakina, Grégoire 
Shamavu, stated that there were some irregularities regarding both goods, he also told me that 
Pharmakina had a close working relationship with REGIDESO and SNEL.178 However, as 
Bralima, the brewery and the largest industry in Bukavu, was expanding there were more 
problems than usual. As Shamavu explained:179  
 
                                               
177 Meters installed to measure consumption were not reliable as they were checked manually by employees that 
were willing to negotiate locally on a preferred sum. 
178 Interview with Grégoire Shamavu, the head of the technical department at Pharmakina, 2 October 2014, 
Bukavu.  
179 Ibid 
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“We are experiencing some irregularities these days with several interruptions. Today we see that the 
pressure in the taps varies considerably and sometimes we have almost no supply of water. These are 
difficult times for REGIDESO, it is an internal problem for them. Pharmakina uses the same water 
delivery as Bralima, which is just a few hundred meters up the road. We have a separate, private line 
with REGIDESO, shared between us [Pharamkina] and Bralima. The problem now is that Bralima first 
gets the water due to its location and since Bralima is expanding, they have invested in large water tanks 
and we receive less water than usual.” 
 
Unfortunately, I was unable to interview at Bralima as they were in a “silence-period” during 
the field visit in October 2014 due to an expansion deal with Heineken, which meant they were 
not allowed to discuss their business with outsiders. What I could observe were the large water 
tanks that they had newly installed, which Shamavu referred to as limiting Pharmakina’s access 
to water. I also asked Shamavu if he had ever considered a more reliable form of water or 
energy resources since they were such a large company located close to the lake and possessing 
a great potential for using solar energy. He replied the following (my emphasis): 180  
 
“That is a beautiful idea. But [in the same way as] when it comes to electricity, this is always provided 
by SNEL. For the few interruptions we have, we use generators. But to be autonomous, like using Lake 
Kivu for instance, there would be a need for several purification treatments. Also, if we do not use the 
state services, we would be heavily taxed if we used the lake as a resource. In addition, the state services 
are not the same as we are private clients, so it is a private service. The private relationship means that 
they [REGIDESO and SNEL] will do whatever we ask them to do. For the public services, the clients 
are there but the supply is not. The hierarchy is long in the public services; money disappears in the 
long process. While with private services, business is taken care of directly.” 
 
Shamavu’s statement reveals an interesting discourse on private and public relations as well as 
on the presence of the state. First, there is an outspoken neglect of the public in the consumer-
provider relations that became clearer throughout the conversation with Shamavu. The public’s 
needs were not a priority for the service providers. Secondly, in this elite consumer-provider 
relationship, there seemed to be much bargaining power for Pharmakina due to the revenues 
generated for REGIDESO and SNEL. By private relationship, Shamavu meant in practical 
terms that Pharmakina had separate pipes and lines with REGIDESO and SNEL that were not 
connected to the public pipes and lines available to the public. It also meant that there were 
close ties between Pharmakina and the central leadership of REGIDESO and SNEL that 
enabled a better customer service that took complaints and irregularities seriously.  
 
Based on this interview, it seemed that the consumer-provider relation with Pharmakina was 
far more important to maintain for REGIDESO and SNEL than the private households without 
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the same revenue potentials or ties to central management. Shamavu’s insistence that their 
usage of water (and electricity) did not affect the public’s access to tap water in Bukavu, seems 
dubious since the only captivated water source serving Bukavu is served by REGIDESO, 
namely the Kahele water station. In other words, the separate, private pipeline for their 
activities was surely exhausting the same captivated source that was meant to serve the public 
lines. This demonstrates relational networks of private connections with “public” service 
providers, which lead to for conflict and mistrust among groups of citizens claiming rights vis-
à-vis service providers.  
 
For private citizens in Ibanda, the realities of obtaining tap water were different than for the 
elite consumer level. In the focus group discussion with men who live in Ibanda, irregularities 
in accessing tap water in private homes revealed differences between owning and renting. In 
Bukavu, home ownership seems exceptional and most citizens in Ibanda rely on renting.181 
Relations with water suppliers for those renting a home with installed tap water arose as a topic 
in the focus group. I asked the male focus group what would happen if they were to refuse to 
pay a bill on the grounds that their water service was not regularly available in their home. One 
man responded: 182  
 
“I am in a weak position. I rent the house and my landlord will tell me that I am only renting the house. 
I cannot refuse to pay for water and electricity because then they will cut the lines and pipes and it costs 
even more to get them re-installed. When I complain to REGIDESO, they don’t do anything. Sometimes 
there might be water during the night, but only for a few minutes. My wife, my kids and I we all wake 
up to try to get some water. But by the time we are by the taps, the water has already stopped flowing. 
If the meters were regulated by computers there would be no problems, but now they do everything 
mechanically and they have no clue about how much water is flowing in the channels.” 
 
 
Indeed, the fallibility of manually measured systems arose during different discussions with 
private citizens enjoying access to REGIDESO services. It meant usually that individuals 
would have to negotiate with REGIDESO technicians that came to measure their consumption. 
These relations illustrate what Shamavu (from Pharmakina) explained above, namely, that 
there is a long hierarchy in public services (“money disappears in the long process”). For 
individuals without direct connections to the leadership of REGIDESO, these lower level 
negotiations were not usually settling problems of tap water supply. Thus, even private citizens 
                                               
181 Based on fieldwork observations, ownership of homes seemed to be divided amongst a small elite and 
generates considerable cash revenues. In fact, from what I could gather during the fieldwork, the main income-
generating activities in Bukavu, apart from the aid industry, are in property and in the import of goods such as 
textiles, food and cars. This economy offers little incentive for elite investment in national or local economies.  
182 Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu 
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in Ibanda who could afford to pay bills were not guaranteed a constant supply of water to their 
private tap.   
 
To women in Ibanda, access to water and electricity was usually within reach, albeit limited 
for some, either in their home or in their neighborhood. There was a group consensus that it 
was the government’s duty to provide the population with basic access to water, which is an 
example of citizens’ calling the state into being. In the focus group, the women were outspoken 
about the difficulties with these services (my emphasis):183 
 
Woman 1: “In my house, there is no water anymore. There [used to be] but since the pipe directing 
water to my house was broken some meters away [from my house], it has never been repaired. As to 
the electricity, there is some but not permanently.”  
 
Woman 2: “There’s water and electricity in my house and I can say it’s regular compared to how it 
works in other areas. I’ve never woken up or sent my children in the morning to fetch water from 
somewhere else except during some occasions in the dry season. There’s always water though it is 
sometimes cut for a few hours.”  
 
Woman 3: “Where I live there’s no water, no electricity. I resort to asking my neighbors to get water or 
send my children to fetch some from ISP [state owned university].”  
 
Woman 4: “In Ibanda, there are houses where there’s water and others where there’s no water. In the 
house that I’m renting, there’s water and electricity. Compared to our neighbors, we have [permanent] 
water and electricity. But you should know that this is the arrangement of my landlord with REGIDESO 
and SNEL technicians who are paid extra money so as to keep this regular for us. Around six families 
in my neighborhood have adopted this practice, and those who haven’t just get supply during the 
evening or at night, two or three times per week, especially for electricity.”      
 
(…) 
 
Woman 1: “[T]here are people who are corrupt at both SNEL and REGIDESO. They permanently serve 
these big factories where they get bribes for the maintenance and forget about the rest. I know a guy 
from SNEL who used to sensitize184 us so that we can get together in our neighborhood and collect 
some money to get a special line. I then understood that when they set a special line they somehow 
forget about the common lines.” 
 
Woman 2: “I know that there’s water and electricity available but there are cuts because they just want 
us to negotiate with some bribes.” 
 
Woman 3: “Yeah, they [have bad intensions] (malfaiteur).”  
 
Woman 4: “And still, none of these workers can be fired even if you report corruption with evidence to 
their superiors since it’s the latter who urge the former to behave so. Where on earth can this happen?”  
 
 
                                               
183 Focus group with four women in Ibanda, conducted in Mashi/Swahili and transcribed into English by 
research assistant Jonathan Magoma. Interviewed 30 November 2014, Bukavu.   
184 This word (sensibiliser) is used frequently among service providers and citizens in Bukavu that illustrates, I 
argue, the infiltration of aid donor language in the city.  
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Clearly, there are variations in the women’s access to electricity and water. For some, the water 
pipes are never repaired and for others there are special deals between landlords and service 
providers to keep the access regular for both water and electricity. These special arrangements 
are interesting forms of statehood relations adding to higher level negotiations between more 
economically resourceful consumers (landlords) and service providers. The relations are 
example of practices employed to overcome limited access to public goods. More profoundly, 
such practices create ways of becoming claim-making subjects (Isin, 2008b, p. 16) at the same 
time as they create a space for thinking about contested access, examples of which could be 
corruption or the unwillingness of citizens to pay for special services because they are 
considered public. By contested access, I refer to focus group women’s protestations regarding 
the discriminate provision of these services; a discrimination enacted mainly through private 
deals.  Throughout the conversation they also discussed the difficulties and unwillingness of 
service providers to reach outside the Ibanda commune, namely to Kadutu. These women were 
thus evincing solidaristic relations with urban residents in Kadutu, in contrast to the 
aforementioned agonistic relations with the service providers.  
 
In the Ibanda youths focus group, there were three students in their early 20s that were studying 
at the stated owned university ISP. When asked about their access to water, all of the students 
had varying degrees of tap water access in their homes (in addition to the one at ISP), although 
the supply varied from every day to three days per week. I asked them what they did when 
there was no running water in their house and two replied: 185  
 
Girl: “There is a community relationship for sharing water. Some charge people, like there are 
families that take money.”  
 
Boy 1: “You know, in neighborhoods like where the governor’s house is, there they have twenty-four 
hours of electricity and water. So they don’t care about us. Just look at Cyangugu [in Rwanda] versus 
Bukavu. There they also have twenty-four hour services. This is because of the political system; they 
[the Congolese authorities] need to be better organized. Things are destroyed by the head of the state. 
Some authorities are above the law. They care only about their private profits, not the people. The only 
chance we have is to remove them. We need to have people that care about their community.”   
 
The youth in Ibanda (as with many of the youths I have interacted with during my field visits) 
quickly turned to a political discussion. They expressed frustration towards the sitting 
government, both in Kinshasa and in the province, and a sentiment of injustice as citizens of 
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Bukavu. This included anger at the affluent neighborhoods where the governor was living and 
enjoying functioning public services. The connections made between water and the “state”, 
represented as central authorities both in Kinshasa and provincially, are an example of the 
associational role and position of the state in providing these services.  The unfair distribution, 
as discussed in this focus group, is an example of disputed statehood in Bukavu. However, and 
what was repeated in many of the focus groups, was their perception of the neighboring town 
of Cyangugu in Rwanda where there is hardly any irregularity on tap water or energy supply, 
despite it sharing the same natural resources. Although I did not inquire about service provision 
or consumption in Cyangugu, the importance of (imagining) a good public service delivery 
was a repeated narrative among Bukavu residents. Cyangugu, I argue, represents the idea and 
practice of a different statehood that is within reach for Bukavu.  Such territorial differences 
are discussed as one of the dimensions of statehood (spatial dimension, see Chapter 8). 
 
The focus group meeting with youth in Kadutu revealed a very different reality compared to 
that of Ibanda with these young people having very little access to tap water and electricity. 
With their lack of access in mind, I inquired about their perspectives on what public services 
meant to them and they replied (my emphasis):186 
 
Boy 1: “It [public services] means it is for the population, something that is given by the representatives 
of the population.”  
 
Girl 2: “It means also something that it is demanded, like health services (santé).” 
 
Solhjell:  “Do you see SNEL and REGIDESO as public services?”  
 
[The students agree.] 
 
Boy 1: “These are public services. Unfortunately, they don’t serve the public. Water and electricity is 
not permanent. It is not like in Rwanda. Here, electricity can come once per week or even once per 
month.” 
 
Boy 2: “Funu [the water pump in Kadutu] is a public service in Kadutu. But there you also have to pay 
and it is crowded with people. It was built by the deputy governor during his last campaign. It is the 
only place to get water in Kadutu, but it is very crowded.” 
 
In the discussion of what public services represent, the youth in Ibanda eagerly explained what 
they saw as their rights, demands and expectations. The idea of public services was something 
that should be free and available based on popular demand. In some ways, it can be surprising 
to hear youths from impoverished neighborhoods making politically and socially engaged 
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claims about these services despite never having enjoyed them in the first place. On the other 
hand, the city is a space where precisely these issues become real, as subjects can witness 
inclusion, exclusion and marginalization in their immediate surroundings.  The youths drew 
comparisons with neighboring Rwanda (Cyangugu) but also described their sense of injustice 
towards higher ranking state representatives. One of the girls from Kadutu explained the 
following when I asked what they could do to alert government employees to the issues of tap 
water and electricity supply:187  
 
 “To raise awareness in the government is impossible because they live in their beautiful houses. They 
never see this sad life. We would like to make changes, but we lack the means to do so.” 
 
Although this girl expressed sentiments of helplessness (change as impossible with “we lack 
the means”) further discussion in the focus group also revealed high expectations of the 
government. This calls the state into being, I argue, as one of the girls expressed:188   
 
Girl 1: “We expect changes from both the government and individual authorities [in the government]. 
We expect a lot from the state, but it is only for the paying for now [those with financial means].” 
 
Solhjell: “What are your expectations?” 
 
Girl 1: “Electricity, water, roads, public toilets, waste services… this is a dream, but it can be 
achieved in several years’ time.” 
 
The youth, I argue, found themselves on the margins of the state in the sense that they were 
excluded from services based on their inability to pay. However, through their experiences 
growing up in Bukavu and their social relations, they envisioned and demanded a better future. 
This youth, as subjects at the margins of inclusion and exclusion of “the state”, confront, 
destabilize and contest citizenship in Bukavu (see also Isin, 2002).      
 
The focus group discussion with five men in Kadutu was difficult since three of the five men 
were highly suspicious of me, being unprepared for the meeting.189 This led to long discussions 
on whether I could be trusted or not and misinterpretations of my purpose and methods. 
Nevertheless, I managed to gain an understanding as to some of their different experiences with 
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decided to show up in a public place called Ancien Coopera where men meet, talk and drink in Kadutu. Unlike 
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tap water supply. When asked if they had regular access to tap water and electricity in their 
homes, two men explained:190 
 
Man 1: “This is a big neighborhood [Kadutu] so I cannot speak for everyone. But at my house we 
have electricity, though not always and not regularly. We also have water from REGIDESO.”  
 
Man 2: “Some people have taps in their houses, others borrow from neighbors. But the people I know 
don't use the rivers as a water source. There is more water in Kadutu then in Nguba [Ibanda] and 
Panzi [outside Bukavu].”   
       
There is a bias in their responses because these two men (who considered me trustworthy) had 
a higher education, which meant that they were not amongst the poorer section of Kadutu 
society. Most importantly, these two men revealed that there are private tap water options in 
houses in Kadutu as well as a system of sharing taps amongst neighbors. Moreover, the 
discussion also revealed some of their expectations of the government and how citizens are 
calling the state into being:191 
 
Man 1: “I expect security, electricity and drinking water [from the government]. I expect water 
regularly, clean and that it is distributed to all neighborhoods in Bukavu.”  
 
The women I spoke to in Kadutu, who lived in households with little or no access to tap water, 
made use of the lake, rainwater, public sources (Funu and Kaduru) and rivers.192 Despite the 
rainy season being helpful for families without access to tap water, it was also associated with 
increased potential for landslides and floods. The women said the following:193  
 
Woman 1: “Now that it is raining, things are better. But the water comes into our houses and floods our 
belongings. Like yesterday, I bought wheat and the rain flooded in and ruined what I had bought.” 
 
Solhjell: “So do you drink the rainwater?” 
 
Woman 1: “Yes, we drink it. During the dry season we have to fetch the water from the lake or a stream. 
Our children also help us doing this. But the water there [in the lake or the streams] is not clean.” 
 
Woman 2: “We also use Funu, everyone uses that source. But a lot of people fight there over water. 
You also have to pay for it.” 
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192 Interviews with different women working in stalls, either individually, in pairs or in focus group meetings, 
25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu. A total of sixteen women were interviewed. A second focus 
group with nine women in Kadutu was conducted 4 October 2014, Bukavu. Full translation was needed in both 
fieldworks as the women did not speak French.   
193 Focus group with nine women in Kadutu, 4 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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In both of my field visits with women in Kadutu, the issue of exclusion from tap water based 
on payment was evident. In addition, they could neither afford cisterns nor water purification 
filters.194 With an income of less than a dollar a day and many mouths to feed, investment for 
the future was difficult from their perspective. Instead, when faced with exclusion from 
REGIDESO services, all the women I talked to in Kadutu kept referring back to the public 
water sources Funu and Kaduru. During the day, Funu was controlled by Salongo, volunteers, 
but after dark groups referred to as fin d’heure were in charge, according to both the women in 
the focus group and women working on the market stands. 195  These are gangs understood as 
banditisme urbain; the increasing problem of urban banditry due to poverty, war trauma, lack 
of opportunity and youth unemployment. Fin d’heure can be translated as “the end of time” 
and refers to when the sun sets at around 6 pm every day. For women that work during the day, 
running for example small businesses (selling vegetables or consumer goods), are expected to 
be home before dark: Only an immoral wife or daughter would stay out after dark. Women 
such as like those I met at the market, who work all day on stalls, cannot close their shop to 
fetch water from distant sources, such as Kaduru. After they had closed for the day, they 
explained that fin d’heure demanded smaller sums from them, usually a fee based on their 
income from the market. These gangs could be armed with sharp objects such as knives (armes 
blanches) or intoxicated and it was best to do as they said to avoid getting hurt.  
 
Finally, the women in the focus group discussion seemed to have far fewer expectations of the 
government and local municipal representatives. When I asked if they could demand 
improvement through their chef du quartier, two women answered:196 
 
Woman 4: “We can talk to him, but he cannot take our concerns to the mairie. We will die together 
here, the flood will take his house too.” [Everyone laughs] 
 
Woman 5: “If you want to speak up, they will arrest you! (...) The leaders of the group will be hunted 
down and imprisoned.” 
 
Their encounters with state-like authorities were often in the form of an agonistic and alienating 
relationship characterized by resistance and hostility (Isin, 2008b, p. 19). During our 
conversation, the women discussed ways of avoiding paying taxes to local authorities, as an 
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example of this agonistic and alienating relation. Their expectations towards “the state” were 
of a more sinister and cautious character, which I interpreted as an othering processes in the 
dimensions of statehood. The aspects of othering, exclusion, fear and resistance will be further 
discussed in Chapter 8, as dimensions of statehood.    
    
7.3 Hydroelectricity   
 
Electricity supply has already been discussed to some degree in the preceding section (7.2), but 
I will elaborate further on some of the providers and consumer dimensions in Bukavu more 
specifically in this section. Two important expressions are used in Bukavu, namely dahoulage 
and délestage. The first is a Mashi term (the main local language) derived from the word 
kudaula, and means “to take a little.” 197 It is used to describe how residents attach small cables 
to the public electrical lines to connect electricity to their homes. The other is a French term 
(délestage), which, in relation to electricity, refers to intermittent supply and be can be 
translated to “rolling blackouts” or “load shedding” in English. This practice is undertaken by 
SNEL agents and is argued to be a public service practice to ensure that district x will have 
electricity on certain times/days so that district y will have it on other times/days. This is done 
because of the limited availability of electricity which is partly caused, in turn, by the practice 
of dahoulage, which clearly eats into profits and therefore exacerbates the lack of investment 
in infrastructure. Thus, dahoulage and délestage are connected local practices, with the former 
done by consumers and the latter by the provider SNEL.  
 
To gain a deeper insight into the perspective of providers, I interviewed representatives at both 
SNEL and Ruzizi I, the main and largest power station for Bukavu. At the SNEL office in 
Bukavu, I interviewed the head of the technical and distribution division, Déo Mashali.198 
Similarly to REGIDESO, they are discussing transitions from being a centralized, state owned 
company (parastatal) to a private utility. Mashali referred to a feasibility study conducted by 
the EU investment bank on the development and rehabilitation of the Ruzizi power stations 
(CEPA, May 2014). This report reveals a regional dimension of developmental initiatives but 
also expresses donor conditions: The Ruzizi I, II and III (the latter is not yet built) will have 
their public sector dimension in the Energie des Grands Lacs, which is a regional organization 
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for Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, where the tri-national company SINELAC is found. As 
mentioned, SINELAC is in charge of Ruizizi II. The national public investment from each of 
these countries is 10% of total funding (30% in total) with the remaining investment coming 
from shares sold to private companies (CEPA, pp. 24-25). There are no escaping the political 
and diplomatic difficulties of regional development, as the nations of the DRC and Rwanda 
have, at different levels, shown hostility towards each other. While these issues reach far 
beyond the focus area of this thesis, Mashali explained some of the coordination difficulties 
within the DRC and his view of the need to decentralize:199  
 
“It is Kinshasa that coordinates the big projects, such as the Ruzizi I, II, III and IV. We [SNEL South 
Kivu/Bukavu] inform the government and ministry of energy about possible solutions for the energy 
problems here in the east. If we were decentralized, we could work faster. Now [SNEL] is heavily 
centralized. You know, Ruzizi I is now only producing 25 megawatts but could provide 500 megawatts! 
There are lots of potentials in this area but realizations of these are not yet happening. Electric dams are 
costly, financially, and Kinshasa needs to sort out their state problems.”  
 
Mashali’s perspective describes the difficult relations between state actors and internal 
problems that limit state performance in providing electricity. The possibility of decentralizing 
SNEL as a solution to their coordination problems was also discussed in relation to water access 
by the cabinet director to the South Kivu governor, Professor Severin Magangu Matabaro (my 
emphasis):200  
 
“The water governance (régie) provided by the state means that everyone has by law the right to access 
water. But there are certain monopolies like REGIDESO and SNEL that makes more use of water as a 
resource. They cannot, however, satisfy all consumers. (...) We are reconsidering the monopoly system 
now so that it may be modified for enterprises and the liberalization of these services. We are 
considering a private/public partnership. The popular perception by many is that these services are 
supposed to be free, provided by the state. But they are not free. SNEL is not yet decentralized for the 
public, while REGIDESO is partly privatized. It is important for people to understand that private 
houses will not have free services. It is a difference compared to, for example fountains, which people 
can use as much as they want to.”   
 
In both interviews, the need to decentralize was put forward as an institutional solution to the 
energy problems. However, from the viewpoint of Mashali at SNEL, the emphasis was put on 
a move from Kinshasa to Bukavu, so that large funds could be channeled directly through 
SNEL’s provincial office for more efficiency. Yet, Matabaro (the cabinet director) wanted to 
change the parastatal and public ownership to a public/private shareholder ownership model. 
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Then, the government in Kinshasa would still have a percentage of the company but the change 
would allow private entrepreneurs to develop and rehabilitate facilities. These proposals for 
changes in ownership evince a neo-liberal policy turn, which challenges popular perceptions 
of public goods as free services, as Mashali argued. The implications of relabeling water and 
electricity provision as client-based consumer goods raise future relational challenges between 
service providers and consumers. Profoundly, it also changes the image of what the state 
“should do” and expectations towards the “state”.    
 
Finally, on the provider side, my meeting with the technician at the Ruzizi I gave me insight 
into the dynamics of Belgian Congo and contemporary Bukavu.201 It is important to note that 
Ruzizi I was, and still is, primarily for the urban centers, such as Bukavu, as well for 
neighboring Cyangugu in Rwanda. The installation was built between 1954 and 1958 and was 
designed to service a population of 300,000 but with a capacity to serve up to 500,000 should 
the need arise. During the tour, the technician at the Ruzizi I explained: 202 
 
“Back in Belgian Congo, they produced too much electricity. The authorities encouraged people to buy 
household products, like refrigerators and so on, because it is not good to produce current (courant) 
without consumption. They also gave electricity to Rwanda and Burundi because the borders were not 
like today, people could cross freely… Today, SNEL still sells electricity but it is not enough to meet 
the demand in Bukavu. We only have four turbines working now and because of the dry season, there 
is not enough water flowing in Ruzizi. In order to produce energy, we need both the lake and the 
machines. But as you can see, we also have big problems with garbage thrown in the lake. It blocks the 
turbines… This didn’t use to be a big problem but people nowadays have lost their sense of public 
responsibility and throw everything in the lake and rivers. In the past, we only needed to remove the 
waste once per month. These days it is twice a week!”    
 
His perspective of “people nowadays have their sense of public responsibility”, is an example 
of agonistic relations between service providers and consumers. From the perspective of the 
technician, subjects in Bukavu were destroying the public good of an electricity facility in the 
urban space. Regarding the issue of waste problems and energy production, my observations 
indicate that there seems to be a lack of coordination between different institutions in ensuring 
that their areas of responsibility and management would not create difficulties for each other. 
As Chapter 5 revealed, there are considerable problems at the municipal level for responsible 
waste management. Moreover, the technician believed that, although there was some potential 
for rehabilitating machines, overall production would not exceed 29 megawatts. He argued that 
the most durable option is to build a new power station, similar to Ruzizi III.  
                                               
201 Visit to Ruzizi I and interview with technician conducted on 12 September 2013, Bukavu.  
202 Ibid.  
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As a participant observer in the installation, it was fascinating to see the old British machinery 
carefully maintained and operating well. Another noteworthy observation was to visit the 
control room; by far the most densely administered place in the entire installation. The room 
was filled with twelve people whose role was to monitor and rotate electricity to different 
districts (délestage). Considering what I was told in the focus group with men and women from 
Ibanda, there is arguably room for negotiating délestage depending on the proximity of 
important SNEL residents in different neighborhoods of the urban center. Also, the provincial 
ministries that resided in la Botte in Ibanda received far more electricity than other 
neighborhoods in Bukavu. This is also true for important consumers such as Pharmakina and 
most likely Bralima. For Pharmakina, it was clear that délestage was not a concern for them 
because of their private and elite-based relations with SNEL representatives. Thus, electricity 
is a form of negotiable but limited public good that favors elite and paying consumers in the 
city. Access to electricity becomes a clue to statehood that differentiates subjects, citizens and 
elite within the city space.   
 
More generally in the city space when it comes to consumers, there are considerable differences 
between access to electricity in the urban center Ibanda and the quartier populaire of Kadutu. 
To various extents, all the focus groups participants living in Ibanda had connections to SNEL. 
But the issue of bribes also came up, as two men from Ibanda explained:203 
 
Man 1: “(…) For electricity, it works if you have a person from SNEL living in the same neighborhood. 
When SNEL comes to your house to check the meters, you should pay them an incentive. The bill will 
always be the same no matter what, but people pay differently. In urban places, you have to pay more. 
If you give something like a bribe to the person who checks the meter, they will write something 
differently on their checks. If you don’t pay, the bills might be higher.” 
 
Man 2: “I only have electricity no more than three times per week and it is only in small quantities. 
Imagine the installation at Ruzizi, it was created for a much smaller population, not one million people. 
(…) We [his family] live in the outskirts [of Ibanda], we only have electricity from three to eight pm. 
You are always losing… They [SNEL] will send a bill no matter what. Even if you ask for them to cut 
the wire so that you don’t have to pay. They even send bills then!”  
 
In Kadutu, however, electricity is severely limited and most people seem to utilize dahoulage. 
When I asked a group of women working in Kadutu market about their connections to SNEL 
                                               
203 Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu 
                   198 of 250 
they replied that they did not (officially) have electricity in their house.204 Then, I asked if they 
stole electricity and two women replied:205 
 
Woman 1: “What is there to steal? [Everyone laughs]. There is no electricity in the cables anyway. They 
[SNEL] don’t send electricity here.”   
 
Woman 2: “Sometimes our children are killed because of dahoulage. It is really dangerous. This is the 
situation because of bad leadership. We need to live but the leaders are killing us.” 
 
These perspectives describe how Kadutu subjects are living on the state margin (“they don’t 
send electricity here”) where access to electricity is left to local practices. However, the second 
woman’s interpretation of dahoulage as a direct responsibility of the “bad leadership” of the 
government falls in line with interpreting state practices and performances as enabling citizens 
to live better lives. These strong sentiments (“we need to live but the leaders are killing us”) 
and relations to life and death matters are also a testimony of calling the state into being. It also 
serves as an example, again, of the associational role of the “state” and service delivery of 
electricity supply.         
 
In Kadutu, the lack of electricity and the cost of connection forces people to use the most 
popular fuel, namely charcoal (makala) for cooking and, if affordable, to power generators 
used in charging computers, cellphones or photocopiers and other common devices. However, 
excessive use of charcoal, due to the population increase coupled with scant electricity supply, 
has caused many problems. One such problem is considerable deforestation in and around 
Bukavu, which has exacerbated pollution and indirectly led to landslides in the densely 
populated neighborhoods of Kadutu (Trefois et al., 2007). Lack of access to renewable energy 
sources in Bukavu is thus threatening the lives of its inhabitants and life quality more generally. 
However, the lack of public provision of electricity has also enabled small businesses in 
Kadutu, called “public phone” (publi phone), that offer the service of charging cellphones 
among other services. To my knowledge, this blooming small scale business is a result of 
limited access to electricity, be it from the grid or from generators, as a majority of Kadutu 
citizens seek power to charge their cellular phones. Thus, there are clearly business 
opportunities for private citizens based on limited access to electricity. This is an innovative 
way to deal with inadequate and discriminatory public services.           
                                               
204 Interview with five women working in a mattress stall, 25 September 2013, Bukavu. 
205 Ibid  
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Going back to the two practices of dahoulage and déléstage, Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, 
a local lecturer in history and political science at the Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu 
(ISP), explained the two practices in the following way (my emphasis): 206  
 
“Insecurity in the region has caused a large number of people to move to Bukavu. The state does not 
control the movement of people here; it is anarchic. Now, the mentality of this population… they have 
anarchic souls. You have expressions like “dahoulage”, meaning that people steal electricity. These 
people are not officially a part of SNEL’s services. They are pirate consumers, illegal… Even at some 
point, a former minister of energy accepted this practice publically to gain support before an election. 
But dahoulage is an expression of state resistance. Due to the illegal consumption of electricity and 
lack of payment, the service provided by SNEL is insufficient to cover the entire city. They instead shift 
and rotate their service [déléstage] to different neighborhoods at a given time per day because it is not 
enough for all. Here at ISP we have electricity until 3:30 pm, then again at 6:30 pm until 8 pm. The 
companies that provide huge revenues for SNEL and REGIDESO are Bralima and Pharmakina, who 
are benefitting from their services. But places like hospitals do not get the services, which in turn creates 
a huge insecurity for the population.”  
 
Viancy’s interpretation of these practices demonstrates the complex relations between 
consumers and providers. His perception of newcomers in Bukavu as “pirate consumers” with 
“anarchic souls” describes also the alienating relations between people who consider 
themselves properly urban and those at the margins of the state. As this research was conducted 
in a period of large influx of village settlers, the relations and ideas of “proper” urban citizens 
and rural “subjects” were intensified. It also shows the importance of national elections, held 
in 2011, in playing on ideas of rights for poorer citizens (claiming access to free electricity) to 
gain votes.  Moreover, the phenomenon of dahoulage represents more than not paying for a 
public service.  As Viancy implied, it can be seen as a form of state resistance, where the public 
sphere is severely constrained and it can also be seen both as an individual action but also as a 
collectively held act of resistance. This shows, I argue, solidaristic bonds between citizens and 
the exploitation of these bonds by authority.     
 
However, Viancy’s perspective on public institutes, that they prioritize elite consumers rather 
than, for instance, hospitals also problematizes the “state”. As he argued further:  “The state 
has failed its mission. Our situation is a form of modern slavery; people are feeling bad about 
their lives. (...)  Life here is in danger.”207 Viancy saw the “mission of the state” to provide 
security and to empower citizens to have a better life, neither of which described the state 
                                               
206 Interviewed 22 October 2014, Bukavu.  
207 Interview with Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, 22 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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practices from his perspective. This understanding of the state – enabling citizens to live a 
better life – is an interpretation that takes into account the importance of public good provision 
as a core dimension of statehood.  
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Water should be plentiful in Bukavu with its numerous rivers, lake and rainy season. 
Nevertheless, the taps often offer only a few drops even when the rain is pouring outside. 
Equally, the potential of the river Ruzizi and its hydroelectric power station (Ruzizi I) could 
offer urban citizens their daily electricity needs.  Yet, there are several neighborhoods cut off 
from these goods and many other areas that receive them only on a rotational basis. There are 
financial and technical aspects to these issues, but they are also highly political. In terms of the 
financial and technical aspects, the major public infrastructures – Kahele water reserve and 
Ruzizi I – date back to the 1950s, although rehabilitate with limited and fragmented donor and 
state initiatives that did not anticipate the rapid urban growth of the 1990s. Politically, a glance 
over to the neighboring Rwandan town of Cyangugu, which shares the same natural resources 
reveals how a different nation-state can provide 24-hour services, even without better technical 
or financial means.  In addition, it was evident that in Bukavu, both water and electricity were 
no longer practiced as public goods. Regardless of private or national ownership, water and 
electricity are already, and without doubt, favoring certain neighborhoods (for example 
Muhumba, which is popular with UN employees and other ex-pats), public buildings in la Botte 
(the peninsula with government buildings) and commercial enterprises.  
 
When it comes to consumers, it is possible to categorize them into three groups. The first is the 
elite consumer represented by Pharmakina and the provincial administrative neighborhoods in 
Ibanda. Though employees at Pharmakina experience some difficulties, they are privileged by 
having a private client-provider type of relation to both SNEL and REGIDESO, a relation that 
takes complaints seriously. In the second group, there are the middle-class citizens that live in 
interconnected houses in the urban center (Ibanda). In particular, the men and women’s daily 
problems related to SNEL and REGIDESO can be attributed partly to issues of house 
ownership and the discriminatory practices of private deals. However, they were also forced to 
pay for these services even though the tap water and electricity outputs were at times marginal. 
The third group can be considered to be the low-income or urban poor mainly residing in 
                   201 of 250 
Kadutu. Many living in households here were not officially connected to either SNEL or 
REGIDESO. Although considered one of the urban territories (communes) of Bukavu, some 
Kadutu residents, I argue, were living on the margin of the state. Many would resort to water 
stations, such as Funu or Kaduru, and local practices of stealing electricity (dahoulage).    
 
Moreover, there is a considerable diversity of income-generating activities and twilight zones 
of public/private relations when it comes to electricity and water provision and enjoyment. 
Insiders to SNEL and REGIDESO can arrange special relationships with landlords or 
neighborhoods that go together to provide funding for pipes or lines to direct water or 
electricity. Also, many of the urban dwellers will rely on alternative provision of water and 
forms of energy outside the national agencies of REGIDESO and SNEL. However, the practice 
of these alternative sites at, for example, public water stations, varied considerably. Funu, the 
public water pump in Kadutu that was used as an electoral boost during the 2011 electoral 
campaign, was soon looted once the election was over and when this study was conducted. 
This demonstrates, I argue, a degree of illegitimacy of public authorities in the eyes of the 
voters. If it had been perceived as a public good and a shared interest for the neighborhood – a 
collective space and community – Funu might have been preserved. The feeling of 
abandonment among poorer citizens after election results and when MPs had returned to 
Kinshasa, legitimized the looting and the emergence of local practices regarding these “public” 
goods such, as enacted by Salongo or volunteers that were de facto governing this space.      
 
Regardless of all these varieties of accessing and controlling water and energy, imprinted in 
the social memory of many citizens in Bukavu is an idea of these goods as public or social 
goods (bien social), expecting them to be delivered freely and to everyone regardless of wealth. 
The second and the third group of consumers had considerable expectations of the “state” 
connected to these public services, despite limited or no provision by “the state”.  This idea of 
public or social good was also repeated by the service providers in charge of the administrative 
and financial aspects of REGIDESO and SNEL, as well as the technical staff employed at the 
water and energy reserves serving Bukavu. Yet, at the same time, consumers expressed deep 
frustration towards the same public authorities for not delivering on their promises, especially 
among the youth. The idea of water and electricity as free, accessible services for everyone 
rather than a commercial good was a source of frustration also for service providers. However, 
from the central administration, this idea was disputed and regarded as a misperception by the 
public. As discussed, REGIDESO and SNEL are turning into public/private shareholder 
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companies and this might have future effects on exclusion, such as through payment and access 
for many inhabitants in Bukavu. For higher level service providers, this shift is seen as 
efficiency solutions to reduce income gaps and promote infrastructure developments. The 
technicians in charge of daily management at Kahele water reserve, on the other hand, 
expressed frustration with the increasingly commercialized system. In the middle of these 
perspectives, the chief of cabinet to the governor, an intellectual, saw these issues as combined 
efforts of both sides of the civic relation.  
 
At the core of these consumer-provider relations of water and energy provision in Bukavu is 
the aspect of state disengagement and transition from public to private goods. This transition, 
however, might not come without cost, as there is considerable potential for social unrest. 
Water and electricity services are closely related to regime stability. During election time in 
2011, for instance, electricity was provided in more neighborhoods and for longer periods of 
the day in Bukavu to boost support for the current regime. In the case of water, the regime in 
Kinshasa regulated water prices even though REGIDESO had become a commercial 
shareholder company. The price of water in Bukavu was considered too low by the REGIDESO 
financial administrator (see also Maractho & Trefon, 2004) but important to avoid public 
demonstrations as ‘water is life’ (REGIDESO’s slogan) and so closely associated with the state 
and hence regime. This demonstrates negotiations of de facto statehood through the state 
practices of regulation as a means of social control, on one hand, and demands made by citizens 
on the other. Thus, maintaining public services at a minimum level and at certain prices is 
important for de facto dimensions of statehood.  
 
Moreover, as the services of piped water and electricity are increasingly becoming 
commercialized, at the same time as they are struggling for improved institutional functioning, 
the state can both be seen as disengaging and engaging. First, the “state” can be disengaging in 
the way that these services are no longer fully in the hands of the state but that private investors 
are engaging in investment and profit. Second, the “state” is also one of positioning and 
engagement, seen through a variety of practices, such as engaging with an international 
network of investors with potential financial and technical resources and re-establishing water 
and energy provision. The transition from public or social goods to private goods is thus a 
dynamic process of negotiating de facto statehood. Here, the plans and efforts to structurally 
change water and electricity services into commercial and private-public enterprises may or 
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may not improve investment and infrastructure but, as I have argued above, these goods are 
political matters that go beyond technical and economic challenges.  
 
These companies (SNEL and REGIDESO), regardless of official ownership, are perceived in 
many respects as the “state” by citizens of Bukavu. When I asked what public goods were, 
water and electricity were often mentioned and expected to be delivered by the state. The 
monopoly of these state agencies in the past and present brings about an important idea of the 
state and the services it is expected to deliver (see also Lund, 2006a). In other words, 
monopolized services both create an imagined state and a popular demand for the state. This 
state is thus not only coercive or violent but also offers, at least in theory, a minimum access 
to much needed daily goods. It is important to emphasize that piped water is the most desired 
form of water in Bukavu and is only offered by REGIDESO. Further, SNEL and REGIDESO 
are also important for the coordination and relations with international and bilateral partners. 
Any medium to large investment in infrastructure in the water and electricity sectors will 
require the knowledge, agreement and agency of actors in these institutions. International 
donors thus uphold the image of these institutions as governmental.  
 
The state, represented by REGIDESO and SNEL, upholds a certain monopoly over water and 
electricity in the urban centers supported by international agencies. The citizens, depending on 
their contextual situation, such as income, literacy or private relations with these state agents, 
are to varying degrees dependent on these services and hold high expectations of what should 
be delivered. The statehood relations in these forms of public good show some potential for 
rejuvenation, but also for conflict, regarding the ability to offer these goods at acceptable prices.  
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8.0 Analysis: Dimensions of statehood  
 
This thesis so far has contributed to a study of daily public good provision and consumption in 
Bukavu, as a counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of statehood. In this respect, 
I have positioned my work in the more empirically informed studies of statehood from the lived 
experience of people (e.g., Olivier de Sardan, 2009b). This approach is different from either 
considering state performance as a monopoly on violence and the control of borders (e.g., 
Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a) or as the performance of service delivery based 
on norms of Western statehood models (e.g., Zartman, 1995). The preceding empirical chapters 
on waste management, water, electricity and roads have dealt with micro-scale perspectives on 
these issues in Bukavu. The actors and groups that I have engaged with in Bukavu are living 
and doing the state from a variety of backgrounds and practices. By the state, I mean “the 
quality of an institution being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on 
members of society” (Lund, 2006a, p. 676), which is not limited to government institutions 
(see Chapter 2).  
 
Through these chapters, I have demonstrated how relations within and between actors and 
groups are formed, discussed, interpreted, and challenged. The relations of service providers 
and consumers with respect to public goods are, I argue, forms of expressing de facto statehood. 
The negotiations, enjoyment, control and access to what can be broadly seen as “public goods” 
create a pattern of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship ideas that 
make up the state effect, i.e., an effect of practices that makes structures of control and 
separation appear to exist (Mitchell, 1999).  
 
The discussion will be further developed in this chapter, examining dimensions of statehood 
based on recurring patterns of public good provision and consumption from the case studies. 
The purpose is to move from a purely context specific description of practices in Bukavu to a 
more conceptually and theoretically abstract discussion. In order to do so, I will first make 
comparisons within the cases of different “modes of governance” (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 
419) and “citizenship” when it comes to public good provision and consumption. Furthermore, 
I also construct and suggest dimensions of statehood that may be useful in other case studies 
or theory-building of de facto statehood. Thus, despite relying on empirical data from one site, 
the cases from Bukavu can illustrate and be used for comparative purposes and theory-building.  
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This chapter is structured in the following way: In the first section, I will develop the 
interpretive analytical perspectives on “modes of governance” (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 
420) and citizenship in a comparative, within-case categorization. This categorization is aimed 
at developing the empirical data into more manageable and analytically distinct (ideal) types. 
I argue that there are three modes that govern public goods; 1) non-governed (waste 
management), 2) plural governance (road construction and control) and 3) state monopoly 
(water and hydro energy).  I further argue that there is a dividing line between inhabitants 
connected to (citizens) and those disconnected (subjects) from the same goods.  
 
In the second section, I will discuss public good provision and consumption as dimensions of 
statehood.  I emphasize three dimensions namely distinctions, spatial and ideology, with each 
holding two sets of components. The dimension of distinction derives from empirical evidence 
of two interrelated components of hierarchies and citizen-subject debates, which is further 
connected to a broader literature field (such as Mamdani 1996 and Ekeh 1975). The spatial 
dimension focuses on specific, geographical elements derived from the study location namely 
international borders and urban design. Finally, the ideology dimension focuses on languages 
of stateness ( Hansen and Stepputat 2001, p. 5) and statehood ideals as discursively produced 
in the case studies.  
 
These dimensions are interlinked, I argue, as assemblages of hierarchies, languages, ordering 
and histories, which are used by citizens, subjects and service providers and which make up 
the state effect.  I further argue that alternative networks of public good providers, whoever 
they may be, cannot completely replace or avoid the state. This is not necessarily the case 
outside Bukavu, but represents rather the way cities can be at the center of negotiating de facto 
statehood through intensified struggles between the populace and service providers over public 
goods. The city can thus be seen as a space enabling intense negotiations over symbolic 
repertoires of power and legitimacy and tangible and intangible resources (Hagmann & 
Péclard, 2010);  negotiations which create the state effect.  
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8.1 Categories of analysis: Modes of governance and citizens-subjects   
 
I will in this section first present my interpretation of service provision in expressing statehood 
through what Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 419) has termed “modes of governance”. Here, 
governance is interpreted as an empirical approach to understand “any organised method of 
delivering public or collective services and goods according to specific norms (official and 
practical), and to specific forms of authority” (Olivier de Sardan, 2009a, p. 4). Further, a “mode 
of governance” is thus any organized form of public good delivery through de facto, but also 
official, i.e., de jure, forms of service delivery involving specific authorities (see Chapter 2). 
Though the emphasis is on de facto, the relations with official or de jure governance structures 
are important as authorities in service delivery positions refer to and make use of these rules in 
a variety of ways. This will become clearer in the discussion on dimensions of statehood.  
 
As argued in the theoretical Chapter (2), the term “modes of governance” is useful as it avoids 
traditional delineations made between state/non-state or formal/informal and rather emphasizes 
dynamic forms of de facto statehood through service provision practices and performance.  
This case studies examined state agencies, private companies, municipal services and 
community networks, all of which were delivering (to varying degrees) services I term public 
goods. For the consumers, which are largely made up of private citizens in Bukavu, I make use 
of Mamdani’s (1996) ‘citizen-subject’ distinction as well as Lund’s (2006b) work on ‘twilight 
institutions’ in relation to accessing and enjoying public goods. In discussing dimensions of 
statehood in the next section, these separations between service delivery providers and 
consumers will be developed according to a more dynamic, relational approach.  I consider 
modes of governance and citizen-subject relations as categories of analysis, i.e., categories the 
researcher uses to describe the object of scientific inquiry (Chapter 3). They are developed 
based on categories of practices, namely how actors self-identify in terms of what they expect 
and how they enjoy, control and manage public goods.      
  
When it comes to ‘modes of governance’ in controlling the public goods discussed, I make the 
following three distinctions:208 First, waste management can be interpreted as a “non-
governed” mode. Though there are some municipal authorities and civil servants formally in 
place (de jure), the practices and performances (de facto) of any “public” waste management 
                                               
208 I would like to point out that all these categories have exceptions when it comes to modes of governance and 
these categories of analysis are used mainly for summarizing and developing my inductive research.   
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are severely limited or non-existent. The management of this public good is notoriously 
understaffed and left for municipal rather than governmental regulation. Though urban waste 
management is generally not considered a task for higher government officials, the lack of 
regulations, financial or political support is a form of the “politics of neglect” (van der Geest 
& Obirih-Opareh, 2009, p. 219) of broader governance structures. That is, the absence of any 
waste management policy but also a de facto governance of “not thinking about it” (van der 
Geest & Obirih-Opareh, p. 19). The exceptions to this category are the politically significant 
places for provincial, regime-affiliated elites (e.g., Place de l’Indépendence). However, these 
spaces are de facto political rather than public spaces. This emphasis on keeping clean only 
politically significant places or neighborhoods in which members of the public authorities 
reside, I argue, is a source of disconnection between authorities, or “the state”, and the 
populace. Simultaneously, citizens enjoy having their private homes clean, and use the public 
spaces – rivers, lake and roads – as dumping grounds. There were also community networks 
that dealt with waste by using public spaces for garbage disposal. Thus, waste management is 
considered non-governed due to the lack of institutional arrangements and actual practices (de 
facto) as a “public good” or “public cleanliness”.    
 
Second, I consider public roads in a category (mode) of plural governance considering the 
range of institutions and actors: locally, nationally and internationally. By plural governance, I 
mean that the management, control and building of public roads are governed by multiple 
agents and agencies, sometimes at a distance and other times in close proximity to “consumers” 
or users. The various actors and affiliated institutions govern, for instance, road construction, 
safety, insurance, union and taxation. This mode of plural governance creates a patchwork of 
relations between investors (mainly international), service providers and consumers. The main 
actors that perform and regulate these practices are found within public institutions, locally and 
nationally, although with a clear role for private companies sub-contracted in the road 
construction industry. Some of the locally positioned institutions in Bukavu, may be 
overstaffed and infused with an arsenal of regulations to be used in a strategic, discriminatory 
manner (Blundo, 2006, p. 807). Here, the consumer/provider relations become blurred. This is 
especially related to the conduct of traffic police positioned along strategic junctions on the 
main roads in Bukavu.  
 
Moreover, public road (re)construction is a field that intersects with local, national and 
international interests and creates prosperity and political legitimacy as well as tension. There 
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are development and investment agencies from the North as well as bilateral agencies of 
Chinese origin that hold a vested interest in the operation and management of infrastructure 
work. Olivier de Sardan (2009a, p. 15) has called these different levels of engagement the 
“associational mode” of local governance.  In this case study, there are clearly forms of 
institutional relations between different agencies associated with public roads. These relations, 
which take a variety of forms, include associations between Bukavu-based agencies (e.g., 
traffic police and insurance company) and Bukavu-based agencies with national (Kinshasa) 
and/or international actors (e.g., road construction agencies and World Bank lenders). The 
relations include cooperation, such as between those governing international funds and those 
constructing roads. In other relations, there are more agonistic or alienating relations (Isin, 
2007, p. 222), such as the arbitrary unionizing of the taxi system by municipal authorities.  
 
However, there are also exceptions or changes to this mode of governance that occur at 
nighttime, after 6 p.m., that allow for more clandestine operations. These nightly changes are 
sometimes attributed to Fin d’heure and other times to the national police and army. The 
distinction between public authorities and Fin d’heure is not always clear and governance after 
dark appears to operate under different rules.209 Nevertheless, there is no, or hardly any, 
escaping the state or state-like presence along the main roads.  
 
Third, I consider water and hydroelectricity governed in a mode of state monopoly. The 
parastatal inheritance of water and energy companies have imprinted a memory of these goods 
as social goods, free and accessible to all. Piped water and hydroelectricity, as located in two 
single state-controlled agencies, can both be seen as “specters of the state”210. The actual 
delivery of services from these agencies may be limited but the memory of social goods located 
in monopolized state agencies demonstrates the reproduction of the state in society. In other 
words, the state monopoly agencies have perhaps ceased to deliver what they promise, but by 
reproducing the physical and symbolic forms of these institutions, they are specters of the state. 
I argue that in the agencies SNEL and REGIDESO, the state is closest to a coherent entity with 
structural effects on governance. 
 
                                               
209 I will discuss fin d’heure further in the next section (8.2).  
210 Term also inspired by Tobias Hagmann, paper presentation of “Specters of the state: Problematics of 
government after state collapse in Somalia” at Ghent University, 16 September 2014.  
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Although there are institutional changes taking place, especially in the water agency, the state 
currently governs and regulates tap water prices. No other groups or agencies are, for now, 
allowed to operate in providing systems of tap water or hydro energy without the blessing of 
these public institutions. Exceptions to this are, for instance, deals between mining companies 
operating in rural areas dependent on energy and water systems where “public” infrastructure 
is absent. Here, deals are made between government officials and mining companies that allow 
for private investors to set up their own systems. However, this is not the case for urban centres, 
where local companies like Pharmakina (the pharmaceutical company in Bukavu) claimed they 
would be taxed heavily if they attempted to create their own system outside the official 
monopoly.   
 
Moreover, the neo-liberal transition regarding water regulations, and to a lesser extent hydro 
energy, comes in the form of investing, through shares, in the existing government agencies. 
Thus, and despite privatization, regulation imposed by government agencies is being 
reproduced and reasserted as the authority on water and energy services. At the same time, 
privatization of water may lead to increased tensions and negotiations between central 
government officials and private citizens.  For instance, increased water prices were referred 
to as threatening regime stability, and hence there is a close associational role of “the state” in 
the delivery of water (the state effect).  Table 5 summarizes modes of governance in the 
management of the public goods.  
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Table 5 Categories of analysis: Modes of governance in relation to public goods 
Public goods Modes of governance  
Waste management  Non-governed 
Managing public roads  Plural governance 
Water and electricity  State monopoly  
 
 When scrutinizing the individuals within these forms of governance structures, the more 
challenging actors to examine are the so-called Salongo, or volunteers, who operate in a 
position in between the formal public bureaucracy of civil servants, on the one hand, and the 
population, or consumers, on the other. Though the term Salongo is unique to the Congolese 
context, the phenomenon itself is not. For instance, as Blundo’s (2006, p. 802) study of 
Senegalese bureaucracy demonstrates, there are “volunteers” operating in public service 
provision. These individuals, Blundo (p. 803) explains, are  
 
“[c]reated by a sometimes opaque, often under-equipped administration, given disproportionate 
discretionary powers and subject to little control, they contribute, as a foot-bridge between the civil 
servants and the population, (…) involving negotiation, monetized powers, and the creation or adaption 
of rules.”  
 
Those I met in Bukavu claiming to be or do Salongo, for instance, controlled and regulated the 
water post Kaduru, while others cleaned public markets and roads. There appears to be a 
distinction between “being” and “doing” Salongo. Those “being” were operating as a public 
authority, i.e., state-like in the form of controlling water sources, while those “doing” were 
conducting services for other (public) authorities, such as the market owner, police or others, 
in the form of communal work. Actors being or doing Salongo are in many ways performing 
de facto statehood in spaces where official authorities may have few solutions to improve state 
performance. This cuts across and intersects with all the goods studied in this thesis and can, 
for instance, be seen by observing waste pickers along the main roads, those dealing with 
crowds trying to access a water source or those intervening in negotiations over taxi parking 
where public parking is limited. Although individuals who position themselves as Salongo may 
be disputed, the term legitimizing these actions as, overall, it fits with state practices and 
performances in public good delivery. This and other dimensions of statehood will be discussed 
further in Section 8.2.       
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When it comes to citizens and their enjoyment of public services, it is possible to distinguish 
between two main groups: those connected to official service provision regulations and those 
disconnected from the same services, in other words, a distinction between the “haves” and 
“have-nots” (Lund, 2006b, p. 700). Another way of putting this distinction is that it is between 
“citizens” and “subjects” (cf. Mamdami, 1996). However, the term subjects does not fall well 
into the category of “rural power of community and culture”, as formulated by Mamdami 
(1996, p. 18). For instance, there is no real presence of the rule of Bami (traditional kings) in 
Bukavu: the closest Mwami (local king) governs a territory outside the city and does not collect 
taxes or offer services in the urban space. The way I view subjects is rather as inhabitants that 
are disconnected from public service provision, for a variety of reasons, and who are somehow 
at the margins of the “state “and distant from customary authorities. Another way of 
determining this distinction is to see it as to whom “the state” answers and to whom “it” does 
not. Again, the modern state effect of establishing a binary rule of the state as an ideological 
entity on one hand, and the society on the other, creates structural effects for who is considered 
within the state’s responsibility.   
 
These divisions partly take the form of territorial delimitations between Ibanda, the urban 
center prioritized by the colonial authorities, and Kadutu, the space mainly inhabited by the 
urban poor. However, there are also neighborhood distinctions within the same urban territory 
that divides these two groups. An example is the differences between the two adjacent 
peninsulas of Muhumba and Nguba neighborhoods in Ibanda (see Figure 4, detailed map of 
Bukavu), where the former was the main residential area for white settlers, a fact reproduced 
today as it is still the residential location of choice for expatriates. The latter, Nguba, was 
largely undeveloped during colonial times but is today densely populated due partly to its 
economic and security benefits gained through proximity to the Rwandan border.211 Within 
Kadutu, there are also the former CEC areas (see Chapter 4) that allowed for the development 
of regulated water and electricity connections. These housing options, however, do not 
accommodate the majority of Kadutu residents.    
 
Moreover, Kadutu residents also have access to the Kaduru water reserve, which is not 
regulated by REGIDESO, but which allows (at least potentially) residents to enjoy regular and 
                                               
211 Economic reasons are especially the plentiful trans-border trade with Rwanda and security reasons are 
mainly the potential ease of seeking refuge from instability in eastern DRC.  
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cleaner water access. However, Kaduru is a space that is used more efficiently by those with 
access to cars that can contain water tanks too heavy for individuals to carry. The individuals 
tasked with carrying water are mainly women and children and thus further separation between 
the haves and have-nots relates to gender roles, regular employment and age.   
 
The discrimination against the have-nots can also be attributed to intentional or unintentional 
barriers to public service provision. Official ownership or the rent status of housing forms one 
such barrier. If a family cannot provide “legal”212 documentation for their living arrangement, 
then there is no (legal) recourse to gain connection to public services. This relates not only to 
accessing tap water or electricity, but also to the potential demolition of “illegal” houses to 
(re)construct roads. Another barrier is the dual issue of French language paperwork and 
illiteracy among poorer residents. Further, authoritarian approaches to governance, such as the 
oppression of public demonstrations or opaque political decisions, pose many challenges for 
residents unfamiliar with systems of access or private relations with service providers.  
 
In sum, subjects disconnected from public services are at the margins of the state and removed 
from customary authorities (e.g., Bami) and often find themselves unable to enjoy what 
citizens, to varying degrees, can enjoy.  Table 6 summarizes the forms of citizen-subject 
distinctions as categories of analysis.  
 
                                               
212 Legal is a disputed term in practice (de facto) as there were examples of housing legally approved by what 
certain public authorities, such as the head of OVD, considered illegitimate civil servants.  
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Table 6 Categories of analysis: Forms of citizens and subjects   
 
Citizens (haves) Subjects (have-nots) 
Official service connections No official service connection, alternative 
practices, e.g., stealing electricity 
(dahoulage), Kaduru and Funu water 
supplies.  
Official housing  “Squatter” settlements  
French literacy Widespread illiteracy 
(Partly) regular income Widespread urban poverty  
“Properly” urban “Newer” settlers from (semi-) rural areas 
 
8.2 Interpretive approaches to de facto statehood: Dimensions of 
statehood  
 
This discussion so far has focused on categorical distinctions of modes of governance, on one 
hand, and citizens and subjects, on the other. The purpose for using such distinctions is to lend 
analytical clarity to the complex and lived experience of state practices and performances. In 
this section, I will further develop dynamics of de facto statehood, namely in what I term 
dimensions. These interlinked dimensions can subsume historical (e.g., colonial), international 
(e.g., de jure relations with de facto), micro (e.g., specific authorities in Bukavu), hierarchical 
(e.g., state control of public goods), or language (e.g., Salongo) characteristics to create the 
overall state effect and performance. By this I mean that there is an “effect of practices” 
(Bourdieu, [1990] 1997; Mitchell, 1999) that structures and orders everyday access to and 
management of public goods.   
 
Dimensions of statehood is a heuristic approach based on public good relations between 
consumers and providers, as presented in the preceding chapters (5-7). As Hagmann and 
Péclard (2011, p. 16) argue: 
 “There can be no conclusive list of dimensions of statehood that are subject to negotiation, but rather 
a changing patchwork made out of the multiple objects of negotiation that are manifest at the boundary 
of state and society, private and public, legal and illegal, indigenous and foreign, collective and 
individual.”  
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In this thesis, I highlight three dimensions of statehood based on my interpretations of the 
empirical observations and discussed in relation to broader scholarly contributions. These are 
spatial dimensions (including international borders and urban design), dimensions of 
distinctions (including hierarchies and citizen-subject) and, finally, ideology dimensions 
(including languages of stateness and statehood ideals).. These dimensions are not seen as 
discrete categories, but rather as aspects of statehood, where each is seen in relation to the 
others.  These dimensions also relate to ideas and practices when it comes to citizenship. Here, 
citizenship will be discussed from the perspective of consumers’ enjoyment of public goods. 
This rather limited perspective of citizenship is based on the case studies and empirical data 
available, rather than engaging with broader theoretical and de jure meanings of citizenship 
disconnected from the empirical data.213 Exceptions here are my engagement with Engin Isin’s 
work on citizenship and city, as well as with the post-colonial approaches of Mahmood 
Mamdani and Peter Ekeh (see Chapter 2). In my study, service providers consist of public 
authorities, state-like agents and networks, all striving for their own position and subject to 
expectations from within the state and from the society when it comes to practices and symbolic 
forms. The many dimensions of stateness produced and reproduced through varies practices 
can be both unique and universal, and anywhere in between. As this section will demonstrate, 
there is no attempt to distinguish “African” statehood from, for instance, “European” statehood, 
as dynamic dimensions of statehood are formed through multiple sources of local, national and 
international imaginings, techniques and rationales. In many ways, statehood in Bukavu is 
influenced by both “European” or “Western” and “African” interpretations and practices of 
bureaucracy, control and provision of public goods. In this section, I will build on the statehood 
dimensions shown through empirical examples from Bukavu to demonstrate the state effect 
and performances. This will shed light on theoretical implications for understanding de facto 
statehood in these case studies and beyond.  
 
First, spatial dimension is based on two empirical insights, namely the interpretation of colonial 
urban design and international borders related to the Rwanda-DRC proximity. I argue that 
colonial aspects of statehood have implications for contemporary statehood practices and 
performances, such as the feeling and creation of the superior colonial state (Ferguson, 1999). 
                                               
213 Also, qualitative empirical work on citizenship in the DRC is largely embedded in identity politics debates 
related to conflict.  
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The colonial vision of Bukavu as a segregated space dividing Europeans, évolués and 
indigenous (though not in entirely fixed identities) influences dimensions of statehood even 
today. Bissell’s (2011, p. 23) argument that colonial urban design transformed drastically both 
the imaginative and physical spaces by creating wide and straight streets, clearing “huts” and 
placing natives where “they ought to be” is relevant for contemporary transitions in Bukavu. 
Though discourses during the colonial governmentality were different from discourses found 
within contemporary political and policy circles nationally and internationally, it is easy to find 
similar concerns and measures. For instance, instead of using certain terms, such as 
“indigenous”, meaning people attached to tribal or customary rule (cf. Ekeh, 1975), other terms 
used in these case studies by service providers and intellectuals revealed the view that there are 
“anarchic” and “disorderly” subjects, who are unable to cope in the modern civic public.  The 
term évoulés in the colonial era is for obvious reasons not a term applied today, especially due 
to the racial discrimination attributed to the term, i.e., evolved from the tribal groups and on 
the path to reach white, European civilization. Instead, the dividing lines of belonging and not 
belonging are based on differentiating between those with formal education and ‘proper’ urban 
settlement in contrast to the illiterate, urban poor, whose dwellings are still viewed as 
characteristically rural, despite their urban location. The reproduction of colonial forms of 
administration, differentiating between literate and illiterate, legal and ‘unruly’ settlements are 
all attributable to a particular colonial inheritance of the urban space.  In Mamdani’s (1996, p. 
4) terms, the citizen-subject divide of the colonial legacy of institutions and institutional 
segregation is continued in different forms in Bukavu and thus challenges statehood relations.      
 
Closely related is the example of the prioritizing of colonial roads (e.g., Avenue Hippodrome) 
through road rehabilitation projects supported by the World Bank. Commenting on this 
process, certain authorities (e.g., the OVD representative, the urban road office) argued for the 
clearing of “anarchic” buildings and shops. These forms of reconstruction and space clearance 
for roads can be seen as forms of “modernization”, at the expense of those considered 
“uncivilized.” “The appearance of structures”, as Mitchell (1999, p. 89) argues, is a central part 
of the modern state effect. By specifying function and space, the appearance of structure 
contributes to an effect of binary order, as Mitchell (p. 89) explains: Individuals and their 
activities, on one hand, and an inert structure, on the other, that is set apart from individuals, 
“precedes them, and contains and gives framework to their lives.” Road (re-)construction is 
created and prioritized at all levels based on an idea of the modern state effect, i.e., structure 
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and order provided by the “state”. Here, disorderly or anarchic subjects are not acting according 
to the modern state effect. However, by tearing down houses and stalls, the modern state project 
is taking shelter and livelihood from their “unruly” inhabitants. The effects of urban reform in 
clearing “anarchic” infrastructure and people have also been recognized in de Boeck’s (2011) 
study of Kinshasa, especially in relation to president Kabila’s campaign of Cinq Chantiers 
(Five Public Works) (see Chapter 4). As de Boeck (2011, p. 273) writes:  
 
“The state’s brutal destruction of citizens’ material and social environments under the guise of urban 
reform that once again seems to be inspired by the earlier moral models of colonialist modernity, 
therefore forms a violent attack on precisely that crucial creative capacity that is a sine qua non to 
belong, and to belong together, in the city.”  
 
Although on a smaller scale, inhabitants of Bukavu thus feel and live the policies of modern 
state reforms.  
 
Furthermore, the memories (experienced or not) of abundant electricity, ordered roads with 
separate lanes and sidewalks, and postal services are not only colonial history but can also be 
seen as specters of the state. Also, the offices of public authorities are located in colonial 
houses, such as the Mairie, the City Hall, occupying the former main administration of 
Costermansville by CNKi (see Chapter 4). These memories and physical signs of the past 
continue to serve as “a legitimating reservoir for renewed assertions of state authority” (Young, 
2002, p. 445). They also create expectations of what the state “should” deliver among the 
populace.  
 
Yet, and despite the historical divisions, maintaining an urban, European-like city and a 
separate African city are not necessarily the case for contemporary Bukavu. Colonial urban 
planning was mostly dramatically different from contemporary practices of, or de facto, 
urbanization in Africa (see also Goodfellow, 2013, p. 48).  Instead, the ever-growing peripheral 
city, as Kadutu exemplifies, penetrates and affects relations with public authorities and above 
all de facto statehood and state-citizens’ relations. Rapid urban growth without corresponding 
urban planning to facilitate public good provision creates an intensified space for negotiating 
de facto statehood. Inhabitants referred to as “subjects” in the preceding section are questioning 
de facto statehood when they demand, expect and challenge their lived disconnections from 
public goods. The fluctuating and confrontational territorial boundaries within the city, such as 
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those which delineate Kadutu and Ibanda, can be seen as both unique and universal as they 
represent hierarchies and identities that can be found in many urban contexts, though carrying 
their own histories, knowledge and people.214 This demonstrates the dynamic, rather than static, 
feature of de facto statehood. Here, urban citizenship is being de facto questioned, demanded 
and potentially transformed to renegotiate statehood. Subjects at the margins of inclusion and 
exclusion confront, destabilize and contest citizenship. 
 
Further, another element of the spatial dimension is the international border between Rwanda 
and the DRC, which serves as a confrontation and dividing line of statehood. Cyangugu (in 
Rwanda) is a site-specific image and performance of an alternative form of de facto statehood. 
Rwanda was often mentioned across all the goods studied, e.g., Rwanda’s waste management 
through banning plastic bags, repairing roads and offering 24hour services of water and 
electricity. This de facto statehood seen as high performance in service delivery functions has 
implications for perceptions and expectations of consumers in Bukavu. For many consumers 
in Bukavu, the state performance of service delivery in Cyangugu was closely associated with 
regime responsibility in Kinshasa and Kigali, the capitals of DRC and Rwanda respectively. 
The discourses on public good delivery in Bukavu, in contrast to Cyangugu, demonstrate the 
close associations between “the state”, interpreted as the central regime in Kinshasa or Kigali, 
and delivery and performance of these services. Through the images of de facto statehood in 
Rwanda, state authorities and their performances are called into being by citizens and subjects 
in Bukavu. Here, state (images of) performances question the legitimacy of public authorities. 
Although this thesis does not focus on international sovereignty principles (de jure statehood), 
de facto statehood dimensions build on images of other sovereign nations to question domestic 
practices.      
 
Statehood in Rwanda, in contrast to those in the DRC, have focused on a processual 
transformation shaped by more recent events, groups and individuals with normative, political 
and economic forces. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, headed by president Paul Kagama (see 
Chapter 4), has fundamentally contested what was the image of the Rwandan state, and 
contributed to different imaginings and practices of what the state “should” look like. For 
instance, as Goodfellow (2014, p. 316) writes, “urban cleanliness and modernity are 
                                               
214 Divided cities can be interpreted in multiple forms and across time and division is so common that it can 
almost be a defining attribute of “the city”.  
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constitutive of the ‘New Rwanda,’” and these discourses have a major impact on forceful urban 
restructuring plans and actions by the Rwandan government. These more recent 
transformations of statehood in Rwanda also highlight not only the importance of historical 
and contextual knowledge but also how statehood is part of local and regional dynamics that 
are not simply “imported” by European (colonial) systems (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 21). 
This image and practices of Rwanda demonstrate a processual understanding of the state and 
dynamics of statehood.   
 
Second, the dimension of distinction relates specifically to aspects of hierarchies and citizen-
subject issues. Hierarchical distinctions of statehood relate to the position of the state in 
controlling public goods. Constraining, controlling and enabling the access and provision of 
public services may be powerful tools. For instance, road (re)construction was a legitimizing 
tool of state performance for public authorities (e.g., from the mayor) and donors. All the goods 
studied were, to varying degrees, controlled and sometimes monopolized through state-owned 
companies (e.g., SNEL and REGIDESO). Even for waste management, the most “neglected” 
service from the delivery side, there was a perception and knowledge of land being owned by 
the state that resulted in disputes over governing waste. This was particularly a source of 
frustration for the sanitation office at Kadutu central market, where the municipality owned the 
market and as such it was perceived as “state-owned”. The state presence is thus felt and 
experienced as a dominant force of public good provision, control and expectations of 
performance. By being a “dominant force”, I mean that “the state”, as a land owner for instance, 
is seen as the responsible “actor” in dealing with the collective needs of society. The 
municipality, as owner of the Kadutu market, was called into being when problems of waste 
became a collective “ill” for the society.   
 
Hierarchies also relate to the capacities of and discrimination against citizens vis-a-vis public 
good deliveries.  Performing as a citizen to acquire certain rights to access public goods requires 
formal property settlements (e.g., owning or renting a ‘legal’ house), knowledge of French and 
some regular income to pay bills. This creates separations between citizens of “haves” and 
“have-nots”, as discussed previously. Such hierarchies have also intensified through decades 
of violent conflicts that have disrupted education, livelihoods and housing options, and 
inevitably constrained public good provision. Following these hierarchies, a relational element 
is how service providers describe these subjects as “anarchic”. Anarchic is a term that 
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illuminates a field of government rationalities, technologies, languages of statehood and 
hierarchies in relation to these subjects (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Rose & Miller, 1992). By 
claiming that they are “anarchic”, service providers adapt a mentality of disengagement 
towards these individuals. When subjects are viewed as anarchic by service providers, there is 
less need for “answerability” (Bakhtin 1993 in Isin, 2008, p. 29) in relation to public goods 
provision. By situating subjects as anarchic, service providers adapt an alienating mode 
towards this group. That is, such individuals are considered anarchic subjects unable to cope 
with government techniques of rules and regulations and thus hierarchically positioned beneath 
civic relations. Anarchic also implies that such subjects are irrational or disordered and that 
they do not respect government technologies.    
 
Closely related to hierarchies, another aspect of the dimension of distinction is the universe of 
“ordinary” people that make up citizen-subject aspects (Mamdani, 1996). Here, relations with 
and position relative to service providers are essential characteristics. The different methods or 
techniques found within the state boundaries for producing hierarchies, institutions and 
identities are also about creating relations between the modern individual and political subjects 
(Mitchell, 1999, p. 87). This aspect, I argue, is at the core of understanding de facto statehood. 
I will thus elaborate further on these relations, their disconnections and prospects in more 
detail.  
 
Recalling Mamdani’s (1996) post-colonial argument of urban power that spoke of civil rights 
(citizens) and customary power that emphasized tradition (subjects); certain urban citizens are 
connected to the public services in contrast to those perceived as rural, anarchic, disorderly 
subjects, who were largely excluded from the same services in these case studies. However, 
these subjects are also not necessarily connected to customary rule, such as the Mwami 
(traditional king) in Kabare outside Bukavu (see Chapter 4). They are subjects considered both 
on the margins of the state and the “primordial public” as  Ekeh (1975, p. 106) terms it. Ekeh’s 
(p. 108) theoretical statement of lucky citizens in the civic public who only gain (rights) without 
giving anything in return (duties) is to a lesser degree supported by the empirical evidence, as 
service provision is severely limited regardless of position. But the symbolic and sometimes 
mythical importance of these divisions is a reality for subjects, citizens and service providers 
at the lower levels in Bukavu. The discourse of the “political class” that consumes without 
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giving anything back and close their eyes to problems of waste in the public market serves as 
an example (see page 123).  
 
In order to understand these citizens-subject tensions, it is useful to incorporate perspectives 
from Engin Isin’s discussion on citizenship and the city. The idea of being a citizen in these 
case studies might relate to the tension of rights and duties as inhabitants of the city. These are 
dynamic forms of relations and, as Isin (2007, p. 224) argues, “[w]hen we assume that 
nationality is citizenship what we accept is that there is a nation that corresponds to a state.” In 
Bukavu, as well as in many other places, the promises of the state, its constitution and policies, 
do not correspond to state practices or performance. Yet, these promises do play important 
roles in reproducing images of a state yet to come.  For instance, the Congolese Constitution 
(February 2006) was referred to here as granting rights and obligations and thus perpetuating 
the existence and promise of the state. The civic public’s great expectations for rights were 
found across all layers of society and especially among poorer citizens (i.e., the subjects) in 
these case studies. Rather than rights per se, the ‘mythical dimensions of the modern state’ 
(Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 15) continued to live on through, for instance, the constitutional 
text that recognized the rights and duties of the “state” and its citizen. The repertoire of rights, 
duties and expectations towards the “state” shows the dynamic and negotiable arenas of 
statehood (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, p. 551).  
 
Moreover, citizenship is practiced in relation to the Other (Isin, 2002, p. 3), namely those who 
I term subjects, or who certain service providers term “anarchic” settlers. This group of subjects 
is differentiated in a number of ways (e.g., by age, background, ethnicized identities) but, all 
in a similar way, they experience disconnections from official public services (what Bourdieu, 
[1990] 1997, p. 59 terms habitus). In this group, there is a sense of a struggle for recognition 
and to be treated on equal terms by enjoying access to regular public services. The poorer 
inhabitants of Bukavu, those disconnected from public service provision, were perhaps the 
most vocal demanders of access. As noted by Fardon (1988 in Hickey, 2006, p. 99), 
marginalized groups may form a stronger basis for identity formation and means of 
mobilization. These are relational issues, as struggles to achieve similar treatment are formed 
in the image of citizens with access to public goods. As I argued in the theoretical chapter, 
inspired by Isin (2007), cities intensify and encourage interactions and are a battleground for 
groups to define themselves, make claims and demand rights. Here, “acts of citizenship” are 
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articulated through “those to whom the right to have rights is due” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2).  
These articulations of rights are related to the possibility of accessing public goods in the future, 
while waiting for a state performance that is yet to come.   
 
Further, the issue of citizenship and belonging is closely associated with “public space” in the 
city, as particularly addressed in Chapter 5 on waste management. Among consumers in 
Bukavu, there were perceptions of dismemberment from official “public” places. However, the 
ways in which citizens and subjects (consumers) expected public spaces to be (e.g., free of 
charge, for recreation, and places for freedom of speech), were lacking in the city. Most “public 
spaces” (espaces publics) in the city center (Ibanda) were instead de facto politicized and/or 
monitored by police and other security forces (e.g., secret police, soldiers, or traffic police). 
This situation seemed to create tensions in de facto statehood relations, where the population 
are kept out of so-called public places in the urban center. Other “public”215 spaces in Kadutu, 
however, were significantly more squalid (see Figure 10 in Chapter 5). Beyond the technical 
and financial aspects of waste management, the dirtiness of public places in Kadutu represents 
both a loss of governance216 and indifference from residents towards the municipal authorities. 
This situation is described by Lesbet (1999 in Bouju, 2009, p. 168), who argues the following:  
 
“Mud and refuse perpetuate the dialogue between the ‘deaf’ governors, who mask their illegitimacy 
and incapacity when they repeatedly state that ‘people are dirty’ and a society reduced to silence, on 
whose behalf the authorities are not even capable of disposing of refuse. This is how the ‘dumb’ speak 
to ‘deaf’ ones by the intermediary of refuse.”  
 
Among residents in Kadutu, Bukavu, the disposal of waste in public spaces, at an individual 
level, is certainly the easiest way to deal with garbage. At a collective level, such disposal can 
be seen as a form of de facto helplessness and an act of resistance in the form of negligence 
towards officials who attempt to raise awareness through campaigns (see also Bouju, 2009, p. 
168). Since the public spaces in the urban center (Ibanda) are protected and protests are 
violently (by force or economic means) struck down by authorities, resistance by poorer 
inhabitants is rather found in more silent modes.                           
                                               
215 That is, land not owned privately but often by the municipality, state agencies or state (as in public land). 
This land could be industrial areas, rivers or other areas where private houses are not built.   
216 I remind the reader that I see governance as “any organized method of delivering public or collective services 
and goods according to specific norms (official and practical), and to specific forms of authority” (Olivier de 
Sardan, 2009a, p. 4). 
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From a provider’s point of view, there were concerns regarding the use of public spaces, such 
as main roads, for small businesses, housing and markets. Broadly, this was seen as abuse and 
neglect by certain inhabitants and a source of frustration for the authorities in the urban road 
construction company (OVD), the water agency (REGIDESO) as well as for intellectuals. 
These authorities’ and intellectuals’ use of the terms “anarchic” or “anarchy” was a way of 
explaining the perceived negligence of city dwellers. Bukavu’s mayor told me that he wanted 
to visit mayors in Europe to learn about their order and use of urban space.217 His perception 
of the citizens of Bukavu was that they were unable or unwilling to keep the city clean (propre) 
and that it was noisy, specifically referring to drivers using the car horn (klaxon).218 His dream 
of a European style urban space demonstrated, in my view, an authority far removed from the 
people he was representing. At the same time, authority figures positioned lower down the 
hierarchy, such as in the municipal sub-offices (Bourgmestre and Chefs de Quartiers) in 
Kadutu, expressed empathy with citizens in their need for waste services. Thus, there were 
variations in provider-consumer relations in perceptions of using or abusing “public space” 
depending on a provider’s position and proximity to consumers.  
 
Another practice, namely dauhoulage, can also to some extent be seen as a form of state 
resistance by subjects in Bukavu. At an individual, daily level, such practices can certainly also 
be seen simply as opportunities of acquiring electricity when people are disconnected in their 
private homes. Arguably, electricity is a desired good that demands some minimum 
engagement from the state, i.e., as a regulator and potential financial source for developing 
infrastructure. In the DRC, the electricity agency (SNEL) is still state-owned (state monopoly) 
though transitioning to neo-liberal modes of operating (i.e., shareholder ownership and 
investment from multilateral investment funds). However, many potential foreign investors in 
hydroelectricity in the DRC fear corruption and, moreover, there is a lack of financial 
incentives (income) to invest. Thus, and for the foreseeable future, it is likely that SNEL will 
continue to operate in a parastatal mode.  
 
SNEL is thus closely associated with “the state” seen as the central government in Kinshasa. 
This is also why the expression dauhoulage is an interesting example of state resistance. 
                                               
217 Discussion with Mayor Philémon Lutombo Yogolelo, 8 October 2014, Bukavu.  
218 ibid 
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Dauhoulage can be seen as a form of popular justice to access a highly demanded public good. 
As such, the expression describes an “act[..] of citizenship” from “those to whom the right to 
have rights is due” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2). The term dauhoulage can, thus, be interpreted 
as a central aspect of the statehood practices employed by the “have-nots”. Such popular justice 
can also find approval from public authorities, especially during election campaigning. 
Politicians outside the regime will use both the representation of SNEL as a state responsibility 
and the perspective of social justice for poorer urban dwellers to gain votes. Those positioned 
in the government standing for re-election can also increase provision of electricity in Bukavu 
during election campaigns. Provision of and access to electricity can thus be understood as 
elements of statehood because of the close associational role of this good and “the state”, i.e., 
the central regime in this case.  
     
Third, and finally, the dimension of ideology plays a role in performing and living the state 
through using languages of stateness and statehood ideals. Language is performative and 
illuminates how authorities or agents of the state give effect to and shape their actions towards 
state practices (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 177).  As Hansen and Stepputat (2001, p. 9) argue, 
“[t]he attribution of stateness to various form of authority also emerges from intense and often 
localized political struggles over resources, recognition, inclusion, and influence.” For 
instance, Salongo, as a term used in the control of the water pump Kaduru in Kadutu, is a way 
of legitimating agents’ positions, ordering and controlling a public good. The volunteers, or 
Salongo, were using languages of stateness inherited from Mobutu’s production of state-
society relations and nation-building attempts. These state-like agents uphold and enable the 
existence of a state or state-like representations in controlling a highly demanded public good: 
Water. These languages demonstrate how images of states and statehood can live on despite a 
lack of corresponding actual or official state practices and presence. Actors and practices 
referring to Salongo are not necessarily a privatization of the state or state failure, but instead 
a mode of governance that adapts to certain circumstances and facilitates interactions between 
state and society.   
 
Fin d’heure, as another example, can be interpreted as a term coming from languages of state 
absence after dark.  Fin d’heure is not, to my knowledge, “a group” of specific individuals but 
rather the term represents a multitude of different de facto (discourses of) statehood when “the 
state” is interpreted as absent. By absent, I do not necessarily claim that they are physically 
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missing, but rather that there are changes in modes of governance that occur at nightfall. From 
consumers, the use of the term Fin d’heure could be interpreted within frames, such as rumors, 
moral views on the position of women, fear of urban banditry committed by former rebels, 
public authorities abusing positions after dark, and sometimes also as a scapegoat expression 
used by public authorities for criminal activities generally in Bukavu. By the latter, I mean that 
public authorities can systematically blame external groups that are seen as beyond the control 
of local politicians or civil servants. From the providers’ point of view, Fin d’heure could be 
seen as illegal taxation groups, armed banditry and a problem resulting from two decades of 
war and conflict. Overall, there is no escaping that the city experiences a near total blackout, 
with some exceptions relating to nightlife and private properties. Fin d’heure can be seen as 
languages of state absence and enables a space for other groups or public authorities to act 
somehow differently from the daytime mode of governance. Statehood can thus be interpreted 
differently depending on night or day and thus shows the dynamics of these relations.  
 
Further, the reproduction and dispute over the idea of a unified statehood plays a key role in 
the ideology dimension. This is not only “a mythicized abstraction” but it also has effects on 
reality (Foucault, 1994, p. 23). To be clear, I do not assume that there is an actual degree of 
unified statehood, e.g., such as the Fragile State Index219. Rather, I assume that the 
representation of a unified statehood plays a role in the creation of the state effect. In one 
example of unity, the representative at FONER (Chapter 6), the national agency for road 
taxation, drew not only on symbolic systems (e.g., the idea of taxation to sustain and distribute 
public goods) but also positioned himself as performing the state ideology of “revolution to 
modernity.”  Here, FONER is an interesting example of the aligning of ideological projects 
with state practices and thus constructing, or at least attempting to construct, a unified state 
ideal. The FONER representative also drew on the Congolese constitution as well as relations 
to other state-like agencies of road construction and security. Through these languages of 
stateness, he combined de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood and by talking also 
constructed a raison d’état. Through agents like him, the state is being produced as a unified 
ideal and comes “into being by stating what [the state] should be” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71).  
 
                                               
219 Previously known as Failed State Index, it is a measurement developed by The Fund for Peace that indicates 
“high risk” states. Accessible at http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi  
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In another example, Forces-vives220 representatives portrayed an opposing image of the state’s 
interest in fractioned, rather than unified, statehood.  As one representative argued: “[The state 
authorities] don’t want people to be united, this could be a cause of revolution against their 
government.”221 From this perspective, state representatives can be interested in maintaining 
divisions among their populace, by, for example, focusing on ethnic differences and loyalties 
or external enemies (e.g., Fin d’heure, Banyamulenge).  Here, creating an image of divisions, 
both among the populace and “the state” can be seen as a government technology for keeping 
the masses at bay. Certainly, the DRC has its share of political, linguistic and ethnic cleavages, 
but the disunity is rather a matter of how these cleavages can be instrumentalized by authorities 
when confronted with grievances (see also Dorman, Hammett, & Nugent, 2006, p. 9). 
Ultimately, notions of unified statehood are tied up to broader questions of nationhood, 
citizenship and belonging. Thus, the dimension of ideology is closely tied to the dimension of 
distinction, where hierarchies and citizen-subject forms important part of experiencing and 
living the state. .     
 
 
In summary, the dimensions of statehood discussed in this chapter illustrate different heuristic 
approaches to the study of state-society relations, moving beyond debates of what the African 
state is not. The dimensions are from inductive approaches to statehood based on consumer-
provider relations of public goods in Bukavu. These dimensions are also inspired by scholarly 
debates and heuristic approaches that take empirical statehood as an analytical starting point 
(e.g., Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010).  The different aspects 
of the three dimensions (distinctions, spatial and ideology) form a patchwork of angles to study 
de facto statehood in contested spaces. Rather than what is missing, I argue that the state can 
be seen as different categories of practices and analyzed through those “living” and 
“performing” the state. These dimensions represent abstract and concrete, as well as ideal and 
material, forms of social processes that produce and reproduce statehood in Bukavu and 
beyond.   
 
 
                                               
220 Forces-vives is a network that works with private investigators for the return of stolen goods, discussed in 
Chapter 6 on public roads. Forces-vives represents both consumers in demanding better rights and improved 
services by the public authorities but also engages with authorities and offers assistance to citizens.   
221 Interview with Hugo Guy Luwese, 21 October 2014, Bukavu. 
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8.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have represented public good provision and consumption in modes of 
governance and citizen-subjects’ divisions, respectively, as an inductive approach from 
empirical observations in Bukavu. Moreover, and in order to show the dynamic forms of 
statehood, I have discussed dimensions as ways of approaching patterns of different practices 
and ideas connected to state-society relations. The three dimensions discussed in this chapter 
are structures produced and reproduced in mundane social process I argue to constitute 
“statehood”. I further argue that the state comes into being through these structures, both in 
abstract and concrete forms. Regarding abstract forms, I have discussed for instance specters 
of the state, modernity, hierarchies and languages of statehood as part of the state effect. 
Regarding concrete forms, I have discussed disconnections and connections to public services 
and the ways in which marginalized individuals circumnavigate the state to enjoy, provide and 
control services.   
 
Rather than assuming state weakness and a lack of authorities, norms and rules, I argue that 
there are rather a plurality of competing structures and divisions that challenge but also 
reinforce de facto statehood. As Abrams (1988, p. 79) argued, “the state is the unified symbol 
of an actual disunity.” Thus, there is no unity in practices but rather a plurality of practices that 
make up what may be called “the state.” Here, the power of the service providers should not 
be underestimated. This micro-study of provider-consumer interactions shows not only how 
these public service providers cope, but also how parallel systems can co-exist and operate in 
the same arena (Lund, 2006a; Olivier de Sardan, 2014). Even for the most neglected public 
good, namely waste management, there are different (local) providers (networks or companies) 
that act to redress the deficiencies in overall management from the municipality. Regarding 
public roads, there are multiple public institutions in place in charge of constructing and 
controlling roads with varying degrees of access to international resources and of domestic 
cooperation. For water and electricity, the state practices and performances were largely 
observed to be a state monopoly.    
 
Furthermore, there were practices of service providers from the same national institutions that 
cooperated in a patronage system with consumers at street-level, such as the neighborhood 
connections to electricity and water for instance, or at the elite level, through private deals on 
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the same services. Patterns of clientelism are evident, i.e., unequal control over resources that 
allows certain exchanges between patron and clients to take place. Yet, these practices can be 
seen through a broader understanding of divided cities and dimensions of statehood in order to 
capture analytically a fuller picture of state and state-like practices. Instead, the modern state 
effect of establishing a binary rule of the state as an ideological entity on one hand, and the 
society on the other, creates structural effects as to who is considered within the state’s 
responsibility.   
 
There exists also a reassertion of the state in these case studies through the resources and 
repertoires available for new investments in the public sector and the public-private partnership 
to enhance service provision (ideally). This is not a unitary process with coherent norms, 
funding and procedures. Rather, it is made up of a patchwork of different elements including 
official norms, adaptive strategies and practical norms within relational and economic 
dimensions (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, pp. 415, 417). All these actors within, at the interface and 
outside the bureaucratic apparatus make use of an ideal form of the territorial state system 
(Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, pp. 542-543). 
 
Moreover, and perhaps more powerful is the very notion of the state and what it should be that 
lives on through imaginative force. For instance, the Congolese in Bukavu often joke about the 
inability of the political leadership, the various infrastructure problems and lack of public 
goods, but I have so far not encountered anyone opposing the state as an institutional 
arrangement or proposing an alternative, stateless society. For any society, sticking to what is 
familiar is often more palatable than upheaval, thus stepping into the unknown. This also 
implies a powerful idea that state presence is an essential part of social order in the everyday 
lives of Congolese citizens and this idea, though far removed from the outcomes of ‘normative’ 
state practices, is an imaginative force not to be underestimated.   
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9.0 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to move away from a limited understanding of de facto statehood in 
Africa (i.e., whether it exists or does not) to reflecting on various dimensions of statehood. The 
thesis started with a criticism of political science literature that has considered certain states in 
sub-Saharan Africa to be weak, failed or collapsed. Neopatrimonialism and clientelism are 
closer to bridging theoretical debates to empirical practices. However, it is problematic that 
Western experiences are used as the main historical sources in discussion of African state 
experiences. Moreover, the assumption of de jure but not de facto statehood, or negative but 
not positive sovereignty, in some African states, such as the DRC, has inspired me to work on 
de facto statehood. Instead of abstract and decontextualized models of statehood, I have argued 
that a starting point for analysis could be to observe how statehood is performed on a daily 
basis in Africa. I have argued that the state can be seen as practices, created, sustained and 
challenged, through the people living and performing the experience of statehood.  
 
Rather than making prescriptive, normative claims about how states should appear, or who 
should provide public goods, I have investigated those living and performing the state in the 
variety of practices, ideas and performances. These were examined through observations of the 
daily negotiations over certain public goods (i.e., waste management, water and electricity, and 
public roads). I have examined the perceptions of service providers and consumers vis-à-vis 
each other and their expectations, such as perceptions and claims on duties and rights. Through 
these case studies, it was possible to study how certain consumers were connected to public 
state provision, while others were disconnected and considered to be on the margins of the state 
(anarchic subjects). This shows how “political rationalities and governmental technologies” 
(Rose & Miller, 1992, pp. 175-176), such as infrastructure and service provisions, are issues 
that divide and connect citizens and subjects within the same state. Thus, people experience 
statehood differently in the same shared space and understanding these experiences are 
important for deeper engagement with those living and performing the state. People also 
experience statehood differently based on the historical context. Moreover, this research was 
conducted in a period of relative peace in Bukavu (not the region as such) and in between two 
national elections. Elections and war can intensify the experience of statehood, such as 
intensifying the dimension of distinction (e.g. citizen-subject, hierarchies of belonging and 
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exclusion). Thus, this type of research is highly influenced by the dynamics of statehood, 
namely the changing character of state-society relations over time.   
 
Moreover, the numerous stakeholders in national agencies, municipal authorities and 
bureaucrats complicate the image of de facto statehood relations. There is no dominant 
framework of “state-building” or a dictatorial leader, which is rarely or ever the case, and hence 
different political processes are taking place in negotiating what are public goods and how they 
should be provided. Thus, there is a need “to problematize the relationship between the 
translocality of “the state” and the necessarily localized offices, institutions, and practices in 
which it is instantiated”, as Gupta (1995, pp. 375-376) argues. These processes differ widely 
in character. One aspect is the local, contextual innovations, such as recycling of waste, 
offering forms of security and insurances at major public road junctions or the presence of “Fin 
d’heure”. Other processes are of national and international character, such as the privatization 
of the water agency, and road and energy infrastructures. In between these processes are (state) 
authorities attempting to position themselves locally, nationally and internationally. Despite 
their translocality, these authorities and various agencies are also part of creating the state 
effect, because the distinctiveness of the modern state is that it appears as an apparatus separate 
from the social world (Mitchell, 1999). However, these individuals also compete, disassociate 
and/or negotiate with each other and the populace, and this also shows the dynamic and 
negotiable space of statehood. These encounters and practices are key to understand “the state” 
as engrained in daily life:  a state that creates structural effects on those “living” the state.  As 
such, it is from my epistemological perspective fruitless to characterize the state as consisting 
of institutions, public authorities and bureaucrats in a singular model labelled “failed” or 
“weak”.   
 
Moreover, the citizens and subjects of Bukavu, encountered in focus group discussions, all 
engaged in discussing “the state”. Often, the state was considered an entity, an “it” or an actor. 
Yet, these understandings of the state, as categories of practices, varied: the state was 
understood variously as the president, the regime, the municipality, the multiple forms of public 
service providers, and it was also found in relations to the Rwandan government. This 
demonstrates, I argue, that the “African state” is not a blank spot, an “empty shell” (cf. Chabal 
& Daloz, 1999), but rather a variety of practices, in which ordinary citizens hold relations of 
connections and disconnections. Moreover, these varied understandings of the state derive 
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precisely from the challenge of viewing the state as a coherent, singular entity. This is not to 
say that categories of practices refuse the term “it” when it comes to an understanding of the 
state. On the contrary, the state is often considered an entity in practice, although there are 
widely different interpretations of what “it” contains. Rather, the discourses described here 
showed varied understandings and multiple layers of the “it” [the state] when it comes to 
perceptions, emphasis and “situated knowledges” (Haraway, 1988).  The following lays out 
the theoretical, empirical, political and methodological contributions of this thesis.  
9.1 Theoretical contribution 
 
Political science terminology is largely bound to political experience from the Western 
hemisphere (Sartori, 1970, p. 1034). This terminology, I argue, limits engagement with the 
actual practices of state and state-like representatives and ordinary citizens in daily modes of 
de facto statehood. The terminology of failure, weakness and also de jure but not de facto 
statehood can be seen as “a function of measurement instead of methodology, thereby 
detaching ontological questions and the implications thereof,” as Hampel (2015, p. 10) argues. 
For instance, instead of state “failure”, there are reasons to consider conceptual failure in what 
traditional political science considers to be de facto statehood. In my interpretation, statehood 
is a dynamic process with no particular end or beginning. Fostering and nurturing relations of 
reciprocity in statehood relations, for instance, does not reach an ultimate level in practice. This 
insight has been recognized in studies of institutions, bureaucracies and street-level bureaucrats 
on the global North but is yet to be developed on a similar scale regarding the global South 
(Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014, pp. 35-36). Thus, this thesis contributes theoretically 
to enriching and balancing understandings of statehood in the global South.  
 
Further, this thesis has contributed to an emerging literature on dynamic forms of statehood, 
authority and “the state” in Africa (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Lund, 2006; Olivier de 
Sardan, 2014). The abundance of political science literature on the “African state” has remained 
surprisingly silent on the detailed day-to-day matters of public servants and actual practices of 
public good provision (Blundo, 2006, p. 799). My theoretical contribution is thus to nuance 
and complicate state practices when it comes to the daily governance of public goods. But more 
than analyzing the control and management practices of these goods, I also contribute to a 
relational approach to understanding citizens’ own perspectives and practices of dealing with 
agents of the state or state-like actors in accessing and enjoying public goods.    
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However, by choosing a single site, however diverse, for empirical work (Bukavu), it is not 
possible to develop a ‘general’ theory on de facto statehood that can be applied to other settings. 
Instead, I positioned my thesis as a building block study (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 76) to 
study dimensions of statehood and to identify patterns of public goods provision and 
consumption. The research conducted offers an insight into an area of contested and 
transforming political order, which is often assumed to be a site of severe state weakness.  On 
the contrary, governance in Bukavu demonstrated an authoritarian character, a density of 
formal and competing arrangements of public goods provision and connected and disconnected 
citizenship. I argue that the state is not an empty shell but establishes modes of governance in 
relation to public good provision and consumption. By distinguishing goods and their modes 
of governance, it is possible to find sites of states (location and form), citizen-state and subject-
state relations, negotiations and disconnections. These modes are dynamic and citizens will 
negotiate and have expectations to accessing different public goods.  I argue also, then, that 
despite the challenges of public goods provision, the state can show remarkable resilience and 
dominance in the public sphere.  
 
Finally, the dimensions of statehood, seen through public good provision and consumption, 
can serve as a heuristic tool for understanding the complex and multiple practices of the state. 
The state, often considered or imagined as a coherent entity (the state effect), is different 
practices found in a variety of spaces and social relations. This approach shifts focus away 
from pre-conceived norms of statehood to an engagement with empirical observations to de 
facto statehood. In this thesis, I discussed elements of urban colonial design and  international 
borders (spatial dimension), hierarchies of control and citizen-subjects (dimension of 
distinction), languages of stateness and unified ideals of statehood (ideology dimension) . 
Dimensions of distinction and ideology may be considered across a variety of spaces and time, 
while the spatial dimension is of a more context specific nature. In addition, these dimensions 
are seen in relation to each other. For instance, issues of urban colonial design have effects on 
inclusion and exclusion rationales of citizen-subject debates, such as dividing urban 
architecture and interpretations of who deserves citizenship status. However, this is not a static 
situation but rather dynamic and negotiable modes that creates statehood relations in the city. 
There may also be a number of other dimensions that are relevant for understanding statehood, 
which is why I consider my approach to statehood to be heuristic.  
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In sum, the theoretical contribution of this thesis is to move away from interpreting African 
states according to a master narrative of Western states and decontextualized models, and 
instead offer an interpretive way of seeing the state as practices, created, sustained and 
challenged, through the people who experience statehood first hand. Such an approach is 
different from starting with ideal-types defined by territorial integrity, the control of borders or 
the monopoly on legitimate use of force: a starting point that often leads to assumptions of 
failure or weakness. Instead, this thesis has demonstrated empirical versions of statehood 
through daily needs, provision and meanings of public goods in an urban space with a density 
of polities.        
       
9.2 Empirical and political contribution  
 
Here, the empirical observations contribute to area studies of the DRC and, more broadly, hold 
comparative and general value. The DRC has attracted numerous students and scholars 
studying peacekeeping (Autesserre, 2010), conflicts and violence (Baaz & Stern, 2009; 
Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2008), hybrid political order (Meagher, 2012) and, earlier, 
nation-building (Lemarchand, 1964), neo-patrimonial forms of governance (Callaghy, 1984; 
Willame, 1972) and state decay (Young & Turner, 1985). Thus, my research contributes to a 
country that has received substantial scholarly attention, although from various perspectives 
and where many contemporary studies have revolved around violence and conflicts. I aim to 
contribute also to this growing body of work, though with an emphasis on the “everyday”, as 
a contrast to a focus on rebel groups, violent conflict or peacekeeping.  
 
There are also certain urban spaces and central towns that have attracted scholars on topics 
related to this thesis, although Bukavu has tended to receive less attention among scholars, who 
favor Goma, Lubumbashi or the mega-city Kinshasa (e.g., de Boeck & Plissart, 2004; Trefon, 
2010). The recent and dramatic history of Congo (see Chapter 4), however, makes Bukavu and 
other “state-dense” areas a fascinating point of departure for (re)negotiating statehood (cf. 
Hagmann & Péclard, 2010). Thus, this thesis contributes empirically both to area studies of the 
DRC, but also holds comparative value to other empirical sites where statehood is intensely 
contested due to various factors, such as violent conflicts, state decay and reassertion, and 
economic difficulties.   
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Second, and as a note of caution, when describing and analyzing empirical observations from 
the eastern DRC, a first step is to be self-aware of normative labels of Western forms of 
statehood. As stated in the introduction, this does not mean to reject Western statehood as a 
whole and completely immerse oneself in “pure” Congolese politics. On the contrary, the many 
forms of interpreting, performing and living the state in the DRC are made up of a variety of 
statehood knowledge and practices. Rather, descriptions and analyses beginning with and 
conflating labels, such as “failed”, “collapsed”, “weak” and “failing”  (see especially Englebert, 
2009, pp. 41-42), are not only negative but also call for explanations of what these labels are 
referring to, in what domains, in which relations and across what space and time. I have in the 
conduct of the fieldwork and in presenting the empirical observations made a more open 
inquiry to avoid these labels. This, however, does not mean that I am somehow “objective” to 
the research, as I agree with Lund (2014, p. 226) in that scholars establish frames of inquiry 
through particular (abstract) language, such as “state”, “public goods” or “citizens”. Rather, 
the aim of my empirical research is to avoid using pervasively negative descriptions formed by 
normative assumptions of an ideal type of state and rather inquire empirically through using 
certain conceptual frames.    
 
Third, when it comes to comparative value, Bukavu is a regional exception and generalizations 
made, based on my empirical observations there, cannot be automatically applied to rural or 
semi-rural areas. For instance, the agencies SNEL and REGIDESO and municipal 
representatives are urban phenomena. Instead, the comparability of Bukavu relates to either 
urban centers in the DRC where public good provision agencies are based, or in different 
African cities. However, a comparative approach can also be made to statehood in areas 
primarily governed by, for instance, chiefs, particular armed groups and/or religious authorities 
(e.g., Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014; Raeymaekers, 2014). Further, the individual topics of, 
for instance, access to water and control over public roads could be further explored in almost 
infinite number of places. The analytical approach of this thesis could also act as a heuristic 
framework for studying public goods, contributing to broad ideas of state-society relations and 
statehood. Thus, and even though Bukavu and all the specific set of events studied may be 
particular of the area, it is possible to apply a similar approach to other spaces.  
 
Fourth, the analytical value of the empirical data is to demonstrate how the same issue, e.g., 
access to water, can be a matter of intense negotiations, claims and rights, showing a pattern of 
dynamic relations across different goods, subjects and time. I have termed these patterns 
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“statehood” but they are not limited to formal state structures. Statehood can rather be seen as 
patterns of social relations, practices and political processes. Some of these patterns can be 
very concrete, such as the practice of attaching cables to electricity wires. However, they can 
also be interpreted as acts of state resistance, depending on context. Other patterns, such as the 
description of certain inhabitants as “anarchic”, are discussed here more in abstract forms of 
ideal civic relations, “modern” statehood and colonial modes of governance. These patterns, 
whether daily practices or more abstract issues, contribute to relational and interpretive 
approaches to de facto statehood. That is, the empirical findings, ranging from taxing usage of 
public roads, dumping waste, fetching water in Funu and administrating electricity provision, 
are “observable, empirical elements signifying different aspects of the  ‘whole’” (Lund, 2014, 
p. 228), which in this case means understanding dimensions of statehood.  
 
Finally, there are also political implications of my research. Many of the daily issues in Bukavu, 
such as waste management or access to water and electricity, remain largely neglected in 
contemporary state and political studies of the DRC (some exceptions include Muhunduka, 
2010; Mwacan & Trefon, 2005; Titeca & de Herdt, 2011; Trefon, 2010). This is puzzling as 
these topics are of concern to most, if not all, citizens and service providers in Bukavu. For 
instance, the mismanagement of waste and relatedly lack of safe water sources have major 
implications for public health. As noted by the medical doctor222 in Chapter 5 (p. 133), the 
annual onset of the rainy season in September often brings outbreaks of cholera and typhoid 
fever, and also a raised chance of contracting malaria. Moreover, and from a political 
perspective, the neoliberal transition to a market controlled water agency is deeply concerning 
in a city with a high urban poverty rate and limited institutional regulatory bodies. The 
considerable confusion regarding the water agency’s continuing “parastatal” status (it is owned 
and regulated still by the government) may imply that these privatization transitions are not 
well communicated for politically sensitive reasons. As a researcher, trying to understand these 
regulations, it was rather by chance that I discovered that this transition in ownership was taking 
place.  Based on my observation, access to water may develop into a private good for paying 
clients, which deserves broader political attention.      
 
Moreover, political projects such as Cinq Chantiers carry a particular exclusionist logic, where 
irregular houses and stalls are torn down to make way for “modern” constructions and 
                                               
222 Categorized under focus group of male consumers living in Ibanda.  
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infrastructure. The irregular houses and stalls torn down are in effect described by Article 15; 
to cope or manage to survive, which can be labelled “informal economy” (de Boeck, 2011, see 
also Chapter 6, p. 156 ). This exclusionist logic also hits women hard as they are often the ones 
running small businesses along the main roads. This is not a one-way process, however, as 
Cinq Chantiers was a political campaign with appeal to many Congolese who would like to 
see improvements in all the domains that can be described as “public work”. Rather, such 
projects, and the de facto realization of these projects (road work and the clearing of houses), 
are worrying for many fearful of losing their homes and businesses. These and many other 
concerns observed empirically are part of the urgency of public goods, both in terms of needs 
and quality of delivery.   
9.3 Methodological contribution 
 
By emphasizing the living and the performing of the state, part of the methodological 
contribution here is the interpretive approach. This approach emphasizes meanings, beliefs, 
and discourses that may provide scholars with tools to find novel ways of understanding 
traditional social and political science topics, such as “the state”, “citizens” and “public goods”. 
Rather than seeking correlations, laws or deduction, I emphasize the position and perception 
of those being researched as well as my own analytical interpretation of these perspectives and 
observations. Within the interpretive approach, I follow the importance of relational 
approaches as a way to understand how “units” or subjects studied involved in transactions 
with other units or subjects derive their meaning, identity and being from these transactions 
(Emirbayer, 1997). I have argued that consumers and providers must be seen as beings in 
relations, such as in a group, a community, a city and/or a state. By taking a relational approach, 
consumer-provider practices and ideas demonstrate different modes of governance structures 
and (dis)connections to services of interest. These relational roles are dynamic and changing 
rather than a priori formed, and thus being a service provider or consumer depends on relational 
roles.   
 
My interpretive approach is aimed at understanding meanings, beliefs and discourses from 
subjects being studied and from there developing an analysis of these perspectives from my 
interpretations, using both theoretical literature and empirical observations.  Conceptually, the 
thesis has contributed to a different way of studying public goods provision and consumption. 
Rather than defining these goods as ‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rivalrous’, a broader 
                   236 of 250 
understanding is needed to capture realities and practices in their daily forms. Public goods are 
seen as such because they address common needs, and, in turn, require control, management 
and delivery by service providers. Thus, I do not make claims regarding a priori functions, 
positions or provision of these goods but rather take an inductive approach to empirical 
observations.    
 
Furthermore, categories of analysis and categories of practices, inspired by Bourdieu, are also 
highly valuable to empirical studies on statehood and “the state”. Conceptually, these 
categories enable researchers consciously to distinguish between and compare topics and 
perceptions raised by those being studied (categories of practices) and the researcher’s 
analytical perceptions (categories of analysis). As such, abstract theoretical fields of “state” or 
“statehood” can be examined empirically in a hands-on, specific manner. This enables 
researchers to move back and forth between the idea of a unified state as a binary order vis-a-
vis society (state effect) and the numerous practices, perceptions and ideals that exist 
empirically.  
 
Eriksen (2011) argued that the state can be considered categories of practices, not of analysis, 
and hence researchers can analyze the idea of state (categories of practices) with actual state 
practices. Epistemologically, this is a useful way of operationalizing “the state”, which consists 
of a range of different actors, history, translocality, ideology and practices. However, at a sub-
level of the state, I also consider categories of analysis based on observed categories of 
practices as valuable to comparative analysis and broader theory-building. The theoretical 
literature has offered useful terms for analysis (e.g., modes of governance or citizens-subjects), 
while the content of individual modes or relations is based on empirical observations. Thus, 
studies on statehood can enjoy both already the heuristic approaches already established, while 
also allowing for the flexibility and dynamics of contextual interpretations of the same topic.  
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Appendix 1.0 List of fieldwork participants  
 
The shaded in orange are participants representing «consumers» of public services, i.e. people 
who were interviewed on the basis of how they were able to access and enjoy public goods. 
Most of the other informants are either representing an agency or a form of service provision. 
Finally, there are others representing intellectuals (university students and lecturers), NGOs, 
reporters and donors to gain further insight into the case interest.   
 
Who Position/role Place Date of interview 
1. Bercky Masheka 
Zihindula 
Congolese PhD candidate 
(degree from South 
Africa) 
Meeting in a 
restaurant, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
9.3.2012 
2. Anonymous Coordination officer in 
MONSUCO (the UN 
operation) 
Meeting at 
MONUSCO 
headquarters, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
10.3.2012 
3. Solange Lusiku 
Nsimire 
Chief editor of 
independent newspaper 
Le Souverain 
Meeting in her 
office of Le 
Souverain, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
22.3.2012 
4. Pacifique Mulirci Head of youth 
organization Jeunes 
Reporteurs de Congo 
Meeting in a bar 
in Ibanda, Bukavu 
22.3.2012 
5. Innocent Utshudi Congolese PhD candidate  Meeting in my 
resident at the 
time, Ibanda, 
Bukavu. 
23.3.2012 
6. Anonymous Military Attache  Meeting in a 
restaurant, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
28.3.2012 
7. Youth (mixed) in 
Ibanda 
Preliminary focus group 
(pilot study) 
Meeting in a bar 
in Bukavu 
5.4.2012 
8. Claude 
Byamungu 
Local NGO (AAP SUD 
KIVU- ASBL) 
developing and 
supporting local state in 
service provision  
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
11.4.2012 
9. Youth (mixed) in 
Ibanda 
Preliminary focus group 
(pilot study) 
Meeting in a bar 
in Ibanda, Bukavu 
23.4.2012 
10. Déo Mashali Head of administration, 
SNEL  
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
12.09.2013 
11. Anonymous Main technician at SNEL 
(Chef de Département 
Technique) 
Meeting at Ruzizi 
I power station, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
12.09.2013 
12. Daniel Kasereka,  Head of REGIDESO’s 
Kahele station (main 
water reserve for 
Bukavu) 
Meeting at Kahele 
water reserve, in 
Kabare territory, 
South Kivu 
12.09.2013 
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13. Albert Tsongo  Head of the Technical 
Division (Chef de 
Division Technique) at 
the Road Office (Office 
de Route) 
Meeting in his 
office, border 
zone 
Ibanda/Kadutu, 
Bukavu 
13.09.2013 
14. Justin Musaka 
Bahati 
President of ACCO Meeting in his 
office, near place 
d'Independence, 
Ibanda, Bukavu. 
24.09.2013 
15. Taxi drivers 
(anonymous)  
Focus groups discussion 
(consumers) 
Meeting in a bar, 
next to taxi station 
near place 
d'Independence, 
Kadutu/Ibanda 
border, Bukavu 
24.09.2013 
16. Ezekiel Mwomera Hygienic Sanitation 
Office at the Central 
Market in Kadutu 
(Assainissement 
Hygiénique Marché 
Central de Kadutu) 
Meeting in his 
office, Kadutu 
central market, 
Bukavu.  
25.09.2013 
17. Women in 
Kadutu 
Stall workers at the 
Central Market in Kadutu 
(Marché Central de 
Kadutu), focus groups 
and individual interviews 
Meeting in their 
stalls, different 
locations around 
the market, 
Kadutu, Bukavu. 
25.-26.09.2013 
18. Anonymous, 
waste workers  
Waste workers hired 
through the Central 
Market in Kadutu 
(Assainissement 
Hygiénique marché 
central de Kadutu) 
Meeting in the 
Mwomera’s office 
(16), 
(Assainissement 
Hygiénique 
marché central de 
Kadutu), Kadutu, 
Bukavu 
26.09.2013 
19. Three master 
students  
Working on public health 
and sanitiation issues, 
l’Université Officielle de 
Bukavu 
Meeting in a 
restaurant in 
Ibanda, Bukavu. 
1.10.2013 
20. Mr. Shiko  City Hall (Mairie de 
ville), Head of Urban 
division (Chef de 
Division Urbaine) 
Meeting in his 
office in the City 
Hall, Ibanda, 
Bukavu   
2.10.2014 
21. Gregoire Shamvu Pharmakina, Head of 
technical department 
(Chef de Département 
Technique) 
Meeting in his 
office at 
Pharmakina,  
Bagira, Bukavu  
2.10.2014 
22. Raphaël Mutikiv City Hall, Second Bureau 
(IIe bureau) 
Meeting in his 
office in the City 
Hall, Ibanda, 
Bukavu   
3.10.2014 
23. Women in 
Kadutu 
Citizens (consumers) in 
focus group discussion 
Meeting in the 
home of one of 
the women in 
Kadutu, Bukavu 
4.10.2014 
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24. Hamuli Theodore 
Muzalia  
SONAS (insurance), 
assistent chief of office  
Meeting in his 
office, Sonas, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
6.10.2014 
25. Philémon 
Lutombo 
Yogolelo 
Mayor of Bukavu (Maire 
de Bukavu) 
Meeting in his 
office in the City 
Hall, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
8.10.2014 
26. Alain 
Tshimbalanga 
Ntambwe 
OVD, provincial director 
(directeur provincial) 
Meeting in his 
office, border 
zone 
Ibanda/Kadutu, 
Bukavu 
8.10.2014 
27. Dieudonné 
Kuburhamwa 
Ngaboyeka 
FONER, director general Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
8.10.2014 
28. Youth in Kadutu Citizens (consumers) in 
focus group discussion 
Meeting in a bar 
in Kadutu, 
Bukavu 
8.10.2014 
29. Severin Magangu 
Matabaro 
Cabinet director 
(Directeur de Cabinet) of 
the governor in South 
Kivu (Gouverneur de la 
Province). Also former 
professor working on 
land rights in the Kivus.  
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu 
9.10.2014 
30. Youth in Ibanda Citizens (consumers) in 
focus group discussion 
Meeting in a 
bar/restaurant in 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
9.10.2014 
31. Men in Kadutu Citizens (consumers) in 
focus group discussion 
Meeting in 
Coopera, a public 
place and bar in 
Kadutu, Bukavu 
9.10.2014 
32. Funu volunteers 
(Salongo) 
Volunteers working for 
the control of the water 
pump Funu in Kadutu 
Funu water pump, 
Kadutu, Bukavu. 
10.10.2014 
33. Men in Ibanda Citizens (consumers) in 
focus group discussion 
Meeting in two 
different bars in 
Ibanda, Bukavu   
14.10.2014 & 
21.10.2014 
34. Robert Njangala 
& Hugo Guy 
Luwese  
SAJECEK/Forces-vives, 
President of SAJECEK 
& Executive secretary 
General 
Meeting in their 
office in Kadutu, 
Bukavu. 
21.10.2014 
35. Eric Mabanze 
Moligi 
Representative of the 
Bukavu Forces-vives in 
Kadutu connected to the 
governor’s office   
Meeting in their 
office, near the 
central market of 
Kadutu, Bukavu.  
21.10.2014 
36. Asani 
Fungomukaba  
Chef d’Avenue 
Virunga/Nyamugo 
Meeting at 
Bukavu Forces-
vives office, 
Kadutu, Bukavu. 
21.10.2014 
37. Paul Jean-Marie 
Koabashi 
 
Head of administration 
(Chef de Bureau) at the 
Bourgmestre office 
(Commune de Kadutu)  
Meeting with both 
in Koabashi’s 
office in 
22.10.2014 
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38. Jean de Dieu 
Tchalumba 
Olomwene 
 
Environmental 
supervisor at the 
Bourgmestre office 
(Superviseur de 
l’enviornnement)  
Commune de 
Kadutu, Bukavu. 
39. Jean-Mari 
Kazunguzibwa 
Viancy 
Lecturer at L'Institut 
Supérieur Pédagogique 
de Bukavu (ISP) in 
political history of the 
Congo 
Meeting in his 
office at ISP, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
22.10.2014 
40. Douglas Dunia 
Mukome 
Bourgmestre in Ibanda Meeting in his 
office (Commune 
de Bukavu), 
Ibanda, Bukavu.  
24.10.2014 
41. Deo Katwanyi 
Kabika 
Head of a local NGO 
named Initiatives et 
Actions pour le 
developpement local 
(IADL) 
Meeting in his 
office, border 
zone 
Ibanda/Kadutu, 
Bukavu.  
28.10.2014 
42. Maneno Swedy Head of administration 
and finance at 
REGIDESO, (chef de 
Division administrative 
et financière)   
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu. 
16.09.2013 and  
28.10.2014 
43. Augustin 
Rukomeza 
Chahihobwa  
Head of the 
Environmental Office, 
(Chef du Bureau, Le 
Service de 
l'environnement et 
conservation de la 
nature) City Hall.  
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu. 
19.09.2013 and 
28.10.2014 
44. Mwami Desiré 
Rugemaninzi II 
Local king (mwami, Chef 
de chefferie) Kabare 
Meeting in his 
office, Kabare 
territory, South 
Kivu.  
29.10.2014 
45. Deo Kwasa Head of District (Chef du 
quartier), Nyalukemba, 
Ibanda 
Meeting in his 
office, Ibanda, 
Bukavu. 
30.10.2014 
46. Marcelin 
Ramazani 
Head of District (Chef du 
quartier), Kasali, Kadutu 
Meeting in his 
office, Kadutu, 
Bukavu. 
30.10.2014 
47. Women in Ibanda Focus group, conducted 
by research assistant 
Jonathan Magoma  
Bethel Church, 
Ibanda, Bukavu 
30.11.2014 
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